Seel No
P330

U.S. NAVY

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 AUGUST - 15 SEPTEMBER, 1944

AND

1 - 15 OCTOBER, 1944

PG Numbers 31863-31866

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

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Grid charts referred to may be found in the War Diary for 18 January to 30 June, 1943.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 AUGUST, 1944

PG/31863

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Kolguev North - Yugorski Strait - Kara Strait - Kostin Strait - Banak. 1 Ju 88 took off at 1001, overdue since 2000.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0315 to 1144, enemy not sighted. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Bardufos - AB 9595 - 5651 - 5477 - Vaernes from 0244 to 0929. Route exhaustively examined by radar, partly examined by visual reconnaissance, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Sighting reports from Russian signal stations:
Chirachi: on 31 July at 1431 1 minesweeper, course 100°.
Cape Kostin: on 31 July 1 minesweeper, course 115°.
Cape Stolbovoi: on 31 July at 1500 1 minesweeper, course 100°.
Pummanki area: 3 M.T.B.s.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "Gremyashchi", "Uritski", "B", "K", 3 minesweepers and 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea: 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: From Kirkenes on 31 July at 1219 British unit in 263°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444)
U 425 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles.
U 668 AB 6795)
U 394 AB 9189)

U 957 AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 278, 362, 365, 711, 997 Hammerfest,
U 307, 344, 354, 363, 636, 703, 739, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 995 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation northeast of Jan Mayen. When Battle Group's exercises have been concluded and the ships are again in port, the area east of 15° E will again be open for group "Trutz". Boats will be in their former formation.

2020 Radio message 2005/751 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats:

"Battle Group has put in to port. Limitations of operational area as given in radio message 0218/723 are canceled."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea. The ice situation at the southern approaches to the Kara Sea as observed by air reconnaissance has been passed on to "Schaar". The sighting reports in II (d) from Russian signal stations in the region of Pechora Sea were passed on to "Schaar" in radio message 1448/748 at 1613.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Battle Group's exercises have been concluded. (See under IV (b)).

D. Organizational:

0150 Teleprinter message Secret 3140 A/FS A Ops. received from C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 673 (Sauer), which up to now has been administratively under the command of 13th U-boat Flotilla, has put in to western France (St. Nazaire). The boat will remain in the west and is to be allocated to a western flotilla."

2350 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00132 A Ops. received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.

"Re Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 3870 A 1: U 293 (Klingspor) and U 771 (Block) will not be assigned to 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas. They are to remain with group Central."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

"After the loss of U 361 (Seidel) and U 742 (Schwassmann), only 29 U-boats remain under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.

p.p. Eckermann.

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2 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0402 to 0836, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

2 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes. Faeroes not exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area from 0321 to 1030. Route 60%, Jan Mayen 10% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: U 394 reported enemy submarine, see under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

On 1 August, for the first time 2 flying boats were intercepted on a flight from America to Russia, intermediate landing at Iceland. They were in communication with Archangel and Murmansk. Radio traffic: exceptionally lively and urgent traffic on the line between Britain/America and Archangel.
Iokanka area: destroyer "Uritski" and 4 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "J" and 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: Kirkenes: at 1123 on 1 August British unit in 304°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444)
U 425 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles.
U 668 AB 6795)
U 394 AB 9189)

U 957 AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 278, 362, 365, 711, 997 Hammerfest,
U 307, 344, 354, 363, 636, 703, 739, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1730 U 995 put in to Trondheim from Narvik. Passage via inner leads.
1015 U 307 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
1830 U 739 put out from Narvik - Ramsund for Hammerfest.
1000 U 278, 362 put out eastwards from Hammerfest for special operation.
1610 U 711 put out eastwards from Hammerfest for special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in attack areas west of Bear Island passage.

0237 Radio message 0114/753 received from U 394 (Borger):

"In AB 9187 a submarine (German silhouette) dived instead of replying to recognition signals."

It was thought to be "Eickstedt", which was lying northeast of "Borger". Nevertheless the possibility of enemy submarines must be taken into account.

0324 Radio message 0312/754 sent:

"Possibly an enemy submarine in the operational area. Take evasive action within the patrol line."

1835 Radio message 0813/765 from U 394 (Borger):

"In AB 9158 fired "Zaunkönig" torpedo at Norwegian submarine, type "Bruno", missed. Shortly before torpedo was fired, enemy apparently changed to electric motors."

3 boats are following "Schaar" on operations along the West Siberian Sea route:

1958 Radio message 1914/767 sent:

"1. U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz): proceed from Hammerfest to AF 88, U 711 (Lange) will follow.

2. "Schaar", "Lange", "Franze" and "Franz": form group "Greif".

3. Information for radio intercept groups aboard will be transmitted under name "Kent" and are of no use to others."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea.
U 711 (Lange) approaching with radio intercept group "Kentmann".
Sighting reports from Russian signal stations were passed on to "Schaar" and "Lange".
"Schaar" may by now have passed Cape Jelaniya.
As we have received no report from him, we presume that the entrance to Kara Sea is free of ice at this point.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1030 Teleprinter message Most Secret 3941 A Ops. 1 sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"1. U 711 (Lange): put out in accordance with Operational Order No. 16. Report time of sailing.

2. U 739 (Mangold) will put out on the afternoon of 2 August for Hammerfest, carrying 5 T5 torpedoes for "Wedemeyer". Both boats will put out as soon as equipped."

Sailing order for U 344 (Pietsch), see Appendix I.

Operational order for U 307 (Herrle), see Appendix II.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2030 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00222 A Ops. received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:

"Subject: Special operations by Naval Meteorological Service, 1944 - 45.

1. 3 special operations by the Naval Meteorological Service have been arranged for 1944 - 45. "Weissdorn" 29 July, "Haudegen" 10 August, "Goldschmied" 15 August, all from Germany. Time limit for leaving North Norway 2 - 3 weeks later, as ice situation permits. Escort by 1 U-boat in each case. For operation "Haudegen" transport of part of the cargo by the escorting boat will probably be necessary.

2. 3 boats should be held in readiness for this purpose and provided on request. Further

arrangements with Naval War Staff, Sixth Division as laid down by Naval War Staff, Second Division."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The transferred flying boats are said to be of type "Mariner" according to a radio intercept report. The U-boats were informed of this.

The striking radio traffic between Britain and Archangel should be noted."

Re IV (b):

"Of the 6 boats intended for Kara Sea, four are on their way. The other two will probably follow in a few days."

Re D:

"In accordance with past experience, U-boats for meteorological operations can only be detailed when it can be seen at what time the meteorological gear and ships will be ready for operations."

p.p. Eckermann.

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3 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0355 to 0857, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0258 to 1014, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0358 to 1100. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen not examined because of heavy clouds, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: on 2 August.2 M.T.B.s in radio communication at 2109.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku".
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 3 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444)
U 425 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep, 50 miles.
U 668 AB 6795)
U 394 AB 9189)

U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 365, 997 Hammerfest,
U 344, 354, 363, 636, 703, 956, 963, 968, 992, Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2130 U 307, 739 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
1300 U 344 put out from Narvik for AB 9189.
U 278, 362, 711 proceeding on special operation from Hammerfest to AF 88.
2000 U 425 returning to Hammerfest from AB 5967.
New position for U 668 AB 5967, for U 394 AB 6795.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in the region of Pechora Sea were passed on to "Kent" and group "Greif".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

p.p. Eckermann.

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4 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak, from 0358 to 0755, nothing to report. Not exhaustive owing to weather and measurements, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0340 to 1040. Route 75% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying fog, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Cape Greben: 2 freighters.
Cape Stolbovoi: minesweepers, 1 freighter.
Murmansk area: 1 minesweeper, 1 ice-breaker.
During the night of 3/4 August, 2 probable M.T.B.s.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and destroyer "Uritski".
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444)
U 668 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep
U 394 AB 6795) 50 miles.
U 344 AB 9189)

U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 307, 365, 739, 997 Hammerfest.
U 354, 363, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1520 U 363 put out from Narvik, at 2130 put in to Harstad.
1415 U 307 put out from Hammerfest via AB 3120 on special operation.
U 424 proceeding from AB 5967 to Hammerfest.
U 278, 362, 711 proceeding eastwards on special operation.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea. The sighting reports from Russian signal stations in the region of Pechora Sea were passed on to "Schaar".

2129 Radio message 2046/713 sent:

" "Herrle" is proceeding at 12 knots from Hammerfest to AB 3120 and will operate along

the west coast of Spitsbergen."

"Herrle" is executing special operation "Schneehuhn".

Most Secret 4003 A Ops. 1 sent:

"Transfer order for U 363 (Nees):

1. Put out from Narvik at 1500 on 4 August.

2. Proceed with pilot via Tjeldsund to Harstad.

3. Base wave "MC", 479 kc/s, to be used also in Harstad.

4. Boat is expected by Naval Harbor Master, Harstad at 2100 on 4 August.

5. 6 hours' readiness."

"Lange" and "Franz" met on their way to Kara Sea in order to transfer a printed document.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

p.p. Eckermann.

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5 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0802, nothing to report, not exhaustive, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0237 to 0957. Islands covered by mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0348 to 1012. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of cloud covering, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (28 aircraft).
Sighting reports from Russian signal stations:
Cape Greben: 1 minesweeper.
Krestovaya Bay: 2 minesweepers and 1 freighter.
Murmansk area: 2 minesweepers.
Iokanka area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski" and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings from Svanvik: British unit in 253° at 1300 on 4 August.
Russian radio traffic: increased transmissions from Belushya to Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444) in attack areas, depth
U 668 AB 5967) of sweep 50 miles.
U 344 AB 9189)

U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 997 Hammerfest,
U 363 Harstad,
U 354, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0117 U 394 left AB 6795, at 1630 put in to Hammerfest.
1130 U 363 put out from Harstad for AB 9189.
0300 U 365, 739 put out from Hammerfest to AF 88.
U 425 proceeding from AB 5967 to Hammerfest.
U 278, 362, 711 proceeding to AF 88.
U 307 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 3120.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage.

0200 Radio message 0117/718 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Am calling at Hammerfest to put ashore serious case of appendicitis. Shall be at "SR 1" at 1130 on 5 August. Putting out again immediately."

0417 Radio message 0313/719 sent:

"1. U 363 (Nees): put out from Harstad for attack area AB 9189, depth of sweep 50 miles, to join group "Trutz".

2. "Borger": return to Hammerfest.

3. "Pietsch" is occupying AB 5967."

2316 Radio message 2247/738 sent:

Group "Trutz":

"At 0800 on 6 August the following boats are to proceed: "de Buhr" to Andfjord - Narvik, "Werner" to Hammerfest, "Eickstedt" to AB 5369, "Pietsch" to 6444, "Noes" to 5967. Proceed submerged."

2231 Radio message 2207/737 sent:

""Wedemeyer" and "Mangold": join group "Greif"."

Group "Greif" will now be complete and consists of 6 boats.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on special operation "Schneehuhn".

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of Kara Sea.

(d) Miscellaneous:

2230 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4016 A Ops. sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"On the morning of 6 August, "Borger" will put out for AB 6795, "Lehmann" for AB 9189, depth of sweep 50 miles, economical speed. In the attack area, they will surface only for charging. If enemy defenses make it necessary, take evasive action up to 150 miles, course 067°."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (d):

"No short signal has yet been received from "Schaar" on the situation in Kara Sea. As he was ordered to remain unobserved, if possible, until the first encounter with the enemy, we do not expect a report from him until he has been on reconnaissance for several days."

p.p. Eckermann.

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6 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0352 to 0704, nothing to report, not exhaustive, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0330 to 1136. At 0615 in Thorshavn harbor, 1 merchant ship of 10,000 G.R.T. at anchor. Details not observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0354 to 1053. Route 30%, Jan Mayen area 20% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: 1 ice-breaker.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and destroyer "Uritski".
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings from Svanvik: British unit in 258° at 0834 on 5 August.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: Nono.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 347 AB 5369)
U 921 AB 6444) in attack areas, depth
U 668 AB 5967) of sweep 50 miles.
U 344 AB 6795)
U 363 AB 9189)

U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 394, 997 Hammerfest,
U 354, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0840 U 425 put in to Hammerfest from AB 5967.
1100 U 394 put out from Hammerfest to AB 6795.
1100 U 997 put out from Hammerfest to AB 9189.
0800 U 921 on return passage from AB 6444 to Hammerfest.
0800 U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 307 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 3120.
U 278, 362, 365, 739 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 88.
U 711 proceeding from Hammerfest to AS 20.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 6 boats approaching Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea were passed on to "Kent" and group "Greif". U 307 (Herrle) on special operation "Schneehuhn".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: None.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

p.p. Eckermann.

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7 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0125 to 1446, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0257 to 1015. Faeroes not examined because of mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0349 to 1039. Route and Jan Mayen area 20% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Report on destroyer formation off Barentsberg

from U 307 (Herrle), see under IV (c).

(b) By air reconnaissance; None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and 4 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: destroyer "Uritski" and 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444) in attack areas, depth of
U 363 AB 5967) sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 6795)

U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 307 AG 7590 on special operation.

In port:

U 425 Hammerfest,
U 354, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1230 U 921 put in to Hammerfest from AB 6444.
1100 U 425 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 278, 362, 365, 739 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 88.
U 394 proceeding from Hammerfest to AB 6795.
U 711 proceeding from Hammerfest to AS 20.
1515 U 394 proceeding to AB 5967, U 363 proceeding to AB 6795.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage.

1515 Radio message 1426/767 sent:

"1. "Borger" and "Lehmann": join group "Trutz".

2. The following boats will occupy attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: "Borger" AB 5967, "Nees" AB 6795, "Lehmann" AB 9189."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea were passed on to "Kent" and group "Greif".

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".

2112 Radio message 2051/770 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"Destroyer formation off Barentsberg."

Naval Chief Command, Norway, Luftflotte 5 and 1st Battle Group were informed by teleprinter. It was presumed that this was a supply formation for Barentsberg.

2348 Radio message 2339/775 sent:

"Herrle" from Captain U-boats:

"You are free to attack, provided special operation is not endangered."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1652 Teleprinter message Most Secret 10010 A 1 received from Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"1. Meteorological survey ship "Kehdingen", with Operational Order "Edelweiss" for Captain U-boats, Norway on board, is putting out from Kristiansand (South) on 7 August.

2. Meteorological survey ship "Busch" ("Haudegen") is putting out from Kristiansand (South) provisionally on 8 August. Operational Order for Captain U-boats sent by courier on 4 August.

3. Meteorological survey ship "Exerstein" ("Goldschmied") will arrive at Kristiansand (South) provisionally on 17 August."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (c):

An operation by boats of group "Trutz" on the reported destroyer formation has slight prospect of success in view of the long distance they would have to cover. The appearance of U-boats off Ice Fjord would also be certain to disturb operation "Schneehuhn" perhaps even endanger it. It is therefore left to "Herrle"'s judgment whether to carry out an attack. Unfortunately this boat is not equipped with T 5 torpedoes owing to deployment in fjords and shallow water.

p.p. Eckermann.

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8 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0828, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0351 to 1213, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0345 to 1010. Route 30% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of 10/10 cloud, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku".
Iokanka area: destroyer "B".
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles.
U 363 AB 6795)
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AF 88
U 362 AF 88

U 307 AG 75/78 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 921 Hammerfest,
U 354, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1400 U 921 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
1900 U 425 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 365, 739 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 88.
U 711 proceeding from Hammerfest to AS 20.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 2 boats in waiting position in AF 88.

2225 Radio message 2144/791 sent:

Groups "Trutz" and "Greif" from Captain U-boats:

"As radio communications between Command and the boats operating in the east are frequently interrupted, the nearer boats, especially group "Trutz", must act as radio links. All boats, therefore, while surfaced, should keep watch on wave "Ulli 3" from the sixth to the tenth minute of each hour. Special short signals for easterly boats consist only of 5 letters without any preamble. Repeat on most suitable wave."

This would make it more likely that the special short signals would reach group "Greif". At the same time ineffective radio transmissions by the boats in the east and hence the danger of the enemy obtaining a fix on them would be reduced to a minimum. Radio intercept reports on the traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea.
U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 394 (Borger), second operation, see Appendix III/1.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

p.p. Eckermann.

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9 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on metdorological reconnaissance, route

Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0410 to 0815, nothing to report. On the outward flight, including Bear Island, exhaustive examination.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0359 to 1217. At 0630 Thorshavn harbor was examined through gaps in the clouds: 1 merchant ship of 5,000 G.R.T. at anchor, otherwise enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0352 to 1036. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of low-lying 10/10 cloud, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "B" and 3 minesweepers..
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.
Bearings: at 1755 on 8 August Svanvik obtained a bearing of 252° on a British unit.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AF 88
U 362 AF 88
U 365 AF 88
U 739 AF 88

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2100 U 921 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 711 proceeding from Hammerfest to AS 20.
1438 Group "Greif" proceeding to new attack areas: U 278 to AT 85, U 362 to AT 82, U 365 to AT 64, U 739 to AT 67.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 4 boats in Kara Sea.

Radio intercept service reported a minesweeper at Cape Jelaniya, the area where the boats are at present.

0057 Radio message 0019/796 sent:

"Group "Greif" from Captain U-boats.
Patrol vessels are not, for the moment, to be regarded as worthwhile targets. If necessary, withdraw to remain unobserved."

As the boats were to remain unobserved and to refrain from reporting for as long as possible, only details on ice and traffic conditions in Pechora Sea had so far been received from the radio intercept service. It was therefore not intended to let the boats operate in a close formation, but rather independently in wide attack areas.

1438 Radio message 1403/705 sent:

"Group "Greif" from Captain U-boats:
Try to reach the following areas for reconnaissance and attacks on worthwhile targets: "Franze" AT 85, "Franz" AT 82, "Wedemeyer" AT 64, "Mangold" AT 67."

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance along the West Siberian Sea route to the east.
U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
No further reports on destroyer formation sighted on 7 August.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

On the subject of the execution of minelaying operations, Most Secret S.O.s only Serial No. 115 A Ops. was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff and for information Naval War Staff, First Division:

"Reference: Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret S.O.s only 331 of 24 July.
The execution of minelaying operations in Barents Sea in accordance with Group North/Fleet Most Secret 202/44 S.O.s only is planned as follows:

1. Operation "Butt" (I or I A) by U 956 (Mohs).

2. "Lachs" (II or II A) by U 968 (Westphalen).

3. "Hering" (III or V) by U 636 (Schendel).

4. "Sprotte" (VII or A VI) by U 992 (Falke).

5. "Forelle" (VIII or A III) by U 956 (Unverzagt).

6. "Dorsch" (IX or A VII) by U 425 (Bentzien).

12 TMC mines for each operation. The second operation in each case is to be regarded as an alternative for the first. Old minefields as mentioned in Naval Chief Command, Norway S.O.s only 1093 of 29 July have been borne in mind. Minelaying orders for Operational Order No. 16 will follow to the above addresses."

E. Organizational:

2145 Teleprinter message Most Secret 05173 received from Naval Chief Command, East, Operations Staff:

"Reference: Captain U-boats, Central Most Secret 01794 C of 7 August.
With effect from 1000 on 10 August, the office of Captain U-boats, Central is to be closed down until further notice. Division of command: general

operational command of the U-boats of group Central as before, through Naval War Staff, Second Division; direct command of individual operations, in place of Captain U-boats, Central, transferred to Naval Chief Command, East, Operations Staff, which has been extended by Operational Group AlU for this purpose. The Operation Group is under the command of Lt. (s.g.) Fenn. Captain's Secretary is Gunnery Lt. Utrecht."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

As we know from experience, any transmission by our boats in Kara Sea would be immediately intercepted by the Russians. The retention of traffic in port and the increase in air and sea patrols would drastically reduce the successes to be expected from a surprise attack. In the absence of information on the exact ice conditions, enemy defenses and traffic, the boats must be given a large measure of freedom in their operations.

p.p. Eckermann.

---

10 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0401 to 0830, nothing to report. Owing to measurements not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 187 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0325 to 1039. In Skaalesfjord 1 merchant ship of up to 8,000 G.R.T. At Thorshavn, 1 merchant ship of up to 6,000 G.R.T., otherwise enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0418 to 0588. Operation broken off in AF 5522 because of radio interference. Route 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity without recognizable point of concentration. (26 aircraft).
Murmansk area: submarine "L 20".
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyers "E", "J", 1 minelayer and 2 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278)
U 362)
U 365) Kara Sea.
U 739)
U 711 AS 20
U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
Group "Greif": U 278 proceeding from AF 88 to AT 85, U 362 from AF 88 to AT 82, U 365 from AF 88 to AT 64, U 739 from AF 88 to AT 67.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance in Kara Sea.
U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

p.p. Eckermann.

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11 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0355 to 0743, nothing to report. Not exhaustive because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0355 to 1132. North Faeroes not examined. At 0950 in AE 9573 2 Swedish ships, names not made out, course east, speed 10 knots.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan

Mayen from 0414 to 1040. Route 80% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of 10/10 cloud cover, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0050 on 11 August a radio message of first priority from Dikson via Archangel to all naval forces.
Submarines "S 16" and "S 19" received several radio messages from Archangel and Belushya, partly in conjunction with flotilla leader "Baku".
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyers "Gromyashchi", "J", and 1 minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minelayer and 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings from Svanvik: British unit between 2019 on 10 August and 0028 on 11 August in 254°.
Russian radio traffic: a few radio transmissions of very high and first priority from Dikson to Belushya.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles.
U 363 AB 6795)
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278)
U 362)
U 365) on passage to Kara Sea.
U 739)
U 711 AS 20
U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 347 on return passage from AB 5369 to Andfjord - Narvik.
Group "Greif": U 278 proceeding from AF 88 to AT 85, U 362 from AF 88 to AT 82, U 365 from AF 88 to AT 64, U 739 from AF 88 to AT 67.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.
Reports from radio intercept service on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were transmitted to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The urgent traffic from Dikson might mean that one of the U-boats of group "Greif" has been observed by the enemy in the Kara Sea area. As the boats have so far sent no radio messages, it could only have been sighted. However, in such a case we would expect a report from the boat concerned."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0503 to 0905, nothing to report, exhaustive on both outward and return flights. Bear Island examined.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0400 to 1050. With 50 km. visibility the fjords were examined while flying past, not occupied.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0427 to 1131. Route 70% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because of ground fog, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: 3 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyers "Gremyashchi", "U", "J", 4 minesweepers and 2 minelayers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 3 minesweepers.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 344 AB 6444) in attack areas, depth
U 394 AB 5967) of sweep 50 miles.
U 363 AB 6795)
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 67)
U 711 AS 20)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2300 U 668 proceeding to AB 11.
1600 U 344 proceeding to new attack area AB 5495.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

1129 Radio message 1046/761 sent:

"Schaar", "Lange" from Captain U-boats. "Attempt meeting in AS 2125, or on corresponding longitude in case of ice hindrance, at 0700 or 1900 on one of the next few days. Arrange for further meetings there."

These meetings were for the purpose of exchanging experiences and reports of the radio intercept service.

1159 Radio message 1051/762 sent:

"1. Eickstedt": proceed to AB 11 to report ice limit to the south as far as 74° N by short signals, giving the last three square numbers on frequency "Anton I" or "Anton II". Report approximately every 50 miles. Then return to former attack area.

2. "Pietsch": occupy new attack area AB 5495, depth of sweep 50 miles.

3. Both boats should report position on departure on frequency "Ulli". Increased speed."

Naval Chief Command's request for ice reconnaissance for operation "Edelweiss" was to be met in this way. Reconnaissance by the German Air Force was still doubtful on account of the fuel situation.

1553 Short signal 1529/768 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"My position is AB 5658 - 1600."

2323 Short signal 2310/778 received from U 668 (Eickstedt):

"AB 5397."

Thus both boats had reported their positions and times of departure.

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1200 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4080 A Ops. 1 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:

"U 347 (de Buhr) is missing. Boat put out from Narvik on 3 July, 1700. Joined patrol line, group "Trutz". Did not report during the whole operation. Last seen in AB 7865 by U 921 (Werner) on 10 July. No further information. Surprise submarine or aircraft attack presumed. The boat did not report after the order to put in to Andfjord on 5 August and has so far not complied with it. There had been no earlier order to report. Also failed to respond to renewed request on 9 August."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

0950 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4078 A Ops. sent to Naval Chief Command, Norway Operations Staff:

"Ice reconnaissance by U-boat arranged for "Edelweiss". Request details of desired area immediately."

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Naval Chief Command confirmed by telephone their agreement to reconnaissance by "Eickstedt".

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"With the departure of U 668, the attack area of U 334 has been advanced westwards. This will at the same time cover the route to Spitsbergen more effectively. We must expect supplies for Barentsberg after U 307's recent report of destroyers off Ice Fjord."

p.p. Eckermann.

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13 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Nautsi from 0400 to 0850. Because of weather not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0338 to 1240. Syderö examined, no occupation observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0426 to 1107. Route 40%, Jan Mayen area 30% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (25 aircraft). Reconnaissance to northwest identified. At 1255 radio message of first

priority from Dikson via Archangel to all naval forces.
Murmansk area: 1 ice-breaker.
Iokanka area: 3 minesweepers..
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Uritski", submarine "S 19", 1 minesweeper and 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper and 1 minelayer.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5495)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 67)
U 711 AS 20)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 668 AB 2648 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".

0735 Radio message 0618/781 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"Longyearby operation successful. No Americans. Airfield unserviceable. Norwegian anti-aircraft defense units."

This report was passed on to G.I.S. station Oslo.
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
U 668 (Eickstedt) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

2216 Radio message 2203/790 sent:

"Eickstedt" from Captain U-boats.
"Report ice limit only on return passage after crossing 10° E to the east, or when ordered."

By this measure it was intended to avoid drawing the enemy's attention to the actual area, even if they obtained a bearing on the ice reports, thus preventing them from carrying out a reconnaissance to discover the planned operation. Owing to engine trouble in the meteorological vessel, operation "Edelweiss" had in any case to be postponed for a few days.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 921 (Werner), first operation,
Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), fourth operation, see Appendix III/2,3.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"It now appears that one of our boats in Kara Sea has been observed. Therefore we must expect increased countermeasures. Probably more flying boats ("Catalinas", and perhaps the newly transferred "Mariners") will be put on patrol of the West Siberian Sea route."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0358 to 0746, nothing to report. On outward flight exhaustive examination; on return flight no examination because of measurements above the clouds.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No reports.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0447 to 1128. Route 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively aircraft activity (26 aircraft).
At 1150 and 1943 on 13 August, radio message of first priority from Dikson to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku" and 2 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 3 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5495)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of
U 363 AB 6795) sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in the attack area.
U 739 AT 67)
U 711 AS 20)

U 307 AG on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 668 AB 1525 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
U 668 (Eickstedt) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The radio traffic from Dikson strengthens the suspicion that our U-boats have been observed in that area. They have been informed of this and will now have to operate extensively on their own initiative insofar as existing traffic and enemy defenses allow."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on shipping and meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - Banak from 0403 to 1035, nothing to report, because of weather not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0342 to 1003. Faeroes covered by mist. At 0935 3 Swedish ships in AF 2860, course north.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0434 to 0855. At 0700 operation broken off in AF 1285. Route 50% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", 3 minesweepers and 1 motor minesweeper
Khabarova area: 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5495)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 67)
U 711 AS 20)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 668 AB 11 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 968, 965, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 5 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
U 668 (Eickstedt) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"As we have still received no reports from Kara Sea, the boats seem to have avoided attacking or being attacked for the present. However, at least the radio intercept group might by now have sent a report."

p.p. Eckermann.

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APPENDIX I.

COPY

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 344 (Pietsch).

1. Put out from Narvik on the forenoon of 3 August.

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AB 9189. Compulsory pilotage from Lödingen to Harstad. Submarine and aircraft danger off Andfjord.

3. Operational Order No. 15, Northern Waters frequency.

4. Russia-bound convoys are still to be expected. The appearance of carrier groups in Northern Waters for attacks on our bases and escorts is always possible. Operations against convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Orders Nos. 8 and 10. Last carrier group from 17 to 18 July.

5. Own forces: 5 U-boats as group "Trutz" in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: U 347 (de Buhr), AB 5369 - 3944, U 921 (Werner) AB 6444 - 6355, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 5967 - 6645, U 668 (Eickstedt) AB 6795 - AC 4473, U 394 (Borger) AB 9189 - AC 4774. The boats are ordered to remain in the western areas and to take evasive action in the direction of the given line according to the air situation. U 957 (Schaar), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 711 (Lange) on special operation in the east.

p.p. Roche.

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APPENDIX II

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
3857 - A Ops.

On board, 26 July, 1944.

Operational Order for U 307 (Herrle).

I. Task: Transportation and landing of scout unit "Schneehuhn" on Spitsbergen, support for the operation and return of unit.

II. Enemy situation:

1. Spitsbergen:

(a) According to air reconnaissance on 12 July, Hornsund and Bellsund are free of the enemy. The radio station at Sveagruva may be manned. Expect armed motor vessels.

(b) Ice Fjord is occupied by about 2 companies of Norwegian and British soldiers. Barentsberg (Grönfjord) and particularly Longyearby (Advent Bay) are defended by gun posts, light anti-aircraft guns and medium artillery. No defenses recognized at Cape Linné.

(c) The areas north of Ice Fjord are not likely to be permanently occupied, but occasional reconnaissance expeditions are made from Barentsberg.

2. At the moment convoys bound for Russia are scarcely to be expected, but carrier groups may appear at any time. Date of last convoy 16 to 17 July, attack on Altafjord ("Tirpitz").

3. German Air Force: From 17 to 22 July strong forces of "Liberators", "Catalinas" and "Sunderlands" flew anti-submarine patrols as far as 15° E. Flying boats were also occasionally observed off Ice Fjord. It is quite possible that Advent Bay is a base for seaplanes. There is also an auxiliary airfield for land planes at Cape Linné.

III. Own forces:

(a) U-boats: Group "Trutz" with 5 boats in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: U 347 (de Buhr) AB 5369, U 921 (Werner) AB 6444, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 5967, U 668 (Eickstedt), U 394 (Borger) AB 9189. Boats will take evasive action as far as Bear Island in the event of strong enemy air patrols.

Special operations: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange) in easterly areas.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights Banak - Bear Island - 75° N, 5° E (or Hope Island) - Banak. Continuation of flights to Spitsbergen, and other reconnaissance will be announced.

IV. Execution:

1. Transfer to Narvik - Ramsund by noon on 31 July. Radio frequency "MC", Northern Waters very long wave.

2. Take on scout unit (10 Norwegian S.S. men in German uniforms) at Ramsund roads from U 703 (Brunner) on passage from Trondheim.

3. Then proceed via inner leads to Hammerfest, from Lödingen to Tromsö with pilot, from Tromsö escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Scout unit to remain below deck as far as "SR 1", must not be observed by pilot, escort or from the shore. Crew to remain aboard and to be kept in ignorance of the purpose of the operation.

4. Put out from Hammerfest as soon as the scout unit leader, Lt. Köhl is on board. Proceed at increased speed (12 knots) via AB 3120 to Bellsund. Remain unobserved at all costs.

5. Cautious approach of coast. It is decisive for the success of the operation that the U-boat is not discovered by aircraft, ships or land stations during the entire period.

6. Reconnaissance of the landing place and landing in co-operation with scout unit leader. Equipment of unit with suitable provisions, and despatch of an armed auxiliary unit, which should carry the first supplies to the main supply camp. (To be led by an officer.)

7. Reconnoiter and agree on evacuation points as well as on definite days and times, at which the U-boat will look out for the unit and be ready to pick it up in case it should be pursued by the enemy. Arrangement of recognition signal.

8. The unit is expected to stay ashore for 3 weeks. During this time, keep watch on the unit's radio frequency, decode their reports and re-transmit on Northern Waters frequency at an adequate distance from the coast. At other times lie camouflaged off the coast or at sea, economical speed.

9. Evacuation according to the agreement or as soon as

position demands it. In emergency, give support with boat's armament. Then return to Andfjord - Narvik, economical speed. Report passing of 76° N by time short signal.

10. Operational Order No. 15 in force. Operations against enemy forces or convoys only in case of special order.

V. Communications arrangements:

U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Maintain radio silence until the successful completion of the landing unless you are attacked. Copy of code "Schneehuhn" must remain on board for receiving reports.

VI. Equipment:

1. 8 T 3 F.A.T. II torpedoes. Landing rubber dinghy with outboard motor. Camouflage net which must be brought back.

2. For auxiliary unit: mountaineering boots, field water-bottles, first aid kit, signaling flags, signaling pistols, hand grenades and weapons.

3. Sea charts: 978, Norwegian 509. Outlines in appendix.

VII. This Operational Order is to be destroyed on returning; the crew should be specially instructed about the need for secrecy even after the conclusion of the operation. Report thereon to Captain U-boats.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX III.

Most Secret

Short Reports.

1. Short report from U 394 (Borger), second operation, (first part).

2. Short report from U 921 (Werner), first operation.

3. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), fourth operation.

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APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 394 (Borger), second operation (first part).

27 July 1944	Put out from Harstad.
5 August	Put in to Hammerfest with critically ill man.
28 July - 2 August	Attack area AB 9189.
3 August	AC 4774.
4 August	AB 6795.
2 August	At 0115 in AB 9187 sighted Norwegian submarine, type "BBB": withdrew 20 miles to the north, submerged and proceeded another 4 miles eastward. At 0800 loud Diesel noise, previously for an hour on the same bearing noise of porpoises. Enemy passed at a distance of 100 meters, might have seen our periscope. Fired "Zaunkönig" torpedo, U-boat's bearing 175°, range 1,000 meters: up to time of firing, high speed; after firing torpedo, enemy could no longer be heard; enemy speed still 8 - 10 knots. After 11 minutes 52 seconds, explosion. No effect on target. Then enemy submerged, lost in hydrophone pursuit.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Operation abandoned near base because of critically ill

man. Up to then operation of no special interest.

2. On 2 August unexplained miss. Type of enemy submarine seems doubtful.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4024 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 921 (Werner) first operation.

2 July 1944	Put out from Narvik.
7 August	Put in to Hammerfest.
9 August	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via AB 88 to attack area AF 2134.
4 July - 6 August.	Attack area and patrol line, group "Trutz".
5 July	At 1545 in AF 2119 "Fliege" location, continuous location transmission, signal strength 1 - 2, snaked the line. Did not submerge, no sighting.
7 July	At 2116 in AB 7956, flying boat in periscope, range 1,000 meters, type not identified because of fog.
13 July	At 1337 in AF 1316 aircraft, range 10 km., course 145°, no location. Remained unobserved on surface.
17 July	At 0912 in AB 7915 continuous location transmission on "Fliege", strength 1, increasing, submerged.
19 July	At 0250 in AB 8835 short location transmission on "Fliege", strength 2 - 3, snaked the line.
	At 0425 in AB 8818 aircraft, type not

recognized, range 4,000 meters, no location, snaked the line.
At 0550 in AB 8826 aircraft, flying boat, type not identified, range 8,000 meters, no location, snaked the line.
At 0651 in AB 8834 aircraft, large flying boat, type not identified, range 7,000 meters, continuous location transmission on "Fliege", strength 2 - 3, submerged.
At 0924 in AB 8836 aircraft, flying boat, type not identified, range 6,000 meters, no location.
At 1934 in AB 8568 short location transmission, strength 3, on "Fliege", submerged.

20 July — At 0052 in AB 8536 short location transmission, strength 3 - 4, on "Fliege", submerged.
At 0432 in AB 8375 short location transmission, strength 2 - 3, on "Fliege", submerged.
AT 0931 in AB 8346 short location transmission, strength 4 - 5, on "Fliege", snaked the line.
At 0955 in AB 8346 aircraft. Attack by "Liberator", range 4,000 meters. Location up to overhead run.
First attack: 3 depth charges, 1 smoke float, armament firing, altitude 80 meters, 3.7 cm. gun semi-automatically clear. Second attack: no location, 2 depth charges, armament fire, altitude 40 meters. Then aircraft circled round boat in AB 8349 until 1048, always making for smoke float. 3.7 cm. gun proved effective. Small-scale damage, 1 man wounded. With 3.7 cm. gun, kept aircraft at a distance of 4,000 meters. When flying off, aircraft dropped 2 smoke floats. Submerged.
At 1755 in AB 8346 sighted "Liberator" at periscope level, range 2,000 meters. Large oil patch resulting from hole in external fuel tank.
At 2209 in AB 8342 aircraft sighted on surfacing, range 7,000 meters, type not identified, submerged.

21 July — At 0925 in AB 8333 short location transmission, on "Fliege", strength 2 - 3, submerged.

22 July — At 1306 in AB 8361 short location transmission, on "Fliege", strength 3, submerged.
At 1425 in AB 8337 short location transmission, on "Fliege", strength 3, submerged.

29 July — At 0909 in AB 5656 flying boat, type not identified, range 10 km., no location, submerged.

Experiences:

1. Metal of 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft gun very soft, hence jamming.

2. "Elektra-Sonne 17" very accurate even over land.

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Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Well-executed operation, no chance of success. Although snaking the line is often effective in faint locations, avoid unnecessary period on the surface. Signal strength is no clue as to distance, in case of the only attack there were still 20 minutes in which to submerge. Defense well-conducted."

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4103 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Immediate. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), fourth operation.

18 July 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
6 August	Put in to Hammerfest.
18 July	Proceeded to AB 9120, group "Trutz".
19 July	Proceeded to AB 9420.
20 July	At 1202 2 aircraft in AB 9433, course 270° and 090°, one of them probably a "Liberator". At 1602 "Liberator" course 270°, AB 9426. At 1722 7 distant depth charges.
21 July	Attack area AB 6794. Proceeded submerged as ordered.
23 July	Short location transmissions several times on "Naxos" during charging procedure. No run-in, submerged.
26 July	AB 5967. No further enemy sightings.
3 August	Return passage.

Drifting mines: 21 July AB 9153, 23 July AB 6761, 2 August AB 5995, 4 August AB 6865, British origin. (Type?).

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

"No possibility for this experienced boat to score any successes."

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4104 - A Ops.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

16 - 31 AUGUST, 1944

PG/31864

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16 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0355 - 0711, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0417 to 1145. Because of weather not examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0438 to 1132. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: 5 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", 2 minelayers and 1 minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
"Kentmann" reports: in the Dikson area destroyers "Baku", "Uritski", 4 fast submarine chasers, 1 minelayer, 20 escort vessels and some 20 merchant ships intercepted in traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5495)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of
U 363 AB 6795) sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":
U 278 AT 85)
U 365 AT 64)
U 739 AT 67) in attack area.
U 362 AT 82)
U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 668 AB 11 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0017 U 711 commenced return passage from AS 20 to Hammerfest.

1516 Group "Trutz": U 344 proceeding to AB 4770, U 997 to AF 2190.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 4 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. 1 boat on return passage.

1516 Radio message 1417/718 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats:

"1. At 0430 on 17 August, 1 FW 200 will take off from Trondheim for ice reconnaissance in AA 60.

2. Proceed immediately as safety service vessels: "Pietsch" to AB 4770, "Lehmann" to AF 2190. Increased speed."

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
U 668 (Eickstedt) on ice reconnaissance north of Jan Mayen.

0515 Radio message 0017/705 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Attack periscope out of order as result of ice damage. Started to return to Hammerfest

to transfer a radio intercept transmitter with "Schwabenland" receiver to "Schaar" for aircraft radio observation. Request necessary replacement and periscope in Hammerfest by 20 August. "Schaar" has refuelled."

"Kentmann" reported that, according to the radio intercept service, our boats have been observed in Kara Sea.
This strengthened our previous supposition.

0546 Radio message 0119/707 received from U 957 (Schaar) via U 711 (Lange):

" "Schaar" reports Kara Strait impassable. Favorable waiting position off Yugorski Strait, 69° 56' N, 61° E. Presume minefield eastwards from Beli. Second minefield from radio mast to Beli."

1145 Radio message 1145/714 sent:

"Greif" from Captain U-boats. Subject: message No. 707:

"The minefields detected by "Schaar" lie at the eastern entrance to Yugorski Strait off Beli Huk."

2126 Radio message 1940/612 received from U 668 (Eickstedt):

"Limit: from AA 3311 via 512 to 153. En route no aircraft or locations."

Thus the commander reported the ice limit as observed and simultaneously that he had gone beyond 10° E on his return passage.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1128 Radio message 1055/711 sent:

" "Lange" from Captain U-boats:
Confirm by short signal that your main periscope is out of order and that Hammerfest is suitable for vital repairs. It is intended that you put out again immediately. Replacement requested for radio intercept transmitter."

1152 Short signal 1152/712 received from U 711 (Lange):

"My position is AF 8775."

Boat reported Hammerfest suitable for periscope repairs.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1800 Teleprinter message Most Secret 10386 A 1 received from Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff:

"1. Obtain ice report from "Eickstedt" as soon as possible. Evaluation of it is to be made by 19 August.

2. "Edelweiss" will put out after the codeword is received. Order sailing according to the local situation. It is most important that the sailing be unobserved. Transmit place and time of leaving inner leads.

3. Inform boats of group "Trutz" of the exact times, courses and character of the codeword operation, and, if necessary, forbid attacks."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (c):

"Up to now no boat from Kara Sea has reported an attack or success. It is all the more striking that for days Russian radio traffic from Dikson, Belushya and Archangel has given further indications for the assumption that our boats have been observed there. We must therefore presume that radio conditions are so unfavorable that various reports from the boats have not come through. From the traffic continually observed in Yugorski Strait the 4 boats to the east of the Strait must have had opportunities to attack."

p.p. Eckermann.

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17 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 BF 109 on shipping and coastal reconnaissance, route Petsamo - Motka Bay - Cape Kora - Belni - North exit - Liza Port - Vladimir - Ura Bay - Petsamo, no shipping observed.

2 BF 109 on shipping and coastal reconnaissance of the north and west sides of Fisher Peninsula. Partially executed, no shipping observed north of Fisher Peninsula.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0440 to 1255, enemy not sighted. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0435 to 1057. Route and eastern part of Jan Mayen 50% examined, enemy not sighted. 1 FW 200 on ice reconnaissance, route Vaernes - Jan Mayen - Koldewey South Point - AH 8848 - AA 3472 - Jan Mayen - Vaernes from 0428 to 1847, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (27 aircraft). Reconnaissance of northern North Sea.
At 0750 and 1232 radio message from Dikson, at 1424 message from Archangel.
At 1508 Polyarno sent a codeword of first priority to all naval forces.
At 1205 a radio message of first priority from Belushya to Dikson. At 1525 and 1534 Polyarno sent a codeword of very high priority to destroyers "K" and "Gremyashchi". Lively radio transmissions to submarines in the operational area off the Norwegian coast.
"L 15" intercepted transmitting.
Iokanka area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "E".
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 guardships, 2 minesweepers and 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 668 AB 5369)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in the attack area.
U 739 AT 67)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.
U 344 AB 4770 on special operation.
U 997 AF 2190 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737, 995 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2020 U 995 put out from Trondheim to proceed by inner leads to Narvik.
U 711 on return passage from AS 20 to Hammerfest

2330 Group "Trutz": U 344 proceeding to new attack area AB 5464, U 668 to AB 5645, U 997 to AB 9189, all depth of sweep 50 miles.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 4 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".
After the report that the ice reconnaissance plane had landed, both safety service vessels could return to the formation of group "Trutz".

2319 Radio message 2303/739 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

"1. Plane landed. "Pietsch" and "Lehmann" turn about.

2. "Lehmann": report position.

3. New attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: "Pietsch" AB 5464, "Eickstedt" 5645,

"Borger" 5967, "Nees" 6795, "Lehmann" 9189."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
U 344 (Pietsch) and U 997 (Lehmann) acting as safety service vessels for an ice reconnaissance flight.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The urgent radio traffic from Dikson gives further indication of the activity of our U-boats in Kara Sea."

p.p. Eckermann.

---

18 August, 1944

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0358 to 0728. Route examined as far as Bear Island, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0356 to 1255. Faeroes covered by mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0432 to 1142. Route 70%, Jan Mayen area 30% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: eastbound convoy in AT 6434, see under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 0226 on 18 August, radio message of first priority from Belushya to Dikson, passed on by Dikson at 0519 to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku" and destroyer "J".
Iokanka area: 2 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 4 guardboats.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 4766 on passage.)
U 668 AB 5645)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas,
U 363 AB 6795) depth of sweep
U 997 AB 8888 on passage.) 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 67)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 995 proceeding by inner leads from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 711 on return passage from AS 20 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 4 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

0229 Radio message 0012/743 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"On 12 August in AT 6434 sank eastbound steamer "Chapaev" and 2 escort vessels. 1 escort vessel escaped. 2 T 5 torpedoes left, one of which cannot be fired from stern. Returning. Inexperienced aircraft and patrols, otherwise no sightings. Up to now have been unable to transmit. No ice, am in AT 6173."

It was assumed that the boat had been trying in vain to report since 12 August. This also explained how our U-boats were observed in Kara Sea. It was not clear from the report whether all other torpedoes had been fired, necessitating return. Therefore,

1014 radio message 0944/750 was sent:

" "Wedemeyer" from Captain U-boats. Presume that, apart from 2 T 5 torpedoes, all other torpedoes have been fired: confirm "Yes", by short signal. Return only if this is the case, otherwise occupy former attack area."

0312 Short signal 0312/744 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"My position is AF 2247."

Thus "Lehmann" reported that he was again with group "Trutz" as ordered. The enemy should be misled as to our formation by this transmission from a southerly direction.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schnoehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
For the execution of operation "Edelweiss" by coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen) and U 703 (Brünner), Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff Most Secret 1118 A 1 S.O.s only was received:

"Sonnenblume via AB 28 to AA 3720, from there on northwesterly course."

That was the sailing order which would most quickly make use of the particularly favorable ice position discovered by air reconnaissance east of Greenland. U 703 was also to take out 2 weather buoys to be tested before use. Meanwhile coastguard ship No. 6 was to move to Tromsö to clarify operational questions with Admiral Polar Coast and the Naval Communications Officer there.

(d) Miscellaneous:

In communication Most Secret 7190 A Ops. 1 transfer order for U 965 (Unverzagt) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1400 on 19 August.

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund to Tromsö, with pilot from Lödingen and after replenishing, proceed in accordance with Operational Order No. 16, escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit.

3. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Report time of sailing from Tromsö punctually to 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit.

4. From Harstad radio frequency "Anton I" under Series No. 600, Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes:

Radio message from U 365 (Wedemeyer), see under IV (b): 1 steamer and 2 escort vessels sunk.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Mining and Barrage Command Tromsö reported that the submarine mines destined for Pechora Sea would be ready from 19 August. 1 boat could be loaded there daily. U 965 will be the first of the 6 boats to arrive there for loading on 20 August. The others will follow daily and then wait in Hammerfest for a combined operation.

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"The bad radio conditions in the east leave Command still doubtful as to the situation of group "Greif" in Kara Sea, since it is not obvious from reports by "Lange" and "Wedemeyer". At any rate we must expect surprises from that area."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0357 to 0837, nothing to report, not exhaustive because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 and 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0445 to 1244. Faeroes examined between Syderö and Sandöy, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

No reports.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (31 aircraft).
On the evening of 18 August radio transmissions of first priority from Iokanka and Polyarno to all ships at sea, from Dikson and Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters, between Dikson and Polyarno and from Belushya to Dikson.
Pummanki area: from 0100 to 0245 on 19 August 15 M.T.B.s.
Iokanka area: 4 guardships and 2 minesweepers.
Dikson area: 1 minesweeper and 1 guardboat.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings from Svanvik: from 2202 to 2229 on 18 August British unit in 254° - 257°.
Russian radio traffic: considerable to lively.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5464)
U 668 AB 5645)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles.
U 363 AB 6795)
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82)
U 365 AT 64) in the attack area.
U 739 AT 67)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 965, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1400 U 965 put out from Narvik, at 2015 put in to Harstad and at 2210 put out from Harstad for Tromsö.

1900 U 995 put in to Narvik from Trondheim by inner leads.

2145 U 711 put in to Hammerfest from AS 20.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 4 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

2400 Radio message 2346/764 sent:

" "Wedemeyer" from Captain U-boats.
Short signal "Yes" of 18 August passed on by "Lange"."

The boat had accordingly been returning since 18 August and had fired all torpedoes except the 2 T 5 torpedoes.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".

CONFIDENTIAL

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

0408 Radio message 2257/98 received from the "Tirpitz":

"From 20 August 1944, the "Tirpitz" will be unfit for operations while the final repairs are carried out on the skin plating, Section II/2 starboard."

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d) and IV (b):

"The urgent radio traffic from Dikson and Belushya continues. After our experience with "Wedemeyer", we can expect hardly any reports from our boats in Kara Sea to get through. Group "Greif" is perhaps having successes; at any rate the boats should have wide contact with the increasing forces of the Russian air and sea patrols but no reports can be sent in to Command. The boats must therefore operate extensively on their own initiative."

p.p. Eckermann.

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20 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0458 to 0755, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, in the area west of the Faeroes from 0447 to 1310, no shipping identified at Syderö.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0458 to 1158. Route 70%, Jan Mayen area 30% examined.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: Aircraft report by U 344 (Pietsch), see under IV (b).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0800 in AB 7857 1 cruiser of 8,000 G.R.T., 3 destroyers and 2 corvettes in all-round screen, course 360°, speed 20 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 2230 on 19 August, radio message of first priority from Dikson to all via Iokanka.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski", 3 guardships, 1 minesweeper and 2 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 8 minesweepers and 1 guardboat.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5464)
U 668 AB 5645)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth of
U 363 AB 6795) sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 82) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 67)

U 307 AG 75 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 711 Hammerfest,
U 354, 425, 636, 703, 921, 956, 968, 992, 995 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1335 U 965 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.

2000 U 425 put out from Narvik for Harstad.
2100 U 968 put out from Narvik for Tromsö.
2215 U 703 put out from Narvik for Tromsö.
U 365 on return passage from AT 64 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

5 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

2236 Radio message 2221/782 sent:

"1. "Franz": thrust ahead to AT 54, if prospects in AT 82 are slight.

2. "Mangold": attack area AT 64."

After "Wedemeyer" had left, both boats were ordered to more favorable positions.

1030 By telephone, Flieger Fuehrer 5 gave an enemy report from the meteorological plane; this was at once passed on to the boats.

1113 Radio message 1025/768 sent:

"Group "Trutz", "Herrle" from Captain U-boats. Meteorological plane reported a cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 corvettes, course north speed 20 knots in AB 7857 at 0820."

1300 Telephone call received from Flieger Fuehrer 5:

"Sighted formation: ahead 2 corvettes, then 1 cruiser with lattice tower of about 8,000 tons, astern 2 destroyers, finally another destroyer, visibility 50 km., long wake, course north, 20 knots."

Disposition rather indicates previous southerly course: long wake contradicts the idea of a deceptive course. Number of funnels not discovered. Presume they are further supplies for Spitsbergen or that cruisers are being transferred to Russia.

1757 Short signal 1757/778 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"Carrier-borne plane. My position is AB 5480."

This seems to confirm the northerly course.

1858 Radio message 1841/779 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Presume search group in AB 78. For 3 days there have been irregular series of explosions far to the southwest (very inaccurate). Am in 5935, proceeding to 72. Wind west, force 5, atmosphere 1012 millibars, rising."

1933 Radio message 1911/780 sent:

"Herrle", group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

"1. Cruiser formation reported in AB 7850 is possibly steering for Spitsbergen or escorting a carrier.

2. "Herrle": inform "Schneehuhn"."

As it was not certain from "Borger"'s report whether the boat was operating against the formation,

2101 radio message 2041/781 was sent:

"Intentions and course of reported cruiser uncertain. Group "Trutz" not to operate on it. Boats sighted on the surface, located or intercepted by D/F will be by-passed and attacked by aircraft."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schneehuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

0520 Radio message 0137/766 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"Barentsberg unoccupied. Anti-aircraft guns at Herodden. Anti-aircraft site at Revneset destroyed by assault detachment."

The report was forwarded to G.I.S. station Oslo. U 703 (Brünner) proceeded to Tromsö with a meteorological buoy for operation "Edelweiss".

1136 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 10532 A 1 received, according to which the sailing of "Edelweiss" was temporarily postponed because of the reported cruiser formation.

(d) Miscellaneous:

In Most Secret 4214 A Ops. 1, transfer order

for U 968 (Westphalen) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik on the evening of 20 August.

2. Proceed to Tromsö with pilot from Lödingen. Make fast early on 21 August at Mining and Barrage Command, Tromsö.

3. As far as Harstad frequency "MC", then "Anton I" under Series No. 600, Northern Waters very long wave.

4. After taking in supplies, put out from Tromsö for Hammerfest in accordance with Operational Order No. 16 escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit.

5. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit: time of sailing must however be sent by the commander to 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Report time of sailing to Captain U-boats."

1135 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4217 A Ops. 1 sent to 13th U-boat Flotilla:

"Transfer order for U 312 (Nikolay):

1. Put out from Trondheim for Narvik on the afternoon of 21 August.

2. Proceed via Frohavet and onwards at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 14, make for Westfjord.

3. Report probable time of arrival at approach point and also the passing of "V 1" by time short signal.

4. Radio frequency "Anton II", Northern Waters very long wave."

In Most Secret 4218 A Ops. 1, transfer order for U 992 (Falke) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik on the evening of 21 August.

2. From Lödingen to Tromsö with pilot. Make fast early on 22 August at Mining and Barrage Command, Tromsö.

3. After taking in supplies, proceed further to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit in accordance with Operational Order No. 16.

4. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Time of sailing must be orally passed on to 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit by the commander. (From Tromsö time of sailing to Captain U-boats.)

5. Radio frequency as far as Harstad "MC", from Harstad "Anton I" under Series No. 600, Northern Waters very long wave."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"Course and destination of the sighted cruiser formation are too uncertain and the speed too high for the boats to operate against it. After the appearance of carrier-borne planes, the boats might indeed become chance casualties, if they were to display themselves to enemy reconnaissance by proceeding at high speed on the surface. As long as no convoy is identified, the boats of group "Trutz" will therefore remain unobserved as far as possible in their attack areas."

p.p. Eckermann.

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21 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0723, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, in the area west of the Faeroes from 0416 to 1221. At 0900 in 26 W 3110 (AM 1231) 1 merchant ship of 10,000 G.R.T., course 140°. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0502 to 1030. Mission abandoned at

0755 in AB 7480 because of technical trouble. Route 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Convoy report from U 344 (Pietsch), destroyer report from U 344 (Pietsch), aircraft report from U 363 (Nees), see under IV (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

During the day several reports of carrier radio traffic and bearings were received from the German Air Force and Naval D/F Stations. The bearings seemed to indicate that there was a carrier formation lying somewhat apart from the convoy.
18th Group: lively flying activity (25 aircraft), reconnaissance of the northern North Sea.
At 1439 and 2225 a radio message of first priority from Polyarno and Iokanka to all naval forces in Northern Waters and another at 1950 from Bolushya to Dikson.
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper.
Archangel area: 2 minelayers, 9 minesweepers, 4 guardboats and 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 5464)
U 668 AB 5645)
U 394 AB 5967) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6795) of sweep 50 miles.
U 997 AB 9189)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 57) in the attack area.
U 739 AT 64)

U 307 AG 78 on special operation.
U 957 southeast of AF 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 711 Hammerfest,
U 703, 965, 968 Tromsö,
U 425 Harstad,
U 354, 636, 921, 956, 992, 995 Narvik,
U 312, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0450 U 425 put in to Harstad from Narvik.
0800 U 968 put in to Tromsö from Narvik, at 1900 put out for Hammerfest.
1045 U 703 put in to Tromsö, at 1335 put out to operate against convoy.
1530 U 992 put out from Narvik, put in to Harstad at 2210.
1845 U 354 put out from Narvik to operate against convoy.
1900 U 965 put out from Tromsö for Hammerfest.
1100 U 307 on return passage to Hammerfest from AG 75.
U 365 on return passage from AT 64 to Hammerfest.
1100 Group "Trutz" proceeding to operate on convoy report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

5 boats to attack convoy. 2 boats approaching.

1022 Short signal 1020/789 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"Convoy in AB 5450, course 060°, at 0600."

As this report was not sent until four hours after the sighting, we could presume that the commander had definite clues to show that it was a convoy and not merely naval forces. On the basis of yesterday's cruiser report, the speed of advance was found to be 11 knots; but it was not certain that it was the same formation.

1045 Short signal 1045/791 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"3 destroyers in AB 5455."

Thus five hours after the convoy these destroyers were in the same square.

1133 Radio message 1104/795 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

"Operate on convoy report: at 0600 in AB 5450, course 060°, speed 11 knots. Maximum speed."

1201 Radio message 1115/796 sent:

"Put out immediately at maximum speed for AC 18: "Brünner" from Tromsö, "Sthamer" from Narvik."

So the only boats at readiness in the ports were set on the convoy. The others were ready for minelaying operations and not for use against the convoy, as re-equipping with torpedoes would take a long time.

To ascertain whether "Pietsch" really had sighted a convoy,

1359 radio message 1335/799 was sent:

"1. "Pietsch": report if it is definitely a convoy, what units have been counted, or if it is possibly yesterday's cruiser group.

2. "Herrle": operate freely on your own initiative depending on the condition of the boat and your position."

"Herrle"'s boat was ready for dockyard after the last trip and was only capable of limited diving.
In cooperation with Captain U-boats, Norway, Luftflotte 5 directed Luftflotte 3 to dispatch 3 BV 138 on reconnaissance against the convoy, but only given 7/10 cloud. Reconnaissance was not to be flown until a report had been received confirming the convoy.

1520 Radio message 0638/701 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"At 0604 convoy in 5450, course 060°, speed 8 knots. 2 T 5 torpedoes fired at corvette, missed: probably through depth charges released shortly after firing. Fan-of-three at cruiser of "Dido" class. 3 successive detonations. After 2 hours in the same position, still 1 destroyer, 2 frigates, cross courses, then made off on course 060°, speed 12 knots."

1528 Radio message 1347/702 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"At 1110 in AB 5456 large patch of oil, thick

furnace oil, countless pieces of wreckage; again submerged because of 3 carrier-borne planes. Still have 3 T 5 and 2 T 3 torpedoes. Wind southwest, force 3, sea 2, overcast, visibility 12 miles, 1014 mb. Pursuing."

Thus the sinking of the cruiser by "Pietsch" could be accepted.
The general weather conditions were not very favorable. Heavy showers and very changeable visibility. As there were very few boats, it was not intended to keep them on the surface to use their anti-aircraft guns. When the report requested from "Pietsch" had still not been received,

1619 radio message 1603/703 was sent:

" "Pietsch": report immediately if merchant ships have been observed, i.e. a convoy."

1640 Radio message 1620/704 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"3 steamers of the starboard column observed, ahead 1 destroyer: on the starboard bow 1 corvette as close escort, about 5 miles ahead 2 escort vessels. Several hydrophone bearings in the direction of the steamers. In the cruiser escort were a destroyer of the "V" or "W" class, a frigate and a corvette. Several carrier-borne planes observed rising and descending beyond the horizon, where I therefore presume the carrier to be. Yesterday's cruiser group probably same formation."

The running of a convoy was therefore certain. It was obviously escorted by a carrier.
As no more contact was reported, the boats were dispatched with varying courses to search along the convoy's northeasterly route. Both boats which put out from the ports joined group "Trutz".

1916 Radio message 1833/706 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

"From AB 5450 operate on following general convoy courses: "Pietsch" 060°, "Eickstedt" 065°, "Borger" 075°, "Nees" 080°, "Lehmann" 085°. "Brunner" and "Sthamer": join on in the south. Reckon on convoy speed of 10 knots. Report "flying weather"."

2140 Radio message 1900/709 received from U 363 (Nees):

"In AB 6146 carrier-borne aircraft. Explosion to west at moderate distance."

Air reconnaissance was to be started by Flieger Fuehrer 3 at 2300.

0051 Radio message 2345/713 sent:

Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

"1. About 2300 3 BV 138 will take off on convoy reconnaissance. From 0100 watch D/F wave "Dora".

2. Intention: to attack in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8. Reports of all clues are important. An incomplete radio message from "Pietsch" indicates a more easterly convoy position. Until results of air reconnaissance come in, all boats are to advance as far as possible. Strive to reach 22° E by 0600.

3. The considerable success of "Pietsch" is a good beginning. Let it continue."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

The information gained by radio reconnaissance in Kara Sea by U 711 (Lange) (group "Kentmann") was passed on to group "Greif".

1151 Radio message 1039/794 sent:

" "Greif" from Captain U-boats.

"Lange" reports: Closing-in of heavier escort forces and livelier air patrol presuppose shipping traffic in the near future. Drift ice only east of 77° E and north of 76° N."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) on operation "Schnechuhn".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

0629 Radio message 0544/788 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"Main task executed, still at Bear Island, request to return via Hammerfest to take in secret material and hand over part equipment for "Schnechuhn"."

According to this report, "Herrle" has the "Schnechuhn" unit successfully on board again.

A landing on Bear Island does not seem to have taken place because of the situation.

1115 Radio message 1034/793 sent:

" "Herrle" from Captain U-boats.

Return to Hammerfest - Narvik. No landing on Bear Island. Report passing 76° N."

1255 Short signal 1255/798 received from U 307 (Herrle):

"76°."

(d) Miscellaneous:

1254 Radio message 1125/772 sent:

"U 365 returning from AF 87 to Hammerfest. Intended to increase speed from Tromsö to Narvik."

"Wedemeyer" had only 1 torpedo clear.

2054 Radio message 2005/707 sent:

"On 21 August U 703 (Brünner) will put out from Tromsö and U 354 (Sthamer) from Narvik. They will join group "Trutz"."

V. Reports of successes:

Sinking of a cruiser by U 344 (Pietsch) is accepted.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 711 (Lange), seventh operation, see Appendix II/1.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

2315 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4255 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2300 on 21 August:

"Pietsch" reported convoy at 0600 in AB 5450, course 060°, speed 8 knots, also carrier-borne aircraft. 3 hits scored, probably on cruiser of "Dido" class, sinking accepted. Large patch of oil, thick furnace oil, numerous pieces of wreckage. Group "Trutz" with 5 boats and 2 operational boats

from the northern ports was sent to operate. Air reconnaissance is being carried out by Flieger Fuehrer 3 with 3 BV 138. Up to now convoy not re-intercepted."

In view of the continuous Russian attacks on the eastern front, supplies were to be expected from Britain, yet the new PQ convoy comes as a surprise just now. We had no previous knowledge of its sailing. Six of the boats at readiness in the Northern area are to put out on a minelaying operation and have no torpedoes. In addition to group "Trutz" (5 boats), 5 more boats are being considered for operations against the convoy; of those, U 307 is only capable of limited diving, while U 365 (Wedemeyer) has only 1 torpedo clear. Considering the wide attack areas, "Pietsch"'s meeting with the convoy and the cruiser group, was a stroke of luck which he immediately turned to success. With the help of air reconnaissance, we must now by-pass the carrier-borne aircraft and assemble the boats ahead of the convoy.

p.p. Eckermann.

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22 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0745. Outward route exhaustively examined, including Bear Island. Return route not examined because of measurements, nothing to report.
1 BV 138 on diverging search patrol with radar, route Billefjord - North Cape - AC 4675 - AB 3655 - AC 4814 - Billefjord. Reconnaissance area examined by radar as far as AB 4251, then, because the radar set broke down, the rest of the area was exhaustively examined by visual reconnaissance. Nothing to report.
1 BV 138 on diverging search patrol, route Tromsö - AB 9193 - AB 5195 - 5444 - 9157 - Tromsö from 2309 to 0637, exhaustively examined by radar, nothing to report.
1 BV 138 on diverging search patrol, route Tromsö - AB 6917 - 6142 - 6394 - 6733 - 6888 - Tromsö from 2316 to 0724, exhaustively examined with radar.
1 BV 138 located several vessels in AB 3819 at 0325, now overdue.

1 BV 138 on diverging search patrol with radar from 1451 to 1608 to intercept probable PQ convoy. Sea area AC 4974 - 4817 - 2744 - 1444 was to be examined, but the operation had to be abandoned in AC 7236 because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0456 to 1255. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0454 to 1049. Mission abandoned at 0750 in AB 7453 because of technical difficulties. Route 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Aircraft report from U 997 (Lehmann), aircraft report from U 363 (Nees), aircraft report from U 394 (Borger), aircraft report from U 703 (Brünner), see under IV (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Tromsö airfield reported at 0225 that the convoy had been located in 15 30 East 17 (AB 3747). Extent 10,000 meters.
At 0325 in 46 86 East 17 (AB 3819) several vessels were located.
At 0343 in 34 59 East 17 (AB 6435) several vessels were located.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1710 on 21 August British unit (AY) transmitted an urgent radio message to Horsea for Senior British Naval Officer, Murmansk. 18th Group: very lively flying activity (37 aircraft). Point of concentration not identified. From Main Naval D/F Station, Kirkenes: at 1810 on 22 August Dikson sent a message to Belushya via Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters. At 1822 and 1837 Dikson sent a radio message of first priority to Archangel.
At 2131 on 22 August, a radio message of first priority was sent by Belushya to Dikson.
The following radio messages of first priority were sent: at 0655 and 1253 from Belushya to Dikson, at 1253 from Dikson to Archangel, at 0750 from Archangel and at 0750 and 1414 from Dikson to all naval forces in Northern Waters.

Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 2 minesweepers and 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AB 3950)
U 668 AC 1770)
U 394 AC 4110) operating against PQ convoy.
U 363 AC 4150)
U 997 AC 4110)
U 703 AC 4130)
U 354 AB 9350)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 in Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 965, 968 Hammerfest,
U 992 Harstad,
U 636, 921, 956, 995 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 711 put out from Hammerfest for AC 4252.
0200 U 425 put out from Harstad for Tromsö.
0600 U 965, 968 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsö.
2315 U 922 put out from Harstad for Tromsö.
U 307 on return passage from AG 75 to Hammerfest.
U 312 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
Group "Trutz": at 0855 occupy patrol line from AC 1525 to 1885 in the following order: U 344, U 668, U 394, U 363, U 997, U 703, U 354, U 365.
Group "Trutz": at 1341 new order: boats Nos. 6 to 9 are U 703, U 711, U 365, U 354.
Group "Trutz": at 1918 occupy patrol line from AC 2546 to 2785.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 32:

7 boats to attack the PQ convoy.
The reconnaissance organized by Luftflotte 5 on the previous day was again ordered for 22 August. It will be arranged with Flieger Fuehrer 3 about noon.

0127 Radio message 0101/715 sent:

"Carrier-borne aircraft known to be particularly strong in the morning. Report aircraft sightings at once. Avoid unnecessary attacks."

0246 Radio message 0201/717 received from U 344 (Pietsch):

"Am in 6110. Maximum speed 14.5 knots because of blower fault. Query: shall I continue to advance?"

The boat was, of course, told in the next order to continue.

0521 The enemy reports from the German Air Force were sent to the boats.
When the previous search courses had brought no results, the boats were disposed in patrol line ahead of the supposed convoy course.
U 711 (Lange), which should really have put out to Kara Sea to continue the special operation with group "Kentmann", and U 365 (Wedemeyer), which was returning with only 1 torpedo, were also directed on to the convoy.

0920 Radio message 0855/723 sent:

"1. Group "Trutz": occupy patrol line from AC 1525 to 1885 in the following order: "Pietsch", "Eickstedt", "Borger", "Nees", "Lehmann", "Brünner", "Sthamer". High cruising speed.

2. "Wedemeyer": extend line to south.

3. Further air reconnaissance intended."

1027 Radio message 0948/725 sent:

"U 711 (Lange) put out from Hammerfest at high speed to join group "Trutz" as boat No. 8 in AC 4252 in patrol line."

From 1100 the boats were unfortunate in reaching the region of the escorting carrier-borne planes.

1107 Short signal 1107/726 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Carrier-borne aircraft. My position is AC 4121."

1127 Radio message 1119/729 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Carrier-borne plane. Bi-plane is shadowing us, came from a northwesterly direction."

1137 Short signal 1137/730 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane (s). My position is AC 4137."

1146 Short signal 1146/731 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"My position is AC 4123."

1305 Radio message 1154/732 received from U 394 (Borger):

"In AC 4121 5 more "Swordfish" planes came from the northeast."

1417 Radio message 1341/733:

"1. New order in patrol line as boats Nos. 6 to 9: "Brünner", "Lange", "Wedemeyer", "Sthamer". Remain unobserved as far as possible in the patrol line.

2. 3 BV 138 are again taking off; result of reconnaissance expected about 1500."

The new formation was drawn up to suit the positions of the boats learned from their aircraft reports, so that they could all reach the patrol line as quickly as possible.

1740 Radio message 1636/737 received from U 394 (Borger):

"True bearings on convoy radio traffic (in future, codeword: "convoy location"): at 0850 in AB 6362 325°, at 0945 in AC 4141 325°, at 1020 in 4143 328°, at 1500 in 4211 333°, at 1517 in 4212 336°, at 1600 in 4221 333°."

Accordingly, the convoy was now on easterly course, proceeding at 10 knots.

1649 Short signal 1643/736 received from U 703 (Brunner):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 1878."

1645 Short signal 1645/735 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Am at full operational readiness."

The boat must have previously reported an attack, but the message had not been received.

1827 Short signal 1827/738 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Moderate air patrol north of AC 1881."

Compared with the convoy bearings, the positions of the boats still lay to the south and astern. The patrol line was therefore moved 110 miles east to enable the boats to gain a forward attacking position. At the same time it was narrowed to 10 miles between each boat.

1943 Radio message 1918/741 sent:

"1. Air reconnaissance abandoned because of weather.

2. By location, convoy at 1600 in roughly AC 1450, speed 10 knots, course east.

3. Group "Trutz": occupy new patrol line from AC 2546 to 2785, former order "Pietsch" to "Sthamer", high speed."

It was to be hoped that the boats would be able to get ahead at twilight. They could reach the new formation by 0800.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas.
No reports up to now apparently because of bad radio conditions. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0410 "Flying weather" 0409/720 received from U 363 (Nees):

"962 400."

Following yesterday's orders the boat reported the "flying weather", with visibility over 9 miles, wind west, force 2, cloud height 400 meters.

No rain, completely overcast. The short signal was passed on to the German Air Force by radio.

In Most Secret 4249 A Ops. 1, transfer order for U 995 (Köhntopp) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik for Tromsö on the afternoon of 23 August.

2. Make fast at Mining and Barrage Command (on the morning of 24 August at the latest) with harbor pilot. Request pilot from Harbor Master.

3. After taking in mines, proceed further in accordance with Operational Order No. 16 to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit.
2nd Inshore Defenses Unit is informed. Commander will arrange sailing time with 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Other escorts are to be fully used.

4. As far as Harstad frequency "MC", from Harstad radio frequency "Anton I" under Series No. 600. Northern Waters very long wave from Narvik.

5. Report sailing from Tromsö promptly on "Anton I"."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

2225 Most Secret 4271 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2200 on 22 August:

Convoy located by air reconnaissance at 0225 in AB 3770, also escorting carrier or escort groups about 0330 in AB 3819 and AB 6435. Not intercepted by U-boats. These were ordered to a patrol line northeast of Bear Island. Between 1100 and 1200 they reported carrier-borne "Swordfish" aircraft in AC 41 and between1700 and 1900 in AC 18. From bearings taken on radio traffic, convoy was in approximately AC 14 at 1600. New air reconnaissance abandoned by Flieger Fuehrer 3 because of weather. Group "Trutz", consisting of 9 boats, was moved to a narrow patrol line ahead of the supposed convoy course. New air reconnaissance requested for 23 August."

From the strong forces of carrier-borne planes operating at noon it seems very doubtful, whether the boats will gain a forward position to attack. Experience of the convoys has shown that usually only unobserved operations by many boats assembled in a forward position lead to success against the core of the convoy, while shadowing and hauling ahead result only in action against the escort. As the convoy has a high speed of 10 knots, too much time would be lost by endeavoring to let the boats haul ahead independently and then only some of them would arrive in position, even if they were not intercepted prematurely in the limited sea area by enemy air escorts.

Re II (d):

"The striking radio traffic in the Kara Sea area continues and presumably indicates activity of group "Greif"."

p.p. Eckermann.

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23 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 BV 138 on diverging search patrol with radar in the sea area AC 4844 - AB 6873 - AC 1544 - AB 2688. Took off at 1604 on 22 August. Both aircraft overdue, whereabouts unknown.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0425 to 1113. Faeroes covered by mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0438 to 1227. Route 50%, Jan Mayen 20% examined, enemy not sighted.
When 3 BV 138 were overdue from reconnaissance against this convoy,

teleprinter message Most Secret 7088/44 was received from Luftflotte 5:

"1. Daylight reconnaissance against the convoy is, with immediate effect, no longer to be carried

out because of losses which we cannot afford.

2. Last reconnaissance against the convoy by BV 138 with radar set 200 will be flown only in the hours of darkness from 23 to 24 August 1944.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Carrier reports from U 354 (Sthamer),
aircraft report from U 668 (Eickstedt),
aircraft report from U 363 (Nees),
convoy report from U 394 (Borger),
destroyer report from U 703 (Brünner),
aircraft report from U 703 (Brünner),
cruiser and destroyer report from U 711 (Lange),
aircraft report from U 997 (Lehmann),
aircraft report from U 711 (Lange),
aircraft report from U 365 (Wedemeyer),
see under IV (a).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From 1135 on 22 August to 0327 on 23 August numerous radio transmissions of first priority from Belushya to Dikson, Dikson to Belushya and Archangel, Archangel and Dikson to naval forces in Northern Waters and minesweeper No. 112. From 1105 on 22 August to 0310 on 23 August British radio traffic presumably between aircraft carrier and carrier-borne planes (20 aircraft picked up in the traffic) of the British fleet formation in Northern Waters.
Svanvik obtained bearings from 1053 to 1816 on 22 August of 033° - 342°. From 1124 to 1202 Bodö obtained bearings of 003° - 015°.
Pummanki area: 2 guardships, 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 guardboats, 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 minesweepers, 1 ice-breaker.
Dikson area: 1 guardship.
18th Group: lively flying activity (27 aircraft).
At 0834 on 23 August, British unit was located in approximately AB 9160.
(The bearing agrees roughly with the position of the carrier group according to dead reckoning.)
At 1805 carrier was located by Kirkenes in 009°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AC 2345)
U 668 AC 1910)
U 394 AC 2744)
U 363 AC 1590)
U 997 AC 1980) operating against PQ convoy.
U 703 AC 2770)
U 711 AC 2729)
U 365 AC 2759)
U 354 AC 6927)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 307, 965, 968 Hammerfest,
U 992 Tromsö,
U 636, 921, 956, 995 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 425 put out from Tromsö, at 1600 put in to Hammerfest.
0649 U 992 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.
0530 U 307 put in to Hammerfest from AG 75.
1345 U 995 put out from Narvik, at 1910 put in to Harstad, at 2300 put out from Harstad for Tromsö.
U 312 on open water passage from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 32:

9 boats operating on PQ convoy.

0030 Short signal 0003/747 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"At 1700 in AB 9333 2 enemy aircraft carriers."

That square is north of Alta, 80 miles from the

coast. It is obviously a formation to attack the "Tirpitz". "Sthamer" came upon it by chance after putting out.
As the time of origin of the carrier report was 7 hours earlier,

0121 radio message 0121/751 was sent:

" "Sthamer": report immediately when, where and on what course carriers last observed. Make full operational use of opportunities to attack."

0122 Radio message 1714/750 from U 354 (Sthamer):

"Carrier group in AB 9333: 2 aircraft carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels. Southerly courses. Speed 16 knots: 1 T 3 F.A.T. 2 torpedo fired at auxiliary aircraft carrier, explosion after 21 seconds. Cloud amidships and slight list to starboard observed. 1 T 5 torpedo at same carrier, explosion after 5 - 7 minutes. No depth charges."

0255 Radio message 0100/755 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"At 2330 in AB 9330 1 escort vessel made off from the place of torpedoing to the west. At 0045 at the place of torpedoing large oil patch, drifting rubber dinghies (empty), very many drifting tin cans and other pieces of equipment. Pursuing."

So the sinking of the auxiliary carrier could be accepted with certainty.
A probable radio bearing obtained by air reconnaissance was sent to the boats.

0053 Radio message 0037/748 sent:

"Air reconnaissance presumes van of convoy to be in AC 1490 at 2000."

During the morning the boats closing in on the convoy from the south observed carrier-borne aircraft.

0314 Short signal 0315/757 received from U 668 (Eickstedt):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AC 1839."

0618 Radio message 0557/761 received from "Nees":

"In AC 1594 strong forces of aircraft. Since 0000 continually forced to submerge."

0344 Radio message 0255/758 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Wide hydrophone bearing, 010°, presumably convoy in AC 1923."

0600 Radio message 0546/760 sent:

"Group "Trutz": narrow patrol line to northeast, 6 miles between each boat. Remain unobserved. Convoy will pass about 0900, thereafter reckon on speed of 10 knots."

Thus the patrol line was more closely drawn up ahead of the convoy course so that the greatest number of boats could attack as the convoy passed.

0725 Short signal 0725/762 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Convoy in AC 1936, southeasterly course, slow speed. Convoy has strong air escort."

Then
0759 radio message 0759/763 was sent:

"Group "Trutz": forward to the convoy in AC 1936, attack, shadow and report."

0907 Radio message 0812/765 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"In 6927 no sign of carrier group. Operating on convoy. Wind southsoutheast, force 3, sea 2, overcast, visibility 8 - 10 miles."

"Sthamer" had thus lost contact after sinking the auxiliary carrier.

1114 Radio message 1024/768 received from "Brünner":

"In AC 2771 at 0618 smoke float from carrier-borne plane where we submerged. At 0705 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, stopping engines then picking up (speed only up to 5 knots), continually curving, no depth charges, presume a search group chasing us."

The destroyers have become very cautious in the vicinity of the U-boats because of the "Zaunkönig" torpedoes.

1156 Short signal 1124/771 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 2747."

1247 Short signal 1247/722 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 2776."

1329 Radio message 1216/774 received from "Borger":

"Forced back by aircraft. Shadower soon called up several planes to attack the U-boats. According to aircraft sightings, convoy course 120°. I am hauling ahead outside the range of the planes."

The convoy appears to be steering a south-easterly course. Towards evening, according to our experience, the course will be altered to south.

1318 Radio message 1002/773 received from U 711 (Lange):

"At 0739 in AC 2729 1 heavy cruiser or battleship, 8 destroyers of "Churchill" class, course 140°, speed 12 knots. F.A.T. fan-of-two on heavy unit: explosion, possible hit. Fired T 5 torpedo at sinking "Churchill" class destroyer, observed sinking. "Catalina" and "Swordfish"."

1338 Short signal 1338/775 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Carrier-borne plane in AC 1998."

1437 Radio message 1421/776 sent:

"Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats. Northerly boats should advance in the north, boats lying far behind should haul ahead to the south beyond the range of planes. Report contact so that aircraft and U-boats can pick up the report. Freedom of attack granted against carriers."

In this way the anti-submarine forces would be split up and we could try to bring the boats up ahead for attacks in spite of the strong enemy air activity. In view of the small number of boats and the obviously large force of enemy aircraft, the boats were not ordered to remain on the surface to attack aircraft.

1520 Short signal 1520/777 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Uncertain bearing on convoy radio wave of 184°. My position is exactly AC 2812 at 1330."

1652 Short signal 1652/779 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 5127."

1732 Short signal 1732/780 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Bearing on convoy radio wave of 205°. My position is roughly AC 2836. 1615."

1823 Short signal 1818/782 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Carrier-borne aircraft. My position is AC 2891."

The splendid reports from "Borger" provide good clues to the convoy's position.

1833 Radio message 1808/783 sent:

"Convoy confirmed in AC 2880 at 1600, course 120°; reckon on alteration to southerly courses towards evening. Southerly boats: haul ahead to the south approximately on the 35th meridian."

Thus the boats were given a clue to enable them to haul ahead out of range of the constant air patrols.

1917 Short signal 1908/784 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Carrier-borne plane(s). My position is AC 5106."

(The grid square details are inexact because of corrupt reception.)

1926 Short signal 1912/786 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane(s). My position is AC 5143."

1944 Radio message 1935/787 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Convoy heard and inexact bearing of 215° taken on convoy radio wave. My position is exactly AC 2956 at 1845."

A location report transmitted by Luftflotte 5 was passed on to the boats.

1930 Radio message 1903/785 sent:

"Carrier located from 1430 to 1700 in AC 5180 to 90."

2000 A German Air Force offer of air reconnaissance for the coming night was turned down as it would not contribute effectively to this operation and the risk to the aircraft would be too great. Moreover, the Gorman Air Force had made their offer very grudgingly, as during the time in question the convoy was already within range of Russian land-based planes.

2122 Short signal 1852/788 from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Several smoke clouds in sight in AC 5427. Carrier-borne aircraft."

Probably it is the carrier formation.

2159 Radio message 2115/789 sent:

"Group "Trutz" from Captain U-boats.

1. Intention: to attack convoy as far as 72° N. Make use of twilight to haul ahead. Boats should steer to AC 5860 without contact and then improve their position in respect of the convoy from the reports. We must still achieve success.
2. Further intention: to return along the convoy route via position lines."

2245 Radio message 2245/791 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Convoy heard and exact bearing of 218° taken on convoy radio wave. My position was exactly AC 2968 at 2000, course 231°. My position was exactly AC 3788 at 2215."

2309 Short signal 2309/792 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Convoy heard and exact bearing of 228° taken on convoy radio wave. My position is exactly AC 6123 at 2245."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. No reports received.
Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1139 Radio message 1038/769 received from C-in-C Navy and C-in-C U-boats:

" "Pietsch" and "Sthamer": well done. Carry on, group "Trutz".".

V. Reports of successes:

Auxiliary aircraft carrier sunk by U 354 (Sthamer) and a destroyer by U 711 (Lange). The latter also torpedoed a heavy unit.
On the sinking of the auxiliary carrier,

1025 radio message 0954/766 was sent:

" "Sthamer": report, if suitable opportunity arises, if F.A.T. fans or single shots were fired, also whether there were sinking noises and further clues to indicate sinking."

In reply,

1550 radio message 1400/778 was received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"F.A.T. single shots. No sinking noises heard, as multi-unit hydrophones were temporarily out of order. Escort vessels at torpedoing position for 6 hours, no depth charge pursuit."

The long stay of the escort vessels at the torpedoing position without any depth charge pursuit seemed further to confirm the sinking of the carrier.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

2255 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4313 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2200 on 23 August:

Convoy intercepted by a U-boat at 0725 in AC 1936, course southeast. Group "Trutz" (9 boats) set on it, tried to haul ahead beyond the range of strong forces of air escort. U 354 (Sthamer): 2 hits on auxiliary carrier in AB 9333, sinking probable, as no pursuit followed and escort vessels remained at the torpedoing position for 6 hours, empty rubber dinghies drifting around, wreckage and giant patches of oil. U 711 (Lange) heard a hit on heavy unit in AC 2729, also sank 1 "Churchill" destroyer. Intention: to pursue the convoy as far as 72° N,

then return along convoy route via position lines."

Re IV (a):

"According to reports, the boats lie on both sides of the convoy over 70 miles from it, and owing to the strong escorting forces of carrier-borne aircraft, they have obviously not reached a forward position to attack the actual convoy. It is evident, as was the case with previous convoys this year, that with such a strong air escort it is useless to haul ahead with our present gunnery equipment. Even the 3.7 cm. gun, fired without any complications such as jamming, is insufficient against the great number of planes immediately summoned by the first sighting aircraft. In this kind of convoy attack, we can expect a few successes against the escort and lucky shots on larger units, but at the same time U-boat losses must be accepted. Only a formation assembled unobserved ahead of the convoy promises success against the actual transports. For this purpose, however, an offensive air reconnaissance is necessary."

p.p. Eckermann.

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24 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

2 BF 109 on photographic and visual reconnaissance of Kola Bay and Murmansk railway station from 1742 to 1753. Abandoned because of undercarriage trouble.
2 BF 109 on visual reconnaissance of Kola Bay and Murmansk railway station. In Kola Bay, from Murmansk to Vaenga about 20 medium and small merchant ships, also 15 fairly large shipping units. Type not identified because of mist. South of Murmansk harbor 12 small vessels. Reconnaissance was very difficult because of heavy mist and in parts, thick ground fog.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0405 to 1125. Faeroes covered by mist, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0500 to 1212. Route 30%, Jan Mayen area 10% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Aircraft report from U 354 (Sthamer),
aircraft report from U 363 (Nees),
destroyer report from U 365 (Wedemeyer),
aircraft report from U 365 (Wedemeyer),
aircraft report from U 711 (Lange),
aircraft report from U 703 (Brünner),
destroyer report from U 363 (Nees),
destroyer report from U 703 (Brünner).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

4 U.S. warships were to put out from the Firth of Forth on the evening of 23 August.
18th Group: lively flying activity (31 aircraft).
On 23 August continuous British radio traffic from carriers belonging to a fleet formation in Northern Waters.
On the evening of 23 August, British units "AM" and "KE 4" were in radio communication with Polyarno.
Iokanka area: 2 guardships and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 guardships, 9 minesweepers and 4 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper and 1 ice-breaker.
Dikson area: 1 guardship.
Very many radio messages of first priority from and to Dikson, some of which were transmitted to "all forces in Northern Waters" by Archangel and Iokanka.
Russian radio traffic: lively, mostly very urgent or of first priority, mainly to and from Belushya, Kara Sea and Dikson.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AC 53)
U 668 AC 51)
U 394 AC 6280)
U 363 AC 5430)
U 997 AC 5420) operating against PQ convoy.
U 703 AC 5370)
U 711 AC 6430)
U 365 AC 5810)
U 354 AC 5730)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 307, 425, 965, 968 Hammerfest,
U 312, 636, 921, 956 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0300 U 312 put in to Narvik from Trondheim,
0730 U 992 put out from Tromsö, at 1840 put in to Hammerfest.
0900 U 995 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.
2200 U 307 put out from Hammerfest to Narvik.
1500 U 365 on return passage from AC 5490 to Andfjord - Narvik.
1500 U 711 on return passage from AC 6430 to Hammerfest.
Group "Trutz": at 1500 proceed to position line 1, at 1000 on 25 August from AC 6167 to 5567. Order: U 394, U 354, U 703, U 363, U 997, U 344, and U 668.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 32:

9 boats to attack the PQ convoy. A location report passed by telephone by Flieger Fuehrer 5 was transmitted to the boats.

0003 Radio message 0003/794 sent:

"Carriers located at 2100 in AC 5840, at 2250 in AC 5850."

The boats to the west of the convoy were not going to reach it because of the strong forces of carrier-borne planes.

0020 Short signal 0020/793 received from U 354 (Sthamer):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 5720."

0109 Short signal 0109/701 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 5444."

0147 Short signal 0146/797 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"1 destroyer in AC 5548."

0154 Short signal 0153/798 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Course southwest, high speed."

0246 Short signal 0246/800 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 5551."

At 0500 the convoy was lying about 80 miles east of that square.

0319 Radio message 0158/799 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Convoy locations from 3 radio sources, one of which is the operational leader of the carrier-borne planes. Distance of the units from me according to signal strength and facility of location is considerably less than 100 miles. Course 238°, 6251."

0421 Short signal 0418/702 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AC 6438."

Thus the boats to the east were also subjected to patrolling aircraft.

0459 Radio message 0320/703 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"From AC 5111 to 5486 continually forced to submerge by carrier-borne aircraft and "Catalina" (also some "Swordfish" and probable "Corsairs")."

Convoy about 120 miles to the east.
Apparent screen of carrier-borne aircraft to the west.
Only "Borger" and "Lange" lie to the east.

0532 Short signal 0525/704 received from U 363 (Nees):

"2 destroyers in AC 5459."

Over 100 miles west of the convoy.

1103 Radio message 0813/706 received from U 363 (Nees):

"At 0309 in AC 5491 from a search group of 4 destroyers, course 280°, sank 2 destroyers. A T 5 torpedo was used in each case, explosion after 615 and 720 seconds. At 0643 1 T 5 torpedo fired at third destroyer, missed because of ground-runner.
At 0651 fired 1 T 5 torpedo and missed the fourth destroyer, which was picking up survivors.
Assumption: miss due to exploding depth charges. Faint sinking noises, deterrent depth charges, no pursuit. 1 T 5, 5 T 3 torpedoes. Wind west, force 2, sea 1, 1012 mb. visibility 12 miles."

1124 Short signal 1115/707 received from U 703 (Brunner):

"Carrier-borne planes in AC 5879."
A carrier bearing from the German Air Force was passed on to group "Trutz".

1239 Radio message 1209/713 sent:

"Aircraft carrier at 0630 in AC 5940, at 0900 in AC 5964, presumably easterly course. Located from radio traffic."

1318 Short signal 1310/717 received from U 703 (Brunner):

"2 land-based planes. My position is AC 5885."

The continually increasing air strength, which has been raised even further by the arrival of land-based aircraft now makes continuation of the operation useless.

1156 Radio message 1039/709 sent:

"1. "Lange": return to Hammerfest to refuel; put out again in accordance with Operational Order No. 16. "Wedemeyer": return to Andfjord/Narvik.

2. Group "Trutz": Withdraw submerged. Proceed via position line I: at 1000 on 25 August, AC 6176 to 5567 and line II: at 1400 on 26 August AC 2472 to 1991 to line III: at 2000 on 27 August AB 3564 to

3867. Order: "Borger", "Sthamer", "Brünner", "Nees", "Lehmann", "Pietsch", "Eickstedt". Boats lying astern should join on without increasing speed."

In addition to the carrier-borne planes, the boats had considerable trouble from destroyer groups.

1135 Radio message 0950/708 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Forced to submerge by 2 destroyers and a carrier-borne plane with rockets in AC 5493 at 0310. Depth charges until 0850. Destroyers made off on course 240°."

1858 Short signal 1857/772 received from U 703 (Brunner):

"1 destroyer on southeasterly course in AC 5868."

2030 Radio message 1942/723 received from "Brünner":

"Destroyers lost to sight in AC 5972, course 100°, high speed."

2350 Radio message 2238/725 received from "Brünner":

"At 2135 2 red flares in approximately AC 5948. Searching for survivors."

The boat appears to believe that there is a German or enemy crew to be picked up.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

1214 Radio message 1102/710 sent:

"Group "Greif" from Captain U-boats. No reports received since 18 August. Russian radio traffic however indicates brushes with the enemy. If there is strong air opposition, withdraw from the vicinity of the coast, if possible on the shipping route."

1220 Radio message 1127/711 sent:

" "Greif" from Captain U-boats. From 22 to 24 August, striking increase in

Russian radio traffic in the Kara Sea area. Radio messages of first priority were sent by each of the following: Belushya - 14, Dikson - 16, Khabarova and Jelaniya - 1 each."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

1942 Teleprinter message received from Dr. Doge:

" "Haudegen" ready to put out."

U 354 was the intended escort for this operation and had already taken part of the equipment on board, when it was necessary to send the boat to operate against the convoy, still carrying the gear.

V. Reports of successes:

The sinking of 2 destroyers by U 363 (Nees) is accepted.

C. Surface forces:

Carrier-borne aircraft penetrated to the Alta area and from 1600 to 1633 attacked the "Tirpitz" in two waves.

D. Plans:

2259 Teleprinter message Most Secret 10467 A 1 received from Naval Chief Command, Norway by Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"C-in-C German Air Force intends to set up meteorological radio stations on Hope Island, Bear Island and South Point, Spitsbergen with 4 men for the first operation and two in each of the others, each expedition with 6.5 to 8.5 tons of equipment. Transfer intended by U-boat and allocation of U-boat for Hope Island, (sailing date from Tromsö 20 September) and of a further boat for Bear Island and South Spitsbergen, (sailing date 27 September) requested."

E. Survey of the situation:

2225 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4326 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2200 on 24 August:
U-boats were kept off the convoy by carriers and destroyer groups, while it probably hauled off to the east. U 363 (Nees) sank 2 destroyers from a

search group of four and missed the other two. Operation abandoned at noon, as boats had no hope of reaching the convoy because of the increased strength of air opposition. Returning via position lines on convoy route."

p.p. Eckermann.

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25 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0458 to 1232. Northern part of Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0509 to 1210. Route 50% examined, Jan Mayen area not examined because low-lying closed-in cloud cover, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Destroyer report from U 711 (Lange),
destroyer report from U 997 (Lehmann),
destroyer report from U 703 (Brünner),
submarine report from U 365 (Wedemeyer),
destroyer report from U 668 (Eickstedt).

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (28 aircraft) over the northern North Sea.
From 1909 on 24 August to 0521 on 25 August radio messages of first priority between Dikson - Belushya - Archangel.

Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku".
Iokanka area: 3 guardships, 2 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "Uritski", "K", 2 guardships, 5 minesweepers and 2 BO-boats, also 4 guardboats and 1 ice-breaker.
Russian radio traffic: considerable, at times lively, at times very urgent.
Britain: increased Polyarno, no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 344 AC 5610)
U 668 AC 7330)
U 394 AC 6190)
U 363 AC 5670) operating against PQ convoy.
U 997 AC 5690)
U 703 AC 5660)
U 354 AC 6440)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 east of Diksons.

In port:

U 425, 965, 968, 992 Hammerfest,
U 995 Tromsö,
U 312, 636, 921, 956 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1400 U 636 put out from Narvik, at 1930 put in to Harstad, at 2400 put out for Tromsö.
2200 U 365 put in to Hammerfest from AC 58.
2215 U 307 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
U 711 on return passage from AC 6430 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

PQ 32:

0125 Radio message 0023/730 received from "Brünner":

"Red stars were decoy measures from "Lange". All is well."

Apparently destroyers were still operating on our boats astern of the convoy.

0154 Short signal 0142/732 received from U 711 (Lange):

"1 destroyer in AC 5856 to the southeast."

0151 Radio message 0101/773 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Am in AC 5439. Since 0130 on 24 August, submerged because of search group. F.A.T. fan-of-two missed a frigate. Torpedo-runner. T 5 torpedo fired at destroyer and frigate. Explosions after 7 and 9 minutes respectively. Escort vessel maneuvered in the position for 1 hour after the attack, then depth charges. Ju-compressor out of order."

0339 Short signal 0339/735 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Destroyer in AC 5948."

0432 Radio message 0409/736 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"At 0343 destroyer in AC 5973 made off to the south at high speed."

0519 Radio message 0439/737 received from U 711 (Lange):

"At 0158 in AC 5839 fired 1 T 5 torpedo, missed a destroyer, scored hit with second T 5 after 6 minutes 20 seconds. Sinking noises, no hydrophone bearing."

1205 Radio message 1105/742 received from Naval Radio Station, North:

"Group "Trutz":
C-in-C Navy and C-in-C U-boats wired: I rejoice in your successes."

The boats, which had not reported lately, were requested to send their positions.

1213 Radio message 1155/743 sent:

" "Pietsch", "Eickstedt", "Sthamer": report position."

1703 Radio message 1418/748 received from U 668 (Eickstedt):

"At 0200 on 24 August in AC-5574, 2 T 5 torpedoes fired, missed destroyers belonging to search group reported by "Brünner". Presume "Koblenz" and "Trier". Explosions after 205 and 95 seconds. No sinking noises. Hits possible on other units of group. Then depth charge pursuit for 24 hours. All clear except for 8 torpedoes. Operational readiness not quite certain. On surfacing after great effort, observed destroyer in 7565, apparently the same one as in radio message 736. Made off to the coast. In 5784 and 7361 this forenoon, 2 indistinct boats, course west, probably M.T.B.s. Am in 7362. Query: shall I proceed to position line II?"

1855 Radio message 1847/749 sent:

"Eickstedt" from Captain U-boats.

"Proceed via position line II."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. No reports. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0135 Radio message 0003/731 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"Request permission to return via Hammerfest to fetch equipment and secret material, which were given up there because of shallows operation: shall reach "SR 1" if permitted at 1600."

0222 Radio message 0205/734 sent:

"Wedemeyer" from Captain U-boats.

"Granted."

1108 Radio message 1008/740 received from U 365 (Wedemeyer):

"In AC 7231 submarine, presumably enemy."

That square is about 50 miles northeast of the Hammerfest approaches.

1145 Radio message 1132/741 sent:

" "Wedemeyer": proceed in accordance with Northern Waters Directions No. 31."

In Most Secret 4330 A Ops. transfer order for U 636 (Schendel) was sent.

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1400 on 25 August.

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund via Harstad with pilot to Tromsö. Sailing times from Narvik and Harstad to be sent by time short signal on "MC".

3. With harbor pilot make fast at Mining and Barrage Command, Tromsö to take in mines. (Request pilot from the naval officer in charge.)

4. When the mines are on board, proceed to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Commander will arrange sailing time with 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Current escorts are to be fully used.

5. Report time of sailing from Tromsö.

6. As far as Harstad use Base frequency "MC", from Harstad to Hammerfest frequency "Anton I". Switch to Northern Waters very long wave from Narvik onwards."

V. Reports of successes:

Sinking of a destroyer by U 711 (Lange).
One hit scored by U 997 (Lehmann) on a destroyer and one on a frigate.
2 further hits possible by U 668.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1020 Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 115 A Ops. 2nd issue sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:-

"Reference Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret S.O.s only 115 A Ops. of 9 August:
As U 965 is unserviceable, operation "Hering" will be undertaken by U 995 (Köhntopp) and "Forelle" by U 636 (Schendel). All boats provisionally ready to sail from Hammerfest on 29 August."

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Survey of the situation:

Short report on attack on PQ 32 from 21 to 24 August 1944, see Appendix IV.

p.p. Eckermann

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26 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0508 to 1327. North fjords and south point of the Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

No operations because of carrier warning.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Submarine report by U 711 (Lange), 2 vessels sighted by U 997 (Lehmann).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1110 in AE 9439 1 heavy cruiser, class not identified, alternating courses.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: 3 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", 2 guardships, 2 minesweepers and 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 2 minesweepers and 1 ice-breaker.
Dikson area: 1 guardship, 2 minelayers and 4 minesweepers.
Radio messages of first priority were broadcast: at 1352, 1705 and 1708 on 25 August from Belushya to Dikson, at 1601 and 1656 from Dikson to Belushya, at 1601 from Dikson to Archangel, at 1930 and 2025 from Archangel to all naval forces in the White Sea.

Britain: at 0215 on 26 August Svanvik obtained a bearing of 262° on a British unit.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AC 2731)
U 354 AC 2735)
U 703 AC 2737)
U 363 AC 2762) on passage.
U 997 AC 2756)
U 344 AC 2758)
U 668 AC 2781)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 365, 425, 965, 968, 992 Hammerfest,
U 636, 995 Tromsö,
U 307, 312, 921, 956 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0903 U 995 put out from Tromsö, at 1830 put in to Hammerfest.
0800 U 636 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.
1830 U 711 put in to Hammerfest from AC 6430.
2000 U 668 on return passage from AC 2781 to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

7 boats proceeding to new attack areas.
3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas.

2018 Radio message 1920/767 received from "Brünner":

"Presume enemy submarines in approximately AC 1984, as in spite of "bellowing" signal strength of location in multi-unit hydrophone, on the surface in clear visibility nothing is

to be seen. After submerging again further west, nothing heard. Remaining submerged in vicinity until 0100."

0745 Radio message 0726/26 received from U 711 (Lange):

"1 submarine in AC 4896."

That square lies 20 miles northeast of the position reported by "Wedemeyer". It is probably the same submarine.

0915 Radio message 0725/35 received from U 711 (Lange):

"At 0641 in AC 4896 fired a T 5 torpedo at Russian submarine, type "S". Torpedo explosion after 9 minutes 50 seconds. Submarine then stopped engines. We surfaced and approached, but it made off at high speed, course 340°, lost in rain squall."

1214 Radio message 1012/40 received from U 711 (Lange):

"Large patch of oil at the place of torpedoing. Nothing found on various searching courses because of deterioration of visibility: no hydrophone bearing. Request aircraft operations, as submarine appears to be unfit for diving. Continuing return passage."

1320 Radio message 1231/765 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"In AC 2741 2 vessels with Asdic. Make off to southwest. Fix inexact, fog."

1823 Radio message 1743/766 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"In AC 1984 scraping location noises, bearing 300°."

1945 Radio message 1911/768 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"In AC 2748 exactly, location by explosive soundings: similar noises in the immediate vicinity. Good opportunities to take bearings. Not from surface vessels, no secondary noises, speedy deviation, short pauses roughly each second. Hammering as in a smithy up to signal strength 5. Passed. Continue passage as ordered."

The report almost leads us to suppose that it is a buoy, particularly as there are no screw

noises to be heard in spite of the speedy deviation.

1245 Radio message 1209/763 sent:

"1. "Sthamer": Report if attacked carrier can be "Furious".

2. "Sthamer", "Pietsch": if unable to transmit, return to Andfjord - Narvik. At 1200 on 29 August be at "Schwarz 25"."

The supposition that it is "Furious", is the result of a P.O.W.'s statement, naming the carriers taking part in the attack on the "Tirpitz" on 24 August, but no auxiliary carrier was mentioned.
"Pietsch" and "Sthamer" have still not reported in spite of my request.

2112 Radio message 2103/769 sent:

" "Borger": at 0000 give short weather report."

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were transmitted to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

(d) Miscellaneous:

2020 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4353 A Ops. 1 sent to 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"Transfer order for U 315 (Zoller):

1. Put out from Narvik on the forenoon of 28 August for Narvik/Ramsund.

2. Inner leads procedure to Frohavet, then at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 13, make for Westfjord.

3. Report probable time of arrival at approach point by short signal, also passing of "V 1".

4. Radio frequency "Anton II", Northern Waters very long wave. After making fast at Ramsund, switch to Base frequency "MC", 479 kc/s.

5. Expect enemy submarines and aircraft, even in the fjords."

0350 Teleprinter message G 2615 received from Naval

War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Fuehrer approves Knight's Cross for "Lange" (U 711). Arrange for ceremony."

V. Reports of successes:

Torpedoing of Russian submarine by U 711 (Lange) is accepted.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), eighth operation ("Schneehuhn"), see Appendix II/2

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

In answer to the request made on 24 August by Naval Chief Command, Norway to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. for the allocation of U-boats to help in setting up meteorological radio stations on Hope Island, Bear Island and South Point, Spitsbergen,

2240 teleprinter message Most Secret 2672 was received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Reference Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff Most Secret 10467 A 1 M, U-boats are available at given dates."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"The boats returning from the action against PQ 32 are apparently still in contact with destroyer search groups or even with drifting acoustic decoys."

Re IV (d):

"The radio silence from Kara Sea continues, but the Russian radio traffic from the Dikson - Belushya area indicates further enemy brushes with our boats."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0710, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No reports received.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes. Islands of St. Dimon and Syderö examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively reconnaissance in the northern North Sea. (25 aircraft).
Iokanka area: 2 guardships, 1 minesweeper and 2 guardboats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Gremyashchi", 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper and 4 guardboats. Radio transmissions of first priority from Dikson and Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters, Archangel and Belushya to Dikson, Dikson to Belushya and Polyarno, Archangel to all naval forces in the White Sea. Broadcast of urgent radio messages on 28 August. Routine at 0000, Rugby broadcasts, Serios Nos. HD and GA indicate further activity of British units in Northern Waters.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Luftflotte Command 5 wired in teleprinter message G 12211/44 Ic:

"Reports of carrier operations on 22 and 23 August were confirmed by prisoners' statements.

Independently of the PQ convoy escort, the following battle group was deployed against the "Tirpitz": aircraft carriers "Formidable" and "Furious", also a third large unidentified carrier of new construction, battleship "Duke of York", 2 cruisers of "Kent" class and 7 destroyers. PQ convoy was escorted by 2 probable auxiliary aircraft carriers."

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AB 2657)
U 703 AB 2682)
U 363 AB 3922) on passage.
U 997 AB 3958)

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 365, 425, 711, 965, 968, 992, 995 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsö,
U 307, 312, 921, 956 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0900 U 636 put out from Tromsö, at 1900 put in to Hammerfest.
1030 U 711, 365 put out from Hammerfest for Harstad.
1700 U 956 put out from Narvik for Tromsö.
1830 U 668 put in to Hammerfest from AC 2781.
U 344, 354 on return passage from the operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.
1400 Group "Trutz" proceeding to new attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: U 394 to AB 3819, U 997 to AB 6387, U 363 to AB 6816, U 703 to AB 9345, U 703 to AB 9630.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats proceeding to new attack areas.

3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. On the subject of yesterday's Asdic report,

0020 radio message 2001/772 was received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"I do not consider it possible for an enemy submarine to be in my vicinity as the noise source has deviated by 80° in a few minutes while at our own crawling pace nothing could be heard at all except the over-loud rhythmic crackling. Finally in three separate bearings, the noise sources varied too much."

0020 Radio message 2005/773 received from U 668 (Eickstedt):

"Am ready for limited diving. Tube 5 loaded with T 5 torpedo, bow-cap not watertight. Starting to return. Shall arrive at "SR 1" at 1400. AC 4391."

0613 Radio message 0542/778 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Abandoned unsuccessful search. Proceeding to position line III."

The origin of the scraping location noises had not been determined by the boat.

1221 Radio message 1130/783 sent:

"1. After passing position line III, occupy the following attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: "Borger" AB 3819, "Lehmann" AB 6387, "Nees" AB 6816, "Brünner" AB 9345.

2. Meeting of "Brünner" with "Edelweiss" intended at point "H"."

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
On receipt of the codeword for "Edelweiss",

1335 radio message 1311/784 was sent:

" "Brünner" from Captain U-boats.
Proceed immediately at increased speed to AB 9630: report expected time of arrival."

1455 Radio message 1428/787 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Shall arrive at 1800 on 28 August."

(d) Miscellaneous:

In reply to yesterday's request,

0320 a short weather report was received from U 394 (Borger) in radio message 0319/777.

In Most Secret 4362 A Ops. 1 transfer order for U 956 (Mohs) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik on the evening of 27 August for Hammerfest.

2. From Harstad to Tromsö with pilot.

3. With harbor pilot, moor at Mining and Barrage Command, Tromsö and take in mines.

4. Thereafter, proceed to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit in accordance with Operational Order No. 16. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Sailing time is to be orally arranged there with 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Current escorts are to be fully used, but an effort is to be made to arrive in Hammerfest as soon as possible.

5. As far as Harstad radio frequency "MC", from Harstad radio frequency "Anton I", from Narvik Northern Waters very long wave.

6. Report by short signal on "MC" sailing times from Narvik and Harstad; arrival and departure from Tromsö to be sent on "Anton I"."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (b):

"According to radio intercept reports and radio transmissions from the boats, returning British naval forces are to be expected in Barents Sea."

p.p. Eckermann.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0400 to 0447. Mission abandoned in AC 7240 because of lack of cloud cover. No sighting reports.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0449 to 1214. Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0545 to 0752. Mission abandoned at 0647 in AF 5286 because cloud cover was too slight, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (28 aircraft).
Iokanka area: 1 guardship and 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyer "Gremyashchi", 2 guardships, 3 minesweepers and 1 guardboat.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship and 1 icebreaker.
Some first priority radio messages between Dikson and Belushya.
Freighters "British Piompipe", "Relinguzon", "Gacelay", "Dafid Jonsan", "Empire Butters", (all unmarked) put in to Dvina estuary (Archangel) on the evening of 26 August. (Probably some of the PQ convoy which put in to Murmansk on the evening of 24 August).
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AB 3819)
U 997 AB 6387)
U 363 AB 6816) in attack areas, depth
U 703 AB 9630) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 957 Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 636, 668, 965, 968, 992, 995
Hammerfest,
U 956 Tromsö,
U 307, 312, 921 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 315, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0745 U 956 put out from Tromsö, at 1440 put in to Hammerfest.

1012 U 711, 365 put in to Harstad from Tromsö, at 1200 put out to Harstad, at 1815 put in to Narvik.

1900 U 315 put out from Bergen on open water passage to Narvik.
U 344, 354 on return passage from operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas. Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.

U 703 (Brünner) proceeding as escort boat for coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen) for operation "Edelweiss".

1147 Radio message 1037/796 sent:

"Brünner" from Captain U-boats.

"1. "Edelweiss" will be at point "H" at 1800. From 2000 the escorting boat will, if necessary, send homing signal "O" on 400 kc/s for 5 minutes every quarter of an hour.

2. Execute operation in accordance with special order. If necessary, return to Andfjord - Narvik to refuel before laying the buoy, announcing your intention by short signal from AB 45."

The minelaying U-boats, which were lying ready in Hammerfest, were sent on operations.

1219 Radio message 1115/701 sent:

"The following will put out from Hammerfest: on the evening of 28 August, U 995 (Köhntopp), U 636 (Schendel), U 425 (Bentzien); on the evening of 29 August, U 956 (Mohs), U 992 (Falke), U 968 (Westphalen).
They will form group "Dachs", proceed via AC 51 and AC 69, further in accordance with Operational Order No. 16."

Apart from "Wedemeyer"'s report received on 18 August, no more reports from Kara Sea.

1348 Radio message 1309/703 sent:

" "Schaar" from Captain U-boats.
If a situation report is necessary, proceed to AF 80 for it, as there is apparently no radio contact east of Novaya Zemlya."

To the question of whether, in view of the possible loss of the materiel for the alternative store on U 354, operation "Haudegen" would be delayed, Admiral Polar Coast sent the following information in teleprinter message Most Secret 5703:

"Replacements have been arranged for all important materiel for alternative stores. Operation can be carried out at once."

In teleprinter message Most Secret 4390 A Ops. to Admiral Polar Coast and Naval Chief Command, Norway, the following was sent:

"Re Admiral Polar Coast Most Secret 5703 F I: U 307 (Herrle) will be ready on 30 August to

move to Tromsö as replacement for escort to "Haudegen". Boat has been ordered to report to Admiral Polar Coast."

(d) Miscellaneous:

In Most Secret 4378 A Ops. 1., transfer order for U 307 (Kerrle) was sent:

"1. Put out from Narvik on the forenoon of 29 August via Bogen and Ramsund to Harstad.

2. From Lödingen to Harstad with pilot.

3. Await further orders in Harstad. Boat is expected by Naval Harbor Master, Harstad.

4. Radio frequency as far as and including Harstad remains "MC", 479 kc/s., Northern Waters very long wave.

5. Report arrival at and departure from Bogen and Ramsund, also arrival at Harstad on "MC". Report sailing from Narvik by time short signal."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The arrival of PQ 32 has been further confirmed by the information on the ships putting in to Archangel. A return convoy is not expected before the unloading of the PQ convoy. As air reconnaissance had previously reported no large ships in such places as Kola Bay, we expect that the sequence to PQ 32 will be the return of naval forces only."

p.p. Eckermann.

---

29 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation.

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0359 to 0720, nothing to report, almost exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 on reconnaissance of harbor and railway installations at Archangel and Molotovsk from 0435 to 1020. Because of too heavy cloud cover, the assignment was not carried out. Reconnaissance of the White Sea from Dvina Bay to West Fairway was almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No reports.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0413 to 1115. Route 80% examined, north and northwest part of Jan Mayen exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0725 in AW 5252 1 merchant ship of 5-6,000 G.R.T., 1 merchant ship of 3,000 G.R.T., 1 merchant ship of 2,000 G.R.T., course 200°, speed 10 knots. Ships all lying deep in the water and with deck cargo, type of cargo not identified.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: lively flying activity (24 aircraft). 1 Iceland aircraft appeared.
Norwegian polar coast: lively, in part urgent radio transmissions to submarines in the operational area.
Iokanka area: 1 guardship and 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: flotilla leader "Baku", 2 guardships, 1 minelayer and 3 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 ice-breaker.
Dikson area: 1 guardship.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Britain: lively, in part very urgent Polyarno broadcasts, no Archangel broadcasts.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AB 5819)
U 997 AB 6387) in attack areas, depth
U 363 AB 6816) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

U 703 AB 6670 on special operation.
U 957 in Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 636, 668, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995 Hammerfest,
U 307, 312, 365, 711, 921 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0200 U 956 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsö.
0300 U 425, 636, 995 put out from Hammerfest on special operation.
1500 U 956, 968, 992 put out from Hammerfest on special operation.
2120 U 307 put out from Narvik for Harstad.
U 344, 354, on return passage from the operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.
1224 Group "Trutz" on passage: U 363 to AB 6780, U 394 to AB 5410.
U 315 proceeding via inner leads from Bergen to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

2209 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4156/44 received from Luftflotte 5 Ic:

"From 1412 onwards, one of the 2 aircraft carriers which had escorted the PQ convoy to Murmansk was again picked up by Svanvik and Kirkenes. A bearing of 028° was obtained at 1500. Possibly escort for return convoy. Further investigation necessary."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas.

2000 Radio message 1923/736 sent:

Group "Greif" from Captain U-boats:

"Your attention is again called to group frequency "Ulli I" for routines in accordance with Standing Order No. 216, as long as boats are not heard by control."

In this way we shall ensure that a unified command of the boats ensues from the most senior commander, even if connection with control breaks down.
Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) acting as escorting boat for coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen) for operation "Edelweiss".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
The sailing of "Kehdingen" on special operation "Edelweiss" was reported to the boats:

1127 Radio message 1003/725 sent:

"On the evening of 28 August, U 703 with trawler "Kehdingen" put out from Tromsö, proceeding via AB 3840 to the west. "Kehdingen": motor vessel of 500 G.R.T., 1 mast forward, open bridge, funnel and D/F apparatus of the same height, boat's davits aft, black hawsepipe, Russian flag. Ship is not to be stopped, if necessary call by recognition signals."

Ice reconnaissance will again be carried out for operation "Edelweiss" and the safety service boats will be detailed.

1318 Radio message 1224/729 sent:

"FW 200 will take off on ice reconnaissance at 1430. As safety service vessels the following are proceeding at increased speed: "Nees" to AB 6780, "Borger" to AB 5410."

1613 Radio message 1542/730 sent:

" "Brünner" from Captain U-boats.
Proceed immediately via AB 28, not 3840." (At request of Naval Chief Command, Norway.)

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 965 (Unverzagt) was sent to U-boat base Hammerfest in Most Secret 4386 A Ops. 1:

"1. First Gunnery Officer will deputize for the

wounded commander.

2. Put out from Hammerfest on the evening of 29 August via Tromsö to Narvik.

3. Escort as far as Tromsö. Make fast there with harbor pilot at Mining and Barrage Command. Give up mines. Boat is expected.

4. Thereafter proceed further with pilot to Ramsund. Take in torpedoes.

5. Radio frequency "Anton I", Northern Waters very long wave. From Lödingen switch to Base wave "MC", 479 kc/s. and report. Report making fast at Ramsund. Further orders follow.

6. If possible execute "Luchs" exercises. Observe Para. 8 of the order.

7. Unverzagt should resume command when he recovers."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

2110 Teleprinter message received from Commander, Altafjord:

"At 1700 on 29 August, some 60 carrier-borne aircraft attacked Altafjord. Smoke screen promptly laid. Several planes shot down, few casualties."

D. Survey of the situation:

2209 Teleprinter message Most Secret 029922 A Ops. received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Query: What are the chances of another QP convoy running in the near future?"

Teleprinter message Most Secret 4395 A Ops. was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"In reply to your Most Secret 029922 A Ops of 29 August:
A return convoy usually runs in conjunction with the next PQ convoy after the ships have been unloaded. The unladen steamers have several times been observed waiting for a long time for such an opportunity."

The laden steamers sighted by air reconnaissance seem to indicate the improbability of a return convoy in the near future. The carrier bearings probably indicate only returning naval forces

which as we have learned, do not remain in a Russian port for very long. Before PQ 32 ran, no adequately large merchant ships were observed in the north Russian ports to enable the formation of a return convoy now.

p.p. Eckermann.

---

30 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0436 to 1334. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0458 to 1137. Route and east part of Jan Mayen 40% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Destroyer report from "Schendel",
destroyer report from "Köhntopp".

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0915 in AE 8940 1 heavy cruiser, course east, high speed, class not identified because of shower; not known whether it is an independent vessel or part of a formation.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: moderate number of radio transmissions. At 1322 on 29 August codewords of very high priority, at 1555 radio message of first priority to all submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku" and 1 motor boat.

Iokanka area: 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Ponoi area: 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 5 guardships, 1 minelayer, 5 minesweepers and 1 guardboat.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: destroyer "Uritski" and 1 guardship.
Messages of first priority from Belushya to Dikson, and from Archangel and Dikson to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area. At 1506 on 29 August Svanvik obtained a bearing of 028° on British radio traffic (probably from carrier). At 1620 Svanvik obtained a bearing of 311° on a U.S. unit.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 997 AB 6387 in the attack area, depth of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

Group "Dachs":

U 425 AC 5430)
U 636 AC 5430)
U 995 AC 5430) on passage.
U 956 AC 4950)
U 968 AC 4950)
U 992 AC 4950)

U 363 AB 6780 on special operation.
U 394 AB 5410 on special operation.
U 703 AB 2840 on special operation.
U 957 in Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 965 Hammerfest,
U 307 Harstad,
U 312, 365, 711, 921 Narvik,
U 315, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0210 U 307 put in to Harstad from Narvik. 1840 put out again for Tromsö.

0315 U 315 put in to Trondheim after proceeding via inner leads from Bergen.

0820 U 363, 394 on return passage to former attack areas.
U 344, 354 on return passage from the operational area to Andfjord - Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 boat disposed southwest of Bear Island passage.
3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas.

0650 Short signal 0641/746 received from "Schendel":

"At 0300 3 destroyers in AC 5423."

1107 Short signal 1107/750 received from U 995 (Kühntopp):

"4 destroyers in AC 5157."

This may be the same destroyer group, probably a search group.

1855 Radio message 1624/755 received from "Borger":

"AB 5235. Inexact convoy location (minimum signal strength broad), bearing 082° and 087° (2 sources). I shall use the following short signals: "UOJD" = Have taken a bearing of ---° on first radio source, am in square ----, etc. to "UOMG" = Have taken a bearing on fourth radio source ---."

It appears to be a returning warship formation (possibly carrier formation.)

As a result of "Borger"'s report,

2042 radio message 2015/759 was sent:

" "Borger": expect returning carriers: you are free to attack."

2124 Radio message 2056/760 sent:

"Nees", "Lehmann" from Captain U-boats.

"You are free to act on "Borger"'s report. Possible formation in AB 61 on southwesterly course."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 363 (Nees) and U 394 (Borger) in formation as safety service vessels for ice reconnaissance.

U 703 (Brünner) as escorting boat for coast-guard ship No. 6 (Kohdingen) for operation "Edelweiss".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
Group "Dachs" on minelaying operations.

0817 Radio message 0758/747 sent:

" "Borger", "Nees" from Captain U-boats.
Ice reconnaissance successfully concluded.
Return to former attack areas at economical speed."

1522 Radio message 1431/754 sent:

"Greif" and "Dachs" from Captain U-boats:

"1. On 12 August "Wedemeyer" reported a steamer escorted from Yugorski Strait eastwards by Diesel vessels of about 600 tons, no funnel, speed 15 knots, mast look-out, no location, slight attacking value, depth charges. No minesweeping activity. Later, expect destroyers to be transferred to Kara Sea.

2. Camouflage procedure off the coast betrayed by "Lange" on 12 August.

3. Act in accordance with the note in Operational Order No. 16."

1250 Radio message 1208/752 sent:

" "Brünner" from Captain U-boats.
Air reconnaissance reported at 2045 on 29 August in AA 5343: 1 vessel of 400 G.R.T., type unidentified, gray streaked special vessel with sickle bow, equipped for ice passage. 1 low funnel, forward a high top-mast, course 060°. Ice report follows."

2143 Ice report was sent to "Brünner" in radio message 2057/761.

(d) Miscellaneous:

1355 Radio message 1326/753 sent:

"Group "Greif", especially "Schaar" from Captain U-boats.
You are again directed to take measures to avoid any danger of "Zaunkönig" falling into enemy hands during attacks and operations near land."

The reminder was necessary because some boats were operating in shallow water. "Schaar" has made a landing as a result of "Lange"'s report.

1455 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4404 A Ops. 1 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 344 (Pietsch) is missing. Put out from Narvik at 1300 on 3 August. Set on PQ 32. Last report on 22 August in radio message 0201/717 from AB 611 concerning blower trouble. No further clues. Loss presumed due to the convoy escort. U 354 (Sthamer) is missing. Put out from Narvik at 1845 on 21 August. Set on PQ 32. Last message was short signal 0020/793 on 24 August, reporting carrier-borne aircraft in AC 5720. No further clues. Loss presumed due to the convoy escort.
Both boats failed to report on request on 25 August and up to now have not complied with the order to put in to Andfjord on 29 August."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 668 (Eickstedt), second operation, see Appendix II/3.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 7339 U 1 received from Admiral Commanding U-boats:

"In view of the altered situation, administrative subordination of operational U-boats will be as follows until further orders:

1. Boats putting out from Germany for Atlantic operations are assigned to 11th U-boat Flotilla, from which exactly the same number of northern area boats are withdrawn and allotted to 13th U-boat Flotilla, which will soon be employed in Northern Waters only. 11th U-boat Flotilla becomes the Atlantic flotilla, but is temporarily subordinated to Captain U-boats Central.

2. Reference the new formation of 33rd U-boat Flotilla in Flensburg on 15 September. It becomes a reception and disposal flotilla for operational boats returning from the western area; under command of Captain U-boats, East, later under the present Captain U-boats, West.

3. New regulations (if any) after clarification of the general situation.

E. Survey of the situation:

1836 Teleprinter message Most Secret 03020 A Ops. received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"In our opinion a QP convoy may run at any time. Compare destroyer report by "Schendel" and bearing on carrier obtained by Svanvik. Report intentions."

Teleprinter message Most Secret 4430 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats:

"Reference your Most Secret 03020 A Ops. of 30 August on the subject of the QP convoy:

1. Air reconnaissance reports ships still putting in to Gorlo Strait on 29 August. They lie low in the water. First arrival observed there on 26 August.

2. Before PQ 32, only small units were intercepted in Kola Bay.

3. The bearing obtained by Svanvik, the reports from "Schendel" and "Köhntopp" of destroyers in AC 51 and "Borger"'s reports on radio traffic east of AB 5235 indicate returning naval forces rather than a convoy.

4. It does not therefore seem likely that a QP convoy will run soon.

5. Apart from the special operation in progress at present, only 3 boats are in the operational area; a further seven at the most will be ready shortly in northern ports.

6. Intention: to attack units returning to the west, employing only the boats in the operational area. Formation of a new group planned for next PQ convoy, for the present undisturbed execution of special operations."

p.p. Eckermann.

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31 August, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No reports.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0500 to 1057. At 0756 mission abandoned in AB 7481 because of lack of cloud cover. Route 95% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Norwegian polar coast: lively radio traffic. At 2118 a very urgent codeword was transmitted to submarines in the operational area.
Radio transmissions of first priority from Belushya to Dikson, Dikson to all naval forces in Northern Waters and Polyarno, Iokanka to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
On the evening of 29 August and during the morning and evening of 30 August, naval forces received urgent messages from Archangel.
Destroyer "Uritski" at sea in the Amderma area on the morning of 30 August.
Iokanka area: 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 guardship and 4 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper and 1 ice-breaker.
Dikson area: 2 guardships and 4 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: at 2200 on 30 August obtained a bearing of 274° on a British unit.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AB 3819)
U 997 AB 6387) in attack areas, depth of sweep
U 363 AB 6816) 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 85)
U 362 AT 54) in Kara Sea attack areas.
U 739 AT 64)

Group "Dachs":

U 425 AC 5665)
U 636 AC 5667)
U 995 AC 5637) on passage.
U 956 AC 5276)
U 968 AC 5524)
U 992 AC 5532)

U 703 AB 3689 on special operation.
U 957 in Kara Sea on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 965 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 365, 711, 921 Narvik,
U 315, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0230 U 307 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.
1200 U 315 put out from Trondheim on open water passage to Hammerfest.
1510 U 957 on return passage from Kara Sea to Hammerfest.
2215 Group "Greif" proceeding to position line 1 from AS 1992 to AS 4331.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island passage. 3 boats in Kara Sea attack areas.

1310 Radio message 1146 received from "Borger":

"Last convoy locations: at 2045 in grid square 2977 first or second radio source, bearing 094°, at 0000 in grid square 2985 third radio source, bearing 208°. Since then no more clues, no hydrophone bearings."

1610 Radio message 1355 received from "Borger":

"In grid square 3496 4 to 6 radio sources, bearing 150° to 160° exactly."

Apparently the formation was on a southwesterly course. By dead reckoning its speed was only 10 to 11 knots, thus it might either be a returning unit which has been damaged, or a convoy. Latter is hardly credible, as no clues indicate the running of a QP convoy.

Both boats "Borger" and "Nees" were again directed to the bearing. "Borger"'s northerly course cannot be explained, as we accept a southwesterly course for the formation.

1624 Radio message 1520/776 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"AB 6151. Intend to return at 2400. Require 3.7 cm. rammer. Radar set out of order, shot through by a bullet from a plane on 22 August. New cable. Port external fuel tank No. 4 also pierced."

1841 Radio message 1801/777 sent:

"According to bearings, formation is expected to be in AB 6260 at 1400, probably on southwesterly course. "Borger" and "Nees": operate on it. "Borger"'s northerly course not understood."

"Lehmann", who intended to return, was also set on to the formation.

2337 Radio message 2247/782 sent:

" "Lehmann": if possible continue to operate on probable formation. Then return to Andfjord - Narvik."

1910 Radio message 1510/778 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"For four days unable to make contact when transmitting, therefore already in AT 21. Proceeding to Hammerfest for immediate refuelling and to pass on facts gained from P.O.W. (among them a communications officer on the staff of S.O. Communications, Dikson). Important facts gained for U-boat operations. Definite pointers to convoy. Propose 4 boats as soon as possible in formation 12 miles off the coast seawards, depth of sweep depending on visibility. Proceed from Kamoni Island eastwards, low speed, group radio frequency."

Hence "Schaar" was returning. Apparently he had made another landing.
On "Schaar"'s report, the 3 boats "Franze", "Franz" and "Mangold" were sent to operate.

2303 Radio message 2215/781 sent:

"Group "Greif": proceed to position line 1 from AS 1982 to 4331, order "Franze", "Franz", "Mangold". Be there at 2200 on 3 September. Group radio frequency, "Franze" as control. In shallow water preliminary flooding of tanks."

Radio intercept reports on traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to group "Greif".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) as escorting boat for coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen) for operation "Edelweiss".
U 957 (Schaar) on reconnaissance of the West Siberian Sea route.
Group "Dachs" on minelaying operations.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 957 (Schaar) proceeding from AT 21 to Hammerfest.

0044 Radio message 2341/785 sent:

" "Schaar" from Captain U-boats.

1. Expect carrier-borne aircraft and destroyer groups in AC 50. Increased danger from Russian submarines 60 miles off the approaches.

2. Send short report from Hammerfest. From there proceed immediately with Lt. Kentmann and prisoners."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer), fifth operation (second in Northern Waters) and short report from U 711 (Lange), continuation of seventh operation, see Appendix II/4,5.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

"Barents Sea: "Borger", up to now the only boat with an intermediate wave D/F apparatus, provided excellent information on a westbound formation. As far as the courses can be estimated from dead reckoning, it might be a convoy or even slow naval forces, but might even be the heavy unit torpedoed by "Lange". In equipping several boats to take bearings on radio traffic, prospects are favorable for intercepting convoys and hauling ahead independently even without any air reconnaissance.
Kara Sea: "Schaar" appears to have captured a Russian lighthouse and gained important information on the traffic to be expected. Gradually the recent excited radio traffic in the Kara Sea area becomes intelligible."

p.p. Eckermann.

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APPENDIX I/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
S.O.s only 123/44 A Ops.

On board, 19 August, 1944.

Sailing order for coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen), operation "Edelweiss".

1. Put out from Narvik for Tromsö on route "Rot" on the forenoon of 20 August. Take on dogs from "Hessen". Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Tromsö. Pilot has been arranged.

2. In Tromsö anchor in Ramfjord. Crew not to go ashore. Report to the Naval Harbor Master and after the arrival of U 703, report with Lt. Brünner to Admiral Polar Coast in Tromsdalen, Haus Lyn.

3. Put out from Tromsö with U 703 as soon as ready, escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Report time of departure at point "H" by Emergency teleprinter message to Naval Chief Command, Norway and Captain U-boats, Norway. Codeword "Sonnenblume" received in Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret S.O.s only 1118 A 1 of 18 August.

4. Proceed under leadership of U 703 via AB 3840 to AA 3490 and then independently on a northwesterly course in accordance with the Operational Order. U 703 will stand on and off the ice limit for two more days after parting and will then return.
Naval Chief Command, Norway wired in Most Secret 1117 A 1 S.O.s only of 18 August: Very favorable ice conditions. The inner North Bay lies in 75° N, 14° W. Approach point is in the northern part of AA 37, from there direct northwesterly course, deviating somewhat westwards in grid square 26, where there is some quite harmless new ice formation. Second reconnaissance flight intended as planned.

5. Procedure in U-boat escort:

(a) Escort leader is the commander of the U-boat.

(b) U-boat normally steers astern of the escorted ship within signaling range. Signal traffic, particularly the fast but unobtrusive transmission of enemy sightings, should be practised.

(c) A rendezvous is to be arranged daily for the following morning at 0800, in case contact is lost through bad weather or encounters with the enemy.

(d) In enemy encounters, it is vital that the type of ship and the fact that she is escorted by a U-boat should not be discovered. The boat will therefore submerge unobserved and watch through the periscope. The ship should steer a dummy course or try to draw the enemy naval forces across the U-boat diving position, so that the boat can attack. If an enemy aircraft attacks, the boat should surface if possible to give help. If there is no more danger, the ship will indicate by 3 echoes on the echo-sounder that the boat can surface. After every encounter with the enemy, the rendezvous will be 20 miles from the diving position in the direction of the course last steered.

(e) In the event of damage or inability to manoeuver, vessels will render mutual assistance and, if possible, attempt a tow. In case of emergency, the U-boat will report by radio.

(f) Encounters with U-boats will, if possible, be avoided. If an unknown submarine is sighted, it is to be regarded as hostile until the correct recognition signal is given.

6. Return passage and further procedure in accordance with the Operational Order.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
4192 A Ops.

On board, 18 August, 1944.

Sailing order for coastguard ship No. 3 (Busch), operation "Haudegen".

1. Put out from Narvik via Bogen - Harstad on route "Rot" for Tromsö on the forenoon of 19 August. Make fast at the new pier in Bogen: report to Hut 8 at 0800. Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Tromsö. Pilot has been arranged. The ship is expected at Naval Equipment and Repairs Office, Bogen, Supply Office, Harstad and in Tromsö.

2. Anchor in Tromsö in the south roads. Crew not to go ashore. Commander to report to the Naval Harbor Master and after the arrival of U 354 to report to Admiral Polar Coast in Tromsdalen, Haus Lyn, with Lt. Sthamer. Report promptly by Emergency teleprinter message (Most Secret) to Naval Chief Command, Norway and Captain U-boats, Norway, when ready to put out. Ice reconnaissance intended after sailing.

3. On receipt of the codeword, put out from Tromsö with U 354 in accordance with Operational Order "Haudegen". Escort provided by 3rd Inshore Defenses Unit. Report time of departure at point "H" by Emergency teleprinter message to Naval Chief Command, Norway and Captain U-boats, Norway.

4. Proceed under leadership of U 354 via AB 3840 and further at a distance of 50 miles from the coast in accordance with the Operational Order.

5. Procedure in U-boat escort:

   (a) Escort leader is the commander of the U-boat.

   (b) U-boat will normally steer astern of the escorted ship within signaling range. Signal traffic, particularly the fast but unobtrusive transmission of enemy sightings, should be practised.

   (c) A rendezvous is to be arranged daily for the following morning at 0800, in case contact is lost through bad weather or encounters with the enemy.

   (d) In enemy encounters, it is vital that the type of

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APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency: Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Immediate. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Red - Most Secret.

Short report from U 711 (Lange), seventh operation.

29 July 1944	Put out from Narvik on transfer passage to Hammerfest.
2 August	Put out.
19 August	Put in to Hammerfest. Radio intercept group "Kentmann" also on board.
2 - 10 August	Proceeded via AF 88 to the operational area AS 20.
10 - 12 August	In AS 2781 boat lay on the bottom in water 7·5 meters deep close to Wardroper Island to survey the shipping traffic undisturbed and for radio reconnaissance. Used nets to camouflage the tower which jutted out.
11 August	At 1700, while covering the aircraft frequency, intercepted a "Catalina", which passed with northerly course, altitude 200 meters, range 3,000 meters to the west: boat not observed.
12 August	At 0915 the "Catalina" picked up by radio monitoring ran in to the boat, altitude 200 meters: boat de-camouflaged shortly before. Sudden burst of fire. Could not drive it off as 3.7 cm. gun failed after the third shot. Blew up and cast off. Aircraft continued to shadow, made several runs-in but never to within an effective firing range. Summoned another aircraft in several

radio messages, so after 30 minutes we submerged and made off.
At 1445 and 1649 several explosions in the direction of AS 2781. Several radio reports showed that the boat had been observed. No radio communication. Strong air patrols intercepted on the radio from the attack area which we had left.

13 August — Proceeded to meet "Schaar" in AS 2125, as ordered by radio. At 0138 in AS 2497 we submerged because of aircraft noise.
At 0600 in AS 2459 we submerged because of aircraft noise; both had previously been intercepted by radio group "Kentmann".

14 August — At 1015 proceeded at periscope depth in the direction of "Schaar"'s hydrophone. Attack periscope damaged by ice.
At 1045 met "Schaar": transferred 1 radio intercept operator with gear, provisions, fuel and oil.
Then commenced return passage because of damage to the attack periscope. Reported by radio.

17 August — In AT 1455 drifting meteorological buoy out of control.

Drifting mines:

19 August AC 4945, AC 4947, AC 4895 and AC 4897. Type Mark XX

Drift ice of varying thickness east of 77° E, southern boundary 76° N, south and west of there no ice. Although we transmitted several radio messages, there was no communication from Kara Sea. The radio monitoring of the aircraft frequencies was worthwhile. The gathering of fairly strong escort forces and the lively air patrol would appear to indicate shipping traffic in the near future.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

"Skillfully executed operation, but the early detection on 12 August might perhaps have been avoided as it makes operations for the other boats more difficult and, in addition, the type of camouflage has been exposed."

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4248 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), eighth operation (Schneehuhn).

4 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
23 August	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded to Spitsbergen, Ice Fjord with scout unit "Schneehuhn".
6 August	Unit landed at Diabasodde, Sassenfjord. Then anchored in Gipsvika.
7 August	Sighted 3 destroyers and 3 vessels off Barentsberg. Weighed anchor, steered towards Templefjord. Did not attack because of the bad state of the battery and insufficient underwater range.
8 August	Anchored at Gasöyane.
11 August	Picked up the scout unit and left Ice Fjord.
12 August	Landed the unit at Cape Björset. Anchored at Van Muydenbukt. Reconnaissance.
16 August	While on reconnaissance, destroyed 2 secondary military camps near the bay.
17 August	Svoagruva: using guns and explosives, destroyed well-maintained mine, power station with several Diesel generators, radio station, settlement and secondary military camp of about 40 buildings.

18 August — At Camp Morton, destroyed a large armed cutter of 100 G.R.T. after spirited defense. Took on the scout unit at Russekjeila.

19 August — Destroyed the occupied anti-aircraft site at Revneset with the cooperation of the scout unit which attacked it from land. Reconnaissance of Ny-Aalesund. Returned via the south tip of Spitsbergen and Bear Island.

Report from the scout unit: Only Norwegian anti-aircraft soldiers with British equipment in Ice Fjord: at the most 250 men in Advent Bay, main camp at Sverdrupfjell. 4 anti-aircraft sites. Airfield unusable. Only 1 anti-aircraft site occupied in Barentsberg.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Skillful, successful landing operation by the tried commander.
Successes: 1 anti-aircraft site, 1 mine and several military camps destroyed; 1 armed cutter destroyed.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4534 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Immediate. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Yellow - Most Secret.

Short report from U 668 (Eickstedt), second operation (Trutz).

19 July	Put out from Narvik.
26 August	Put in to Hammerfest.
19 July	Proceeded via AB 9480 and 9446 to attack area AB 9189.
20 July	In AB 9442 at periscope depth. "Catalina", short location transmission in AB 9443 on "Fliege".
21 July	In AB 9425 "Liberator" on parallel flight. In AB 9152 short location transmission.
22 July	In AB 9431 at periscope depth, spotted "Liberator". AB 9435 short location transmission. Attack area on 27 July AB 6795.
5 August	In AB 5967.
8 August	In AB 5369, depth of sweep 50 miles.
12 August	Proceeded to AB 11 to determine the ice limit.
14, 15 August	From AEH 8994 via AA 3512 to AA 6153 along the ice limit as far as 74° N.
18 August	Attack area AB 5645. No sighting.
21 August	At 1600 operated on the convoy reported in AB 5450.

22 August — Submerged from a carrier-borne aircraft in each of the following: AC 7196, 1817, 1824, 1826, 1831 and from 4 aircraft in 1844. (All "Swordfish").

23 August — Submerged from a carrier-borne aircraft in 1834. At 0300 on the surface in 1839 drove off an aircraft, which remained at the limit of the 2 cm. gun range: 3·7 cm. gun very inclined to jam. In parts of the samson lever and the rammer, the metal was too soft. After submerging, 2 bombs were dropped, dived to A-35. Slight damage. Carrier-borne aircraft at periscope depth in AC 1517 dropped bombs in an oil patch 500 meters astern. 2 alarms due to Russian flying boat in AC 5416. Carrier-borne aircraft in 5464 dropped a depth charge, dived to A + 20.

24 August — At 0100 alarm due to short location transmission in 290° in AC 5574. Later at 0200 two misses with T 5 torpedoes fired at a destroyer belonging to a search formation. Possible that a hit was scored on another unit of the search formation. Procedure "Trier" before firing and continuous alteration of position: "Koblenz" after firing. Depth charges presumed from sound of explosions. Then depth charge pursuit. Proceeded at depth 2A to 2A + 20 until 0200 on 25 August. The destroyer kept coming from the same side ahead of the boat at slight speed, stopped apparently to listen, then came nearer and used a location set, which probably sent out the singing note which faded and swelled (over 1,000 cycles) in equal revolutions. Roughly abeam the boat, depth charges were dropped ½ - 1 minute after the location transmission. Then the destroyer again went ahead of the boat at slight speed. The decoys had little effect in preventing the discovery of the boat.

25 August — At 0300 surfaced after all our reserves were used up. Destroyer making off in AC 5765, just visible. Boat withdrew to the coast: again able to dive. Steered towards approach point for position line in AC 1991. 2 submarine silhouettes in 7361 and 5784, probably Russian submarines.

26 August — Commenced return passage from AC 4391 because of leak in loaded stern tube (bow-cap jammed).

Drifting mines, apparently Mark XX: on 21 July in AB 9192, 24 July in 9173, 25 July in 9311 (2 mines), 11 August in 5356, 12 August in 5334, 22 August in AC 1796, 23 August in AC 4395, 26 August in 4677, all more or less rusted.

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Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Unsuccessful operation against strongly escorted convoy. Commander missed a chance to fire through bad fire control. One hit possible on unidentified unit.

2. Defensive procedure of search formations against T 5 torpedoes and 24 hours of depth charge pursuit confirmed several times.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4382 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/4

COPY

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Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer) fifth operation, (second in Northern Waters).

5 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
25 August	Put in to Hammerfest.
28 August	Put in to Narvik.
12 August	Reached attack area AT 64 via AF 88. Drifting mine in AC 4887 and another in 4947. Aircraft sighted in AC 7248. Before reaching AT 1339, 8 locations intercepted on "Fliege" and "Borkum". "Wanze" was out of order. Possibly "Hohentwiel" operated by the accompanying U 374.
12 August	At 1705 in AT 6437 masthead and escort, bearing 240°. Submerged off 30 meter line and ran in 6 miles under water. At 1853 in AT 6434 fan-of-three at a fully laden transport (5 loading hatches) with 3 escort boats (Diesel vessels of some 600 G.R.T. without funnels), probably "Chapaev" (3,560 G.R.T.), course 060°. 1 hit amidships. Engine out of action. At 1858 missed with T 5 torpedo on approaching escort boats and steamers. At 1905 T 5 fired at approaching escort boat. Hit after 1 minute 32 seconds. Presume boat sunk: 1. Noise of screws stopped. 2. Later only 2 escort boats heard and seen.

3. An escort boat dropped a fairway buoy at the presumed scene of sinking and lay there at anchor.

4. Drifting pinnaces which could not have come from any other ship sunk.

5. Flight of the third escort boat.

6. Depth charges were not dropped until 40 minutes later: quite ineffective. On the bottom in water 65 meters deep, reloaded 4 tubes. An escort boat lay at anchor 4 - 500 meters from us; this we discovered only after reloading. (Scene of sinking of first escort boat with buoy).
At 2345 T 3 torpedo fired at anchored boat. Hit after 44 seconds. Sinking observed after 5 minutes. Last escort boat made off at high speed beyond torpedo range in a northeasterly direction.

13 August — At 0104 finishing shot at steamer with no extensive effect.
At 0123 second finishing shot with T 5 torpedo and at 0153 steamer sank. From 16 August onwards, inexperienced patrol vessels and aircraft in the attack area. Otherwise no sightings.

18 August — Commenced return passage, since one of the last 2 T 5 torpedoes could not be used as water had reached it. No radio message received as to the success and procedure of the other boats in the eastern operation. Last sighted U 739 in AT 3322 on 10 August.

22 August — Proceeded at high speed to AC 4225 to strengthen the patrol line against the PQ convoy.

23 August — At 0300 lay in AC 2783. At 0425 drove off carrier-borne aircraft, 3·7 cm. gun functioned well. Then proceeded under water until 1405 because of destroyers and "Catalinas".

24 August — At 0120 in AC 5548 a destroyer on southwesterly course. At 0310 submerged from 2 destroyers and a carrier-borne aircraft firing rockets. 67 depth charges.
At 1650 commenced return passage from AC 5865.
At 1848 a destroyer, course 160°, high speed.

25 August — At 1008 in AC 7231 enemy submarine, submerged.

Experiences:

1. Kara Sea: very strong layering. Inexperienced air and sea patrols. Very seldom heard by control. Reception varying, very long wave good.

2. Searching destroyers proceeded in circles at 2 - 3 knots, making a loud grating noise.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed special operation. Although the commander had few torpedoes left, he was sent to intercept the PQ convoy with the other boats. Successes: 1 freighter ("Chapaev" class (?) 3,560 G.R.T.) and 2 escort boats sunk.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4437 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/5

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Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Immediate. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 711 (Lange), continuation of seventh operation.

22 August Put out from Hammerfest.

26 August Put in to Hammerfest.

28 August Put in to Narvik.

22 August Ceased passage to Kara Sea and operated on the PQ convoy reported by "Pietsch" and the German Air Force in AB 3818 and AB 6435.
At 0430 in AC 7251, submerged from an aircraft, bearing 140°, range 10,000 meters. Run in, type not recognized.
After receiving radio message 0948, boat joined group "Trutz" and occupied AC 4252 in the patrol line. From 1943 proceeded at maximum speed to new patrol line AC 2546 to 2785.

23 August At 0345 reached patrol line. At 0426 met "Wedemeyer". Carrier-borne aircraft, medium altitude, range 12,000 meters, submerged unobserved. "Wedemeyer" remained on the surface. At 0455 "Swordfish" circled over presumed diving position of "Wedemeyer". Made off to the northeast under water to evade the escorts which would surround the observed diving position.
At 0650 in AC 2729 2 masthead, bearing 004°, simultaneously broad band hydrophone bearing.

At 0655 3 carrier-borne aircraft above approaching formation, course 150°. At 0703 a battleship or heavy cruiser with high foremast, one thick funnel with cap, enemy bow right, angle 15°, zig-zagging by 20° every 20 minutes; 8 destroyers providing close and more remote escort to starboard, port and on the port bow, all "Churchill" class. At 0720 F.A.T. fan-of-two fired at heavy unit, as 1 tube was not functioning. Range 3,000 - 3,500 meters, speed 11 knots, enemy bow right, angle 80°. Torpedo explosion after 8 minutes 45 seconds. Heavy unit drew in the escort and set flag signal. Destroyers of the port escort formed up. Close starboard escort dropped to starboard. At 0728 T 5 fired at third destroyer of the starboard escort, range 1800 meters, enemy bow right, angle 150°, enemy speed 14 knots, tube-runner immediately on leaving the mine discharge. Loud torpedo explosion after 8 minutes 32 seconds, high explosion column from the target, which immediately dropped astern, forecastle well above water. At 0741 destroyer sank, at a distance of 4,000 meters. At 0742 starboard forward escort dropped depth charges.
From 0800 to 1145 strong air activity over the formation. 5 "Swordfish", 1 "Catalina". Destroyers dropped depth charges and we made off at periscope depth. At 1235 surfaced in AG 2726 and reported. Carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 192° (wide), unobserved.
At 1330 submerged from a carrier-borne aircraft which ran in from a distance of 1,800 meters, high altitude. From 1433 hauled ahead at maximum speed level with the convoy outside the close air escort. Contact with carrier-borne aircraft. At 1630 carrier-borne aircraft in southwest, unobserved. At 1932 in AC 2972 2 carrier-borne aircraft in southwest, range 12,000 meters, unobserved.

24 August

At 0407 in AC 6238 carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 270°, range 12,000 meters, unobserved. At 1037 in AC 9177 carrier-borne aircraft in the north, by dead reckoning ahead of the convoy. At 1058 submerged to listen out: various hydrophone bearings in north and northwest. No details. From 1500, searching courses. From 1857 operated on destroyer reported by "Brünner" in AC 5868. Red stars fired to attract attention, noted in "Brünner"'s report.

25 August

At 0135 in AC 5856 destroyer, bearing 265°, range 9,000 meters, southeasterly course, turned towards. At 0145 submerged to attack; at 0155 T 5 torpedo fired at approaching destroyer, firing angle 20°, but torpedo ran straight course on 35°, miss. Destroyer stopped, turned to starboard, enemy bow left, angle 90°, range 2,500 meters. At 0158 destroyer started up again with speed, turned towards; T 5 torpedo fired with action setting, dived to 2a + 20, torpedo explosion after 6 minutes 20 seconds. 1 minute later second explosion and loud sinking noises. Operated on increasingly loud hydrophone bearing in the north. At 0305 surfaced and proceeded towards hydrophone bearing in the north. At 0608 ordered to return.

26 August

At 0629 in AC 4896 a surfaced Russian submarine, Type "S", range 5,000 meters, not observed in this visibility, submerged to attack. At 0641 stern T 5 torpedo fired at submarine, enemy bow left, angle 90°, enemy speed 10 knots, range 2,000 meters. After 9 minutes 46 seconds torpedo explosion, no hydrophone bearing. At 0700 surfaced and approached stopped submarine which started up at high speed, made off and disappeared in rain squall. At 0738 no results from hydrophone searching courses, oil patch at torpedoing position, torpedo directed correctly according to hydrophone bearing. Failure could not be explained.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Ideal convoy operation which led to the commander receiving the Knights' Cross.
Successes: 2 destroyers sunk, 1 hit on heavy unit, 1 unexplained ineffective hit on Russian submarine Type "S".

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4438 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
S.O.s only 124/44 A Ops.

On board, 19 August, 1944.

Operational Order for U 703 (Brünner),
operation "Edelweiss".

I. Task:

1. Escorting of coastguard ship No. 6 ("Kehdingen") from Tromsö to the ice limit.

2. Laying of the meteorological buoys Nos. 132 and 133.

II. Enemy position:

1. Russian convoys are not likely at present, but carrier formations may appear at any time. Last operation was on 16 and 17 July, the attack on Altafjord ("Tirpitz").

2. Air patrol: From 17 to 22 July anti-submarine patrol flown by strong forces of "Liberators", "Catalinas" and "Sunderlands" as far as approximately 15° E and 72° N. Occasionally, flying boats were also observed off Ice Fjord. No aircraft were observed on Jan Mayen this year. Also see Northern Waters Directions No. 30.

3. No new information is available on Iceland. Expect shore location, patrol vessels and strong air patrol.

III. Own forces:

(a) U-boats: Group "Trutz" with 5 boats in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: U 344 (Pietsch) AB 5464, U 668 (v. Eickstedt) AB 5645, U 394 (Borger) AB 5967, U 363 (Nees) AB 6795, U 997 (Lehmann) AB 9189. Avoid strong air patrol by taking evasive action as far as the latitude of Bear Island.
Group "Greif" with 6 boats in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 365 (Wedemeyer), U 739 (Mangold).
Special operations: U 307 (Herrle) off the west coast of Spitsbergen, U 354(Sthamer) proceeding from Tromsö to the north.
Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for the others.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim to Jan Mayen and Banak to Bear Island. Further activity of aircraft and naval forces will be announced.

IV. Execution:

1. Move from Narvik - Bogen to Tromsö as soon as the meteorological buoys are transferred from Carinthia and the method of laying has been practised. Report time of sailing promptly on "MC". Proceed on route "Rot" at increased speed. Pilot from Lödingen as far as Tromsö.

2. Arrange anchorage at Tromsö with the Naval Harbor Master. Report to Admiral Polar Coast along with the commander of coastguard ship No. 6 ("Kehdingen") which is lying in Ramfjord.

3. Put out from Tromsö as quickly as possible with "Kehdingen". Escort provided by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit via point "H". Codeword for sailing has already been received by Naval Chief Command, Norway.

4. Escort "Kehdingen" via AB 3840 to AA 3490 as far as the ice limit. Leave "Kehdingen" there and for 2 more days stand on and off the ice limit.

5. Procedure in U-boat escort:

(a) Escort leader is the commander of the U-boat.

(b) U-boat will normally steer astern of the escorted ship within signaling range. Signal traffic, particularly the fast but unobtrusive transmission of enemy sightings, should be practised.

(c) A rendezvous is to be arranged daily for the following morning at 0800, in case contact is lost through bad weather or encounters with the enemy.

(d) In encounters with the enemy, it is vital that the type of ship and fact that she is escorted by a U-boat should not be discovered. The boat will therefore, submerge unobserved and watch through the periscope. The ship should steer a dummy course or try to draw the enemy naval forces across the U-boat diving position, so that the boat can attack. If an enemy aircraft attacks, the boat should surface if possible to give help. If there is no more danger, the ship will indicate by 3 echoes on the echo-sounder that the boat may surface. After every encounter with the enemy, the rendezvous will be 20 miles from the diving position in the direction of the course last steered.

(e) In the event of damage or inability to maneuver, vessels will render mutual assistance and if possible attempt a tow. In case of emergency, the boat will report by radio.

(f) Encounters with U-boats will, if possible, be avoided. If an unknown submarine is sighted, it is to be regarded as hostile until the correct recognition signal is given.

6. Then proceed unobserved to lay the meteorological buoys: No. 133 in 64°N, 15° W and No. 132 in 76° N, 51° E. More exact details on the advice of the accompanying Inspector Ernst. Remain unobserved at the expense of loss of speed. Certainty of location close in to the coast.
Report laying of buoys on frequency "Anton" by short signal affixing your series number, once you are sufficiently far from the spot. (Series No. 153 from AE 61).

7. Proceed on the Great Circle unless meanwhile ordered to put in at Narvik to replenish.

8. After laying the meteorological buoys, you are free to attack valuable targets in the area.

9. Return to Hammerfest after laying both meteorological buoys.

10. Operations always possible against reported enemy forces. Otherwise procedure in accordance with Operational Order No. 15.

V. Communications arrangements:

Frequency "Anton I" from Lödingen until the reporting of passing point "H", then independently on U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Listen to very long wave routine from Narvik.

VI. Equipment for 6 weeks, 80 cubic meters fuel, 5 T5 and 5 electric torpedoes. Roller for buoys.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX III/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
S.O.s only 134/44 A Ops.

On board, 28 August, 1944.

Operational Order for U 307 (Herrle),
operation "Haudegen".

I. Task:

1. Escorting of coastguard ship No. 3 ("Busch") from Tromsö to Nordaustland and back.

2. To assist in setting up meteorological station "Haudegen".

II. Enemy situation:

1. After an interval of 3 months another PQ convoy (32) escorted by 2 carriers ran from 21 to 24 August. (Aircraft reported: "Swordfish", "Corsairs", "Catalinas"). Simultaneously a carrier formation attacked the "Tirpitz" in Altafjord. It consisted of the battleship "Duke of York", carriers "Formidable" and "Furious" and a fairly large carrier of new construction, 2 cruisers of the "Kent" class and 7 destroyers. (Participating types of aircraft: "Seafires", "Barracudas", and "Martlets".) Forces are expected to return.

2. Air patrol: From 17 to 22 July air patrol was flown by strong forces of "Liberators", "Catalinas" and "Sunderlands" as far as approximately 15° E and 72° N. Occasionally flying boats were also observed off Ice Fjord.

3. In Ice Fjord there are about 2 companies of Norwegian - British anti-aircraft personnel. North of there, occasional reconnaissance is to be expected by armed motor vessels off the west and north coast. "Herrle" will have the latest information himself.

III. Own forces:

(a) U-boats: Group "Trutz" in attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: U 394 (Berger) AB 3819, U 997 (Lehmann) AB 6387, U 363 (Nees) AB 6816.
Group "Greif" with 4 boats in Kara Sea: U 957 (Schaar), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold).

On 28 and 29 August group "Dachs" will put out from Hammerfest with 6 boats via AC 51 for AC 69: U 956 (Mohs), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Kühntopp), U 992 (Falke), U 636 (Schendel), U 425 (Bentzien). Special operation: U 703 (Brünner) will proceed with "Edelweiss" on 28 August from Tromsö via AB 3840 to AA 3490. Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for the others.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim to Jan Mayen and Banak to Bear Island. Further details will be given on aircraft and naval forces. The meteorological flights are occasionally extended to cover Spitsbergen. (Ju 88s, BV 138s, FW 200s).

IV. Execution:

1. The crew is not to be informed of the type and aim of the operation before leaving Tromsö.

2. Proceed from Narvik to Tromsö on receipt of order.

3. Arrange anchorage at Tromsö with Naval Harbor Master. Report to Admiral Polar Coast along with the commander of coastguard ship No. 3 (Busch) which is lying in Ramfjord.

4. Put out from Tromsö with "Busch" on receipt of codeword "Mondschein" from Naval Chief Command, Norway. Escort as far as point "H". From there, escort "Busch" via AB 3840 and further at a distance of 50 miles from the coast round West Spitsbergen via North Cape from Nordaustland to Rijpfjord.

5. Procedure in U-boat escort:

(a) Escort leader is the commander of the U-boat.

(b) U-boat will normally steer astern of the escorted ship within signaling range. Signal traffic, particularly the fast but unobtrusive transmission of enemy sightings, should be practised.

(c) A rendezvous is to be arranged daily for the following morning at 0800, in case contact is lost through bad weather or encounters with the enemy.

(d) In encounters with the enemy it is vital that the type of ship and the fact that she is escorted by a U-boat should not be discovered. The boat will therefore submerge unobserved and watch through the periscope. The ship should steer a dummy course or try to draw the enemy naval forces across the U-boat diving position, so that the boat can attack. If an enemy

aircraft attacks, the boat should surface if possible to give help. If there is no more danger, the ship will indicate by 3 echoes on the echo-sounder that the boat may surface. After every encounter with the enemy, the rendezvous will be 20 miles from the diving position in the direction of the course last steered.

(e) In the event of damage or inability to manoeuver, vessels will render mutual assistance and, if possible, attempt a tow. In case of emergency, the boat will report by radio.

(f) Encounters with U-boats will, if possible, be avoided. If an unknown submarine is sighted, it is to be regarded as hostile until the correct recognition signal is given.

6. Before "Busch" puts in to Rijpfjord, reconnoiter the area, if possible by landing a scout unit. While "Busch" discharges her cargo there, set up a secondary camp in Walenberg Bay according to the directions of the leader of the meteorological unit, Dr. Doge, with whose requests for assistance you are to comply. If the ice situation or the enemy prevents landing in the intended place, the alternative plan is to proceed to the north side of West Spitsbergen. (Navigation report from U 737 will be carried on board).

7. After the execution, return with "Busch", approach route via Tromsö to Narvik. Report passing of point "H" from AB 23.

8. Operate on reported enemy forces only if given a special order. Otherwise procedure in accordance with Operational Order for Northern Waters U-boats No. 15.

9. Before entering port, the crew is to be instructed on the extreme secrecy of the operation even after its execution.

V. Communications arrangements:

1. Frequency "Anton I" from Harstad as far as point "H", then independently U-boat Northern Waters frequency.

2. Listen for very long wave routine from Narvik.

3. Preserve radio silence except for reports which are absolutely necessary for the execution of the operation or if observed by the enemy.

VI. Equipment for 6 weeks, 80 cubic meters fuel, 5 T 5 and 3 electric torpedoes. Reinforced rubber dinghy with outboard motor, material for secondary camp (such as Dr. Doge desires). Special charts.

p.p. Roche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX IV.

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

1. Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

2. Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

3. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

4. Immediate. For information Naval Chief Command, Norway.

5. Immediate. For information Luftflotte Command 5.

6. Immediate. For information Flieger Fuehrer 3.

7. Immediate. For information Flieger Fuehrer 5.

8. 11th U-boat Flotilla)) by express letter.

9. 13th U-boat Flotilla)

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report on the attack on PQ 32 from 21 to 24 August, 1944.

I. Course of the operation:

1. Did not operate on the fast cruiser formation reported by the meteorological aircraft on 20 August, lost in the uncertain conditions, we should betray our formation if we surfaced. Convoy not expected after the interval of 3 months.

2. Convoy intercepted by chance in AB 5450 on the morning of 21 August by the most northerly boat: 3 steamers sighted course 060°, speed 8 knots. U 344 (Pietsch) sank an escorting destroyer of the "Dido" class, which was following the steamers.

3. 5 boats of group "Trutz" and 4 more boats either ready to sail or returning were sent to operate.

4. Intention: To assemble the boats in close attacking formation ahead of the convoy, when re-intercepted by air patrol or by U-boats. No surface engagements

against the air escort because of the scarcity of boats and the unreliability of the 3·7 cm. gun. As long as there was any prospect of success, attacks in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

5. Convoy located by air reconnaissance in AB 3770 on the morning of 22 August. Then ordered patrol line northeast of Bear Island.

6. Boats forced southwards by carrier-borne aircraft from 1100 on 22 August. Patrol line relinquished in favor of independent hauling ahead.

7. On the afternoon of 22 August U 354 (Sthamer) put out and met a carrier formation off the coast north of Alta and sank an auxiliary carrier.

8. German air reconnaissance abandoned owing to lack of cloud cover and later temporarily canceled because of high losses. The air reconnaissance intended for the night of 23/24 August was also canceled, as it could no longer be effective in the operation and it would have served no purpose.

9. Convoy again intercepted in AC 1936 on the morning of 23 August by U 394 (Berger) and continuously reported - Commander made good use of the bearings taken on the convoy's traffic.

10. U 711 (Lange) scored a hit on a heavy unit in AC 2729.

11. Boats were mostly kept west of the convoy by strong carrier-borne forces of "Swordfish" and "Corsairs", also "Catalinas". They were able to attack only the destroyer search formations.

12. The operation was therefore abandoned in 72° N when the first land-based aircraft appeared. Return passage: convoy route searched.

II. Survey of the operation:

13. The number of boats was low because of the simultaneous operation in Kara Sea and the minelaying operations by 6 boats.

14. Due to lack of German air patrol in Northern Waters, the convoy came as a surprise. The hauling ahead for simultaneous unobserved attack by several U-boats was barred by strong enemy air cover in the almost continuous daylight; thus there were no prospects of success against ships, as the convoy speed of 10 knots prevented the boats from hauling ahead again independently. The attacks on heavy units were mere chance.

15. From 2 convoy reconnaissance operations in which 6 BV 138 took part, 3 aircraft were lost, although shadowing and homing signals were forbidden and the

flights were made with strong cloud cover. Aircraft with more endurance are essential for convoy reconnaissance. Without these, it is doubtful if U-boat operations will be successful.

16. U-boats report "Swordfish" aircraft operating with rockets by the convoy, perhaps also "Catalinas" and "Corsairs". Air defenses and strong destroyer formations operating against the main U-boat force were increased, while the outer boats in the north were less hampered. Shadower always summons several more aircraft to the attack in a short time. Smoke floats dropped at diving position.

17. Search formations of 2 destroyers and 2 frigates observed curving constantly, speed not above 5 knots, often stopped. Several T 5 torpedo failures. Depth charge pursuits for 24 hours.

18. Bearing on convoy radio traffic well exploited for unobtrusive shadowing.

19. Successes to date:

1 cruiser of the "Dido" class sunk,
1 auxiliary carrier sunk,
1 F.A.T. torpedo hit possible on heavy unit,
4 destroyers sunk,
1 hit on a destroyer)
1 hit on a frigate) probably sunk
2 further hits possible on search formation.

20. Up to now we have not any confirmed losses, but U 344 (Pietsch) and U 354 (Sthamer) have not reported as requested.

III. Conclusions:

21. In spite of the unfavorable situation, the U-boats have scored substantial successes by showing offensive spirit and making quick decisions. The main object, the attack on the core of the convoy, was not achieved owing to lack of reconnaissance and because of the strong carrier escort.

22. Enemy is attempting to obviate earlier heavy destroyer losses to T 5 torpedoes by employing fairly strong air defenses and by cautious procedure of the destroyers in the vicinity of the U-boats.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4341 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX V/1

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 956, first operation ("Butt").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. Southern part of Belushya Bay ("Butt I"):

71° 30·5' N, 52° 13' E.
71° 30·5' N, 52° 21' E.
71° 27·5' N, 52° 27·5' E.
71° 27·5' N, 52° 17' E.

Mines are to be laid from north to south on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Southern entrance to Kostin Strait ("Butt II"):

Alternative area.

70° 54·5' N, 53° 02' E.
70° 57' N, 53° 11' E.
70° 52' N, 53° 23' E.
70° 50' N, 53° 13' E.

Mines are to be laid from northeast to southwest on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 2 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 2 to 6 days. Firing unit DM 1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most

favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps, in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation do not permit minelaying while surfaced.
Assignment I was similarly carried out by U 601 (Grau) in 1943. (See War Diary). These mines are no longer active.

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APPENDIX V/2

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 968, second operation ("Lachs").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. Off Kanin Nos ("Lachs I"):

68° 44·5' N, 43° 9' E.
68° 39' N, 43° 8' E.
68° 39' N, 43° 16' E.
68° 44' N, 43° 23' E.
68° 40·5' N, 43° 23' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 300 to 500 meters.
No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Northwest of Kolguev ("Lachs II"):

Alternative area.

69° 24' N, 47° 45' E.
69° 28' N, 47° 52' E.
69° 23·5' N, 48° 20' E.
69° 20' N, 48° 15' E.

Mines are to be laid from east to west on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 2 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 2 to 6 days. Firing unit DM1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

For Assignment I steer to the minelaying area from the north. Do not proceed further south than 68° 55' N.
For Assignment II steer to the minelaying area from the northwest east of 48° E, do not proceed north of 69° 30' N: in the whole area do not proceed south of 69° N, as mines laid there earlier may still be live.
The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps, in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation should prevent minelaying while surfaced.

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APPENDIX V/3

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 995, third operation ("Hering").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. Area off the western exit from Yugorski Strait ("Hering I"):

69° 30' N, 59° 30' E.
69° 42·5' N, 59° 30' E.
69° 41' N, 59° 49' E.
69° 30' N, 59° 49' E.

Mines are to be laid from north to south on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Area east of Matveev ("Hering II"):

Alternative area.

69° 30' N, 58° 52' E.
69° 38' N, 58° 52' E.
69° 38' N, 59° 12' E.
69° 30' N, 59° 12' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 1 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 1 to 6 days. Firing unit DM1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation should prevent minelaying while surfaced.
Assignment I was similarly carried out by U 625 in 1943 (See War Diary). These mines have been made safe.

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APPENDIX V/4

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 992, fourth operation ("Sprotte").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. North of Kolguev ("Sprotte I"):

69° 31' N, 48° 57' E.
69° 40' N, 48° 47' E.
69° 41' N, 48° 58' E.
69° 32·5' N, 49° 08' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Area north of Russki Zavorot ("Sprotte II"):

Alternative area.

69° N, 53° 25' E.
69° 08' N, 53° 25' E.
69° 11' N, 53° 39' E.
69° N, 53° 39' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 1 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 1 to 6 days. Firing unit DM1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

For Assignment I, steer to the minelaying area from

the northeast. The line between the following points - (i) 70° N, 49° E, (ii) 69° 48' N, 49° E, (iii) 69° 45' N, 48° 35' E - and from there on 180° to the coast must not be crossed to the west, as earlier mines may still be live there. The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly, observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation should prevent minelaying from the surface.
Assignment II was similarly carried out by U 629 (Bugs) in 1943 (See War Diary). These mines have been made safe.

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APPENDIX V/5

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 636, fifth operation ("Forelle").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. Eastern exit from Pechora Bay ("Forelle I"):

68° 48·5' N, 57° 36' E.
68° 52·5' N, 57° 29' E.
68° 56·5' N, 57° 46' E.
68° 52·5' N, 57° 53' E.

Mines are to be laid from southwest to northeast on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Area off the eastern exit from Pechora Bay ("Forelle II"):

Alternative area.

69° 06' N, 58° 09' E.
69° 06' N, 57° 45' E.
69° 12' N, 58° 15' E.
69° 12' N, 57° 51' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 1 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 1 to 6 days. Firing unit DM1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly, observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps, in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation should prevent minelaying while surfaced.
Assignment I was similarly carried out by U 629 (Bugs) in 1943 (See War Diary). These mines have been made safe.

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APPENDIX V/6

Most Secret

Minelaying order for U 425, sixth operation ("Dorsch").

1. Assignment: Laying of minefield.

I. Western exit from Pechora Bay ("Dorsch I"):

68° 54' N, 55° 43' E.
69° 02' N, 55° 31' E.
69° 02' N, 55° 37' E.
68° 54' N, 55° 50' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

or II. Area at the western exit from Pechora Bay ("Dorsch II"):

Alternative area.

69° 4·5' N, 55° 12' E.
69° 10' N, 55° 12' E.
69° 10' N, 55° 34' E.
69° 04·5' N, 55° 34' E.

Mines are to be laid from south to north, on varying courses in groups of 2 to 3 mines. Distances between mines in the individual groups to vary from 400 to 600 meters. No mines to be laid in water exceeding 30 meters in depth.

2. Mining material:

12 TMC mines: 4 pressure magnetic, Type 1 (DM1).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 2 (MA2).
4 magnetic acoustic, Type 3 (MA3).
Types to be mixed.

Clockwork setting switch (UES): varying from 2 to 6 days.
Period delay mechanism (ZK): varying from 1 to 3 actuations.
Time setting (ZE): 80 days.
Safety distance (type TMC): 170 meters.

Mines have a special mechanism and become live after 2 to 6 days. Firing unit DM1 must not fall into enemy hands. Lay the various types of mines mixed and load accordingly.

3. Execution:

The course on which the mines are to be laid, as shown in the minelaying plan, is regarded as the most favorable, but is not absolutely binding. It is essential that the whole area should, if possible, be mined irregularly, observing the safety distance, unless observation of traffic leads to the conclusion that there are fixed routes or mine gaps, in which case a more intensive minelaying is indicated. Preparations must be made for laying the mines while submerged, in case enemy patrols or shore observation should prevent minelaying while surfaced.
Assignment II was similarly carried out by U 586 (v.d. Esch) in 1943 (See War Diary). These mines have meanwhile been made safe.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 SEPTEMBER, 1944

PG/31865

1 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 1100 to 1445, nothing to report, exhaustive.
2 BF 109 on visual reconnaissance in the Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet area as far as Polyarno from 0920 to 1100, no shipping traffic.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0445 to 1420. Northern part examined, no shipping observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0504 to 0927. Assignment abandoned in AF 1536 at 0715 because of insufficient cloud cover. Route 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

2 aircraft sighting reports from U 363 (Nees),
aircraft and minesweeper sighting report from U 957 (Schaar),
submarine sighting report from U 394 (Borger),
report of patrol vessels from U 703 (Brünner).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Berth at Pumanki occupied by 3 M.T.B.s and 2 probable fast motor minesweepers or supply boats.
At 0725 in AE 9834 3 destroyers, westerly course, speed 25 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Lively radio transmissions of first priority to all naval forces in Northern Waters, Belushya to Dikson and Khabarova, from Dikson to Archangel and Belushya, from Archangel to Kola, to flotilla leader "Baku" via Polyarno and to minesweeper No. 119 via Dikson.
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper and 1 ice-breaker.

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 guardship and 2 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Murmansk/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Trutz":

U 394 AB 5680)
U 997 AB 63)operating against an enemy
U 363 AB 68)formation.

Group "Greif":

U 278 AT 67)
U 362 AT 56) on passage.
U 739 AT 63)

Group "Dachs":

U 425 AC 69)
U 636 AC 69)
U 995 AC 69)
U 956 AC 68) on passage.
U 968 AC 68)
U 992 AC 68)

U 703 AA 34 on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 965 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 365, 711, 921 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 315 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 957 on return passage from Kara Sea to Hammerfest.
U 363 on return passage from AB 68 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 997 on return passage from AB 63 to Andfjord - Narvik.
1600 U 965 put out from Hammerfest for Tromsö.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats operating against an enemy formation.
3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.
The 3 remaining boats in group "Trutz" sent further reports on the westbound enemy units.

0315 Short signal 0248/789 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Traffic audible and exact bearing of 106° taken on convoy radio wave. My position is approximately AB 5682. 0200."

0740 Short signal 0500/790 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne aircraft (with southerly course) in AB 6761."

1104 Short signal 1004/794 received from U 363 (Nees):

"Carrier-borne plane(s) in AB 9133."

1650 Radio message 1533/702 received from U 394 (Borger):

"Naval grid square 8258. Last location at 0315 in grid square 5913. Bearing 091°. Presume forces have made a diversion, as we were sighted by an enemy submarine at 0445 (2 clear thick periscopes) in grid square 5943. No hydrophone bearings."

3 boats of group "Greif" in Kara Sea.
1 boat on return passage.

0024 Radio message 1858/786 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"Since 24 August, eastern route patrolled by minesweepers and up to 4 "Catalinas" (not carrying radar sets). On 29 August, 5 minesweepers of type "Wedemeyer", easterly course, presumably as convoy escort. Matissena and Russki: drift ice. Bad ice year."

1745 Radio message 0320/704 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"Request:
1. Permission to leave boat at Hammerfest for immediate fitting-out for continuation of prepared assignment. More details by telephone.

2. If possible, an aircraft to confer with "Kent", "Petrow", Naval Communications Officer and lighthouse keeper.

3. Speeding-up of "Greif"'s approach...."

Para. 3 of the radio message was not entirely readable, but it was assumed that "Schaar" considered it necessary in the light of some special information to occupy the new position line as quickly as possible.

2115 Radio message 2033/707 was therefore sent:

"Group "Greif": increased speed. Be in position line 1 from AS 1982 to 4331 by 0600 on 3 September."

Radio intercept reports on the traffic in Pechora Sea and the approaches to Kara Sea were passed on to groups "Greif" and "Dachs".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1. U 703 (Brünner) as escort for coastguard ship No. 6 (Kehdingen) for operation "Edelweiss".

2. Group "Dachs" proceeding to carry out minelaying operations in Pechora Sea.

1132 Radio message 0906/795 received from U 703 (Brünner):

" "Kehdingen" observed by a patrol vessel (of roughly the U.S. "Northumberland" type) in AA 3414 at 0530. Made off to the northwest. 2 T5 torpedo failures, explosion. Patrol vessel following a northwesterly course through thick drift-ice. I am holding on."

1219 Radio message 1151/796 sent:

" "Brünner" from Captain U-boats.

"Edelweiss" reported at 1011:
Attacked by surface forces in AA 2643. Attempt to give help."

1226 Radio message 1155/797 sent:

" "Brünner" from Captain U-boats.

"Edelweiss" reported at 1025:
U-boat attack probably failed. Am being pursued. Attempting to reach South Koldewey."

1256 Radio message 1154/799 received from U 703 (Brünner):

"Cannot proceed further in AA 2662. At 1120 the vessel disappeared westwards."

Thus the success of operation "Edelweiss" was endangered.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing orders for U 711 (Lange) and U 921 (Werner), see Appendix I/1,2.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

1135 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats Secret 5309 received:

"With effect from 1 September, U 1003 (Stübing) of 31st U-boat Flotilla and U 1200 (Mangels) of 8th U-boat Flotilla are again seconded for duty to 11th U-boat Flotilla.
From the same date, U 278 (Franze) and U 312 (Nikolay) of 11th U-boat Flotilla are seconded for duty to 13th U-boat Flotilla."

E. Survey of the situation:

1100 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4459 A Ops:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 1 September:

1. Number of Northern Waters boats reduced through losses to 26.

2. Effective attack of further PQ convoys in September impossible owing to lack of boats, as there are simultaneous operations by groups "Greif" and "Dachs" and 3 meteorological operations which it is considered must be carried out.

3. As the best chance for attacking convoys is at present in Northern Waters, request reinforcements up to a total of 36 boats or at least 32, as has already been achieved.

4. Suggest temporary allocation of 10 Atlantic boats to help out."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - AC 4461 - 1877 - Banak from 0400 to 0706, exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0502 to 1145. Thorshavn examined. 2 Red Cross ships of 10-15,000 G.R.T. and trawlers at anchor, otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0500 to 1032. Assignment abandoned in AB 7760 at 0755 because of insufficient cloud cover, enemy not sighted. Route 80% examined.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Aircraft sighting report and convoy location from U 394 (Berger).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Thorshavn: 2 Red Cross ships of 10-15,000 G.R.T. and trawlers.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

From 1300 to 1700 urgent radio messages from Archangel via Iokanka to naval forces in Northern Waters and the White Sea, also between Dikson and Belushya.
From 0806 to 2030 on 1 September radio messages from Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters and the White Sea and minesweeper No. 119, also between Dikson and Belushya.
Codeword of first priority from Polyarno to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Iokanka area: 2 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 guardships, 3 minesweepers, 3 guardboats.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.
At 0030, 0040 and from 0235 to 0450 on 2 September, British radio traffic, no bearings.
At 1840 on 1 September Svanvik obtained a bearing of 258° on a British unit.
In answer to the query whether "Lange"'s hit on the Russian submarine on 26 August had been mentioned in Russian radio traffic, Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes sent teleprinter message Most Secret 00103 at 1032:

"Attack on Russian submarine on 26 August not mentioned on radio."

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Greif":

U 278 AS 40)
U 363 AS 40) on passage.
U 739 AS 40)

Group "Dachs":

U 425)
U 636)
U 995)
U 956) in the operational area AT 70.
U 968)
U 992)

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest,
U 307, 965 Tromsö,
U 312, 365, 711, 921 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0450 U 965 put in to Tromsö, at 1300 put out from Tromsö for Narvik.
1030 U 363 put in to Harstad from AB 68, put out at 1100 and put in to Narvik at 1700.
1730 U 921 put out from Narvik, at 2200 put in to Harstad, at 2345 put out again for AB 65.
2245 U 997 put in to Narvik from AB 63.
0044 U 394 on return passage from AB 68 to Harstad.

U 957 on return passage from Kara Sea to Hammerfest.
U 315 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

0405 Radio message 0044/712 received from U 394 (Borger):

"In grid square 8876 enemy aircraft activity by night. Convoy location 204°. No hydrophone bearing. Commenced return passage...."

1255 Radio message 1144/718 sent:

"Bearing reports on convoy radio frequency by "Borger" were good and offer new prospects for intercepting convoys and hauling ahead without air cover. However, differentiate between bearing and location. All other boats are being fitted with intermediate wave D/F sets."

1632 Radio message 1511/722 sent:

Group "Greif":

"1. Proceed from position line 1 to position line 2 from XA 7182 to 7431: be there by 0600 on 5 September. "Mangold" is permitted to proceed by coastal route according to the visibility.

2. "Lange" observed "Catalina" from Dikson via AS 5145 to 1938 on the sea route, then on a straight course for Dikson. Passed Wardroper Island at approximately 1700. When "Lange" was detected there, he observed 3 "Catalinas" and 1 minesweeper on reconnaissance."

The boats then searched the outer shipping route as far as north of Yermak Bank.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

6 boats on minelaying operations in Pechora Sea.
1 boat in support of operation "Edelweiss".

1153 Radio message 1141/717 sent:

"To "Brünner": remain temporarily in that area to attempt interception of enemy."

At the request of Naval Chief Command, Norway, the U-boat was to wait until 6 September for coastguard ship "Kehdingen", which was being chased by the U.S. patrol vessel, or, if possible, was to intercept the patrol vessel.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1415 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 057 to Luftflotte 5 received:

"It is intended to alter the outward route for "Haudegen" to east of Edge Island through Olga and Hinlopen Strait. Request execution of necessary ice reconnaissance on 4 September."

E. Organizational:

1330 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., Most Secret 5829/F2 received:

"In reply to Captain U-boats, Norway 4459 A Ops. Most Secret of 1 September, Naval Chief Command, Norway 1132/F1 S.O.s only of 1 September:

1. As they are relieved by Schnorchel boats proceeding from Germany, 6 boats without Schnorchel from Group Central will be temporarily put under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.

2. Execution: Schnorchel boats putting out from Kiel will carry out Schnorchel tests for some 3 days in Horten. When finished in Horten, they will join group Central; simultaneously a boat without Schnorchel will join the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.

3. Supervision of relief for 2. by Naval Chief Command, East I and in agreement with Captain U-boats, Norway, Admiral Commanding U-boats, 5th U-boat Flotilla and Defense Group, Operational Branch, Horten. Torpedoes to be exchanged and any necessary orders to be given in Trondheim. Length of term with group Central depends on the choice of boats.

4. U 978 (Pulst) and U 483 (v. Horstein) are expected to be the boats and are ready in Horten. Boats will receive an order from C-in-C U-boats Ops. to remain in Horten and will await further instructions from Naval

Chief Command, East. The next boat, U 200, will put out from Kiel on 2 September.

5. Admiral Commanding U-boats will control the operational allocation of the relevant boats to Captain U-boats, Norway."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re E:

"According to this ruling, the transfer of the proposed new boats will depend entirely on the supply of Schnorchel boats from Germany (conditions of which cannot be foreseen from here, but which are known to be very uncertain) and upon their training in Horten. Thus the new Northern Waters boats will provisionally come north singly and at varying intervals. This system of allocation will not be completed by the next convoy run."

(Signed) Suhren.

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3 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0405 to 0538. Abandoned in AC 4881 owing to insufficient cloud cover, enemy not sighted.
2 BF 109 on photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay from 0902 to 0944. No shipping in the Kola inlet area or Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 in the area west of the Faeroes from 0601 to 1043.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Report on an attack on a southeastbound convoy by U 425 (Bentzien), see under IV (c).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In Kola Bay between the south side of Murmansk and Krasnaya Bay 1 large destroyer of the "Petro Savodsk" class, 2 probable escort vessels,

11 Liberty freighters totaling approximately 77,000 G.R.T., 1 Liberty freighter of 7,000 G.R.T. in the dry dock. 5 freighters, totaling approximately 10,500 G.R.T., 2 coastal tankers, totaling approximately 1,000 G.R.T., 2 probable repair ships, 1 wreck (stern of a freighter), 1 coastal freighter under construction, 5 coastal freighters in the slips, 1 coastal lighter.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority from Naryan Mar to Archangel and Dikson, and from Amderma and Belushya to Dikson for guardship No. 75 and minesweepers, from Archangel to all forces in Northern Waters and the White Sea.
Iokanka area: 2 minesweepers, 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski", 1 guardship, 4 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 3 minesweepers, 2 ice-breakers.
Britain: according to radio traffic, there are no longer any enemy units in the north of Northern Waters.
From 2109 to 0600 radio traffic on carrier wave, signal strength still slight.
Russia: on the afternoon and evening of 1 September lively air reconnaissance of the Norwegian polar coast (8 aircraft).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Greif":

U 278 AS 1950)
U 363 AS 1990) on passage.
U 739 AS 1990)

Group "Dachs":

U 425)
U 636)
U 995) in the operational area
U 956) southeast of AC 69.
U 968)
U 992)

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 363, 365, 711, 965, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0200 U 965 put in to Narvik from Tromsö.
1230 U 957 put in to Hammerfest from Kara Sea.
0000 U 992 commenced return passage to Hammerfest.
1058 U 921 commenced return passage, at 2100 put in to Narvik.
1900 U 425 commenced return passage to Hammerfost.
U 394 on return passage from AB 68 to Harstad.
U 315 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

6 boats on minelaying operations in Pechora Sea.
1 boat in support of operation "Edelweiss".
The first minelaying boat to report was U 425 (Bentzien):

1807 Short signal announced that U 425's task had been executed and that the boat was returning.

2209 Radio message 1931/735 received from U 425 (Bentzien):

"At 1108 on 2 September in AT 7585 2 misses with T3 torpedoes in an attack on southeast-bound convoy."

The convoy's course could lead to Pechora Sea, where the northern exit had just been mined by "Bentzien". It was to be hoped that the attack had not been observed so that the other boats of group "Dachs" would not encounter increased anti-submarine forces.

(d) Miscellaneous:

As no further report had come in from U 394 (Borger), indeed the boat had not answered the call to report, and since it should have put in long ago,
radio message 2306/739 was sent:
" "Borger": report position immediately."

V. Reports of successes:

1855 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4489 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 425 (Bentzien) reported operation "Dorsch I" executed."

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0100 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats Most Secret 7560 Order received:

"From the middle of September, be prepared to receive Captain U-boats, West initially with Staff of 8 officers. Further personnel to be provided by 11th U-boat Flotilla. Make necessary preparations. Further instructions from Captain U-boats, West. Separating line between Captain U-boats, West and Captain U-boats, Norway will be announced by Naval War Staff, Second Division."

2355 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, East, Operations Staff Ops. Most Secret 05651 received:

"At the end of the Schnorchel exercises, U 978 (Pulst) will proceed to Egersund to relieve U 310 (Ley), while U 483 (v. Morstein) will proceed to Stavanger to relieve U 293 (Klingspor).
After transferring the operational order and Naval Chief Command, East S.O.s only 501, "Ley" and "Klingspor" will proceed to Trondheim to join Captain U-boats, Norway on arrival.
"Ley" is directed to carry out the testing of the T5 torpedoes by 22 September.
11th U-boat Flotilla will distribute the sailing orders."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (b): From the large merchant ships sighted off Murmansk and later reported putting in to Gorlo Strait, it would appear that PQ 32 had been composed of some 20 ships. The next returning convoy can be assumed to be equally large.

Re II (d): The urgent message from Naryan Mar may perhaps have something to do with a mine success by "Bentzien".

Re D.:

The first 2 relieving boats can thus be expected in Trondheim by the middle of September at the earliest.

(Signed) Suhren.

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4 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0357 to 0716. Outward route exhaustively examined; on return flight no examination made because of measurements, otherwise nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

No operations because of warning of carrier.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority:
Belushya to Dikson and Archangel, Archangel, Dikson and Belushya to all naval forces in Northern Waters, Dikson to Archangel.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski", 2 minesweepers, 3 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 4 minesweepers, 1 guardboat.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Svanvik: British radio traffic (probably from carrier) from 0652 to 0904 on 3 September in 268° - 272°, from 0055 to 0421 on 4 September in 261° - 263°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Greif":

U 278 AS 2449)
U 362 AS 2485) on passage.
U 739 AS 2722)

Group "Dachs":

U 636)
U 995) in the operational area
U 968) southeast of AC 69.

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 957 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 363, 365, 921, 965, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1500 U 315 put in to Narvik after open water passage from Trondheim.

0120 U 711 put out from Narvik - Ramsund, at 1800 put in to Tromsö.

U 425, 956, 992 on return passage from Pechora Sea to Hammerfest.

U 394 on return passage from AB 68 to Harstad.

2030 U 956 on return passage to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea. Information gained from "Schaar"'s report was passed on to group "Greif":

0231 Radio message 0231/743 sent:

"Group "Greif":

Fairly large ships and convoys prefer the open water route, independent vessels use the coastal route and Matissena passage which is an easier route in bad weather. All-round lights burn on Kamenni, Morjevo, Wardroper, Ploski, Scott-Hansen, Mikhailovo (do not approach here), Kravkova (new beacon), Sterlegova (switched off). Islands and coastal area uninhabited, only hunting huts. Air reconnaissance was evident from the following callsigns transmitted simultaneously on 500 meters: "Four rrr aaa" = Dikson, figures with rrr lll = 4 Catalinas. Dikson called shore stations and warships (4 letters), as "www three ch ch ch."

2158 Radio message 2006/752 sent:

"Group "Greif":

1. It is known that Russians stop all traffic as soon as U-boats are sighted or their radio is heard. If any boat has already used radio or been sighted east of Dikson, it should proceed to AF 80 and report position in order to pretend it is returning.

2. After position line 2, meet for conference on the situation off the north coast of Kravkovo Island. Then take up lurking position: "Mangold" with location north of Yermak Bank, "Franze" off Kravkovo, "Franz" off Kaminskovo. Look-out towards the island; boats camouflaged; action stations on sighting the enemy. Preserve radio silence. After radio reconnaissance use long wave as group frequency. Be sparing with fuel."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1. Group "Dachs": 3 boats on minelaying operations in Pechora Sea. 3 boats on return passage.

2. U 703 in support of operation "Edelweiss".

V. Reports of successes:

After receipt of the short signals reporting execution and return passage, the following was sent:

0135 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4492 and 4507 to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 992 (Falke) reports assignment "Sprotte I" and U 965 (Mohs) assignment "Butt I" carried out."

VI. U-boat reports:

0932 Teleprinter message U-boat base Hammerfest Most Secret 398 received:

Report on situation in Kara Sea for August, 1944 (U 957), see Appendix III.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

0215 Teleprinter message received from Buedel, Banak airport:

"He 111 and FW 200 have been at readiness for days

for the "Haudegen" and "Goldschmied" reconnaissance flights. From the middle of September the ice situation may deteriorate. Request decision."

2040 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0104 W/F received:

"Reference Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. A Ops. 2672/teleprinter message of 26 August: Propose landing of a meteorological unit on Bear Island and Spitsbergen in 2 consecutive trips; on each, 2 men and roughly 7 tons of equipment and gear, no bulky goods."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re VI:

"From the radio intercept service and from prisoners, "Schaar" had gained important information on the situation in Kara Sea, laying a firm foundation for further operations by group "Greif"."

(Signed) Suhren.

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5 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0503 to 1153. North part examined, no shipping observed. At 0518 in AN 2368 Swedish ship "Gripsholm" on southerly course. At 0643 in AF 7477 Swedish ship "Drottningholm" and 1 Red Cross ship on easterly course.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 He 111 and 1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen. Of these, 1 He 111 intended to operate from 0529 to 0710, abandoned the mission in AF 5641 at 0615 owing to a technical breakdown. The relieving Ju 88 operated from 0759 to 1451: route and eastern part of Jan Mayen 90% examined, enemy not sighted.

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II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0710 In AE 9976 7 merchant ships and 5 patrol vessels totaling 60,000 G.R.T., southwesterly course.
1012 In AF 7723 same ships as at 0643.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority sent from Belushya to Dikson, Dikson to Belushya and to all naval forces in Northern Waters via Archangel.
Polyarno to guardship No. 75 and minesweeper No. 54.
Iokanka area: 2 minesweepers, 2 guardboats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "E" and "Uritski", 4 guardships, 5 minesweepers, 3 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 3 minesweepers.
Dikson area: 1 BO-boat, 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7182)
U 362 XA 7185) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7431)

Group "Dachs":

U 636)
U 995) in the operational area AT 70.

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 957 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 315, 363, 921, 965, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0500 U 711 put out from Tromsö, 1420 put in to Hammerfest.
U 425, 956 put in to Hammerfest from Pechora Sea.
2130 U 921 put out from Narvik for AB 65.
0736 U 968 on return passage from Pechora Sea to Hammerfest.
U 992 on return passage from Pechora Sea to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

1056 Radio message 1016/757 sent to group "Greif":

"Last year 4 convoys and many single vessels ran from the east, also through-convoys passing from Archangel to Wilkitzki. There are indications that such traffic will soon start up again. If U-boats are sighted early, ships are held back east of Wilkitzki Strait. Therefore at all costs remain unobserved until valuable targets appear."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

3 boats on minelaying operation in Pechora Sea.
1 boat in support of operation "Edelweiss".

2210 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00533 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division; C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"In view of the fact that the U.S. patrol vessel (Type "Northland") probably has the meteorological unit and the crew of "Kehdingen" on board and that this vessel is only of slight military importance, forbid "Brünner" to attack."

2241 Thereon radio message 2224/764 was sent:

" "Brünner": no attack on patrol vessel which has probably picked up "Edelweiss". Continue operation."

The boat had waited to intercept the returning enemy patrol vessel but now continued the operation to lay the meteorological buoy. A second buoy, which was still stored in Narvik, was not laid until the boat had refueled and put out again.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Most Secret 4531 sent:

"Transfer order for U 365 (Wedemeyer):

1. Put out from Narvik for Hammerfest on the evening of 6 September.

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund Finnsnesrennen. Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Tromsö. Escort by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit from Tromsö to Hammerfest. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Make use of current escorts.

3. Radio frequency "Anton I", Northern Waters very long wave.

4. Give 3 T5 torpedoes to U 668 (v. Eickstedt) in Hammerfest. Then after replenishing, put out in accordance with Operational Order No. 16."

1046 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4512 sent to 11th U-boat Flotilla:

"Transfer order for U 313 (Schweiger):

1. Put out from Bergen for Trondheim on the evening of 6 September.

2. There take in 12 T5 torpedoes for Ramsund.

3. Proceed further via Frohavet and then on open water passage at a distance of 50 miles from the coast as far as 66° N in accordance with Order No. 13. Make for Westfjord on passage to Narvik - Ramsund.

4. Radio frequency "Anton II", Northern Waters very long wave.

5. Report probable time of arrival and passing of approach point "V 1" by time short signal."

V. Reports of successes:

The fourth boat to report by short signal that the assignment had been executed and the boat was on return passage was U 968 (Westphalen).

0912 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4519 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 968 (Westphalen) reports assignment "Lachs I" carried out."

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2307 Teleprinter message 7444/44 received from Luftflotte Command 5:

"Routes for the combined reconnaissance flight for "Haudegen" and "Goldschmied" scheduled for 6 September if weather permits: Bear Island - Olga Strait - Hinlopen Strait.
Southern part of Walenbergfjord - Rypfjord - Hinlopen Strait.
Northern part - ice limit north of Spitsbergen - ice limit north of Franz Josef Land - circular flight over Alexandra Land - Cambridge Sund - Hope Island."

E. Organizational:

1325 Teleprinter message Most Secret 00518 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Reference Naval Chief Command, East Operations Staff Ops. 5669 F 1 U:

Concur that the number of operational boats in group Central should not be lower than 12."

2140 Teleprinter message Most Secret 7619 received from Admiral Commanding U-boats:

"1. With immediate effect, U 483 (v. Morstein) and U 978 (Pulst) of 3rd U-boat Flotilla are again placed under the operational command of 11th U-boat Flotilla for group Central.

2. Simultaneously, U 293 (Klingspor) and U 310 (Ley) of 11th U-boat Flotilla (group Central) will again be placed under the operational command of 13th U-boat Flotilla for operations in Northern Waters."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re II (b):

"The sighted ships obviously belonged to the formation observed on return passage from Russia. That would explain their slight speed of advance. Contrary to the previous belief, only a few of the merchant ships which were clearly left over from previous operations on the north coast of Russia had been brought back."

Re IV (c):

"Only two minelaying operations had not been executed, namely those for which the boats had to proceed longest in shallow water to the south-eastern corner of Pechora Sea."

(Signed) Suhren.

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6 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0510 to 0830. Assignment carried out on the directed route, exhaustive, nothing to report.
2 BF 109 operated from 0655 to 0736. No further reconnaissance in Kola Bay as aerial photographs had already been taken. Kola inlet examined, no shipping observed. Motovski Bay not examined because of fighter defenses.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0520 to 1046. At 0815 in AE 9860 mission abandoned because of technical breakdown. At 0855 in AF 7755 a submerging submarine. At 0950 in AN 2231 a submarine, course 150°.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0524 to 1239. Route 90%, Jan Mayen area 70% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

First priority radio messages from Iokanka and minesweeper No. 116 via Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Iokanka area: 2 minesweepers, 2 guardboats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski", 1 guardship, 1 minelayer, 3 minesweepers, 1 guardboat.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 2 minesweepers, 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearing of 257° obtained by Svanvik at 1735 on 5 September on British unit, at 1923 U.S. unit in 316°.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7182)
U 362 XA 7185) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7431)

Group "Dachs":

U 636)
U 995) in the operational area AT 70.

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 425, 668, 711, 956, 957 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 312, 315, 363, 365, 921, 965, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 313, 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 921 proceeding from Narvik to AB 65.

1940 U 365 put out from Narvik for Tromsö, at 2350 commenced return passage to Narvik.
1340 U 992 put in to Hammerfest from Pechora Sea.
1900 U 425, 956, 992 put out from Hammerfest for Tromsö.
1630 U 313 put out from Bergen to proceed via the inner leads to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2 boats on a minelaying operation in Pechora Sea.
U 703 on return passage from meteorological operation "Edelweiss".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay), see Appendix I/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

2045 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4534 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), fifth operation, see Appendix II/2.

2220 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4536 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 997 (Lehmann), second operation, see Appendix II/1.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

2310 At the request of Naval Chief Command Norway, Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. 622 teleprinter message F II was received:

"1. Of the U-boats which arrived in June, two are released for anti-submarine operations between Skudenes and Lister.

2. Naval Chief Command, Norway will be in direct communication with Naval Chief Command, East to facilitate allocation of boats. Operations and command through S.O. 11th U-boat Flotilla, in accordance with instructions from Naval Chief Command, Norway as in spring, 1944. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. is to be informed."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV:

"At present there is no indication of another convoy, but after PQ 32 we must always expect that one may appear suddenly. The daily meteorological aircraft which flies to Jan Mayen only makes an unsatisfactory and partial reconnaissance and we know from experience that the enemy keeps the approach of convoys and naval forces extremely secret by scrupulous radio silence. The first 2 boats are now putting out to form a new group west of Bear Island passage; the boats returning from the minelaying operations will follow after quick re-fitting. 5 boats remain on duty in Kara Sea, while 5 more are employed on meteorological operations.

(Signed) Suhren.

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7 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 FW 200 on ice and meteorological reconnaissance for a special operation, route Banak - North Cape - Hope Island - König Karl Land - Hinlopen Strait - ice limit north of Spitsbergen - ice limit north of Alexandra Land - Alexandra Land - North Cape - Banak, from 0235 to 1502. Assignment successfully carried out.
4 BF 109, in 2 operations, on aerial photographic reconnaissance of the naval harbor at Polyarno and Kola Bay from Kola to north of Murmansk from 0720 to 1310. Photographs of Fisher Peninsula. No shipping observed in visual reconnaissance of Motovski Bay, Ura Bay and Kola inlet. In Russian Strait only very slight traffic by independent ships proceeding toward the front.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0715 to 1310. Route 70%, Jan Mayen 30% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Naval harbor of Polyarno: 7 submarines, 1 probable escort boat.
Photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay: in Vaenga Bay 1 British battleship ("R" class) and 4 destroyers.

1800 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff, Most Secret 0181 to 1st Battle Group received:

"Photographic reconnaissance has identified 1 battleship, presumed to be of the "Revenge" class, and 4 destroyers in Vaenga Bay. Opinion: They may be

(a) the unit heavily damaged by "Lange" in AC 2729 on 23 August.

(b) Escorts in readiness for a new QP convoy.

(c) A battle group ready for a combined operation against the Arctic Ocean coast."

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority from Dikson to Archangel and Belushya.
Murmansk area: destroyer "Gremyashchi".
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper, 1 MO-boat, 1 guardboat, 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Dikson area: 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: at 1426 on 6 September from Svanvik: 1 British unit in 254°.
At 1902 Hammerfest obtained a bearing of 319° on a U.S. unit.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Dachs":

U 636)
U 995) in the operational area AT 70.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7182)
U 362 XA 7185) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7435)

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668, 711, 957 Hammerfest,
U 307, 425, 956, 992 Tromsö,
U 312 Harstad,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 312 put out from Narvik, at 0740 put in to Harstad, at 1230 put out from Harstad for AB 65.
U 921 proceeding from Andfjord to AB 65.
1026 U 711, 957 put out from Hammerfest for Kara Sea.
U 968 on return passage from Pechora Sea to Hammerfest.
U 313 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
1100 U 365 damaged, put in again to Narvik.

0600 U 425, 956, 992 put in to Tromsö from Hammerfest, at 1200 put out from Tromsö for Harstad.

1545 U 956 put in to Harstad, at 2359 put out again for Narvik.

2345 U 425, 992 put in to Narvik from Tromsö.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats approaching west of Bear Island passage.
3 boats in Kara Sea.

Radio contact could not be established. Probably the boats were maintaining strict silence in expectation of traffic.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2 boats on a minelaying operation in Pechora Sea.
U 703 on return passage from operation "Edelweiss".

(d) Miscellaneous:

0322 Teleprinter message received from "M 361":

"U 365 unable to maneuver, am towing boat from "Rot 25" to Narvik. 0115."

U 365 (Wedemeyer) was on passage to Kara Sea and was again delayed. Thus only U 711 (Lange) and U 957 (Schaar) were returning to group "Greif" in Kara Sea.
In teleprinter message Most Secret 961 "Schaar" confirmed from Hammerfest that he had made arrangements by radio with "Lange" who was proceeding to Kara Sea with him. At the same time, he reported taking on a flying boat crew of 3 men for a sudden attack which he intended to make on a "Catalina" of the Russian reconnaissance in that area. He also asked for information on the position of mines.

1200 Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 139 A Ops. sent to "Schaar" and "Lange":

"Avoid the following: AT 7230, AW 3110, AT 7720, AT 7990, AT 87 and 88, as well as those squares appearing in Appendix II of Operational Order No. 15."

1916 Radio message 1813/788 sent:

"U 711 (Lange) and U 957 (Schaar): proceed via AC 50 eastwards and via AF 88 to Kara Sea. Expect to meet returning boats "Westphalen", "Köhntopp" and "Schendel" in AC 50."

Schaar intended to examine the west coast of Novaya Zemlya en route.

A third boat became ready for group "Grimm":

Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller), see Appendix I/4.

Transfer order for U 965 (Unverzagt):

"1. Put out from Narvik for Ramsund on the morning of 8 September.

2. After taking in torpedoes, proceed to Tromsö. Pilot from Lödingen to Tromsö.

3. Boat is expected by Admiral Polar Coast, Naval Officer in charge and the Harbor Master at Tromsö.

4. Radio frequency:

"MC" as far as Harstad)northern waters
"Anton I" from Harstad)very long wave.

5. Report promptly on "MC" times of sailing from Narvik and Ramsund.

6. Await further orders in Tromsö."

The boat was to escort the metcorological unit "Goldschmied".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

1055 Teleprinter message 4575 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 363 (Nees), Second operation, see Appendix II/3.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1600 Teleprinter message "Haudegen" via Admiral Polar Coast Most Secret 5831 to Naval Chief Command, Norway received:

"In view of the destruction of "Edelweiss", "Haudegen" proposes that the whole unit be taken

on board "Herrle". In this way even without "Busch", the execution of operation "Haudegen" is to a certain extent assured, i.e. without the help of aircraft."

E. Organizational:

1020 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats U 5430 Secret U 1 received:

"With effect from 1 September, the following boats are re-allocated for duties with 11th U-boat Flotilla: From 4th U-boat Flotilla, U 867 (v. Mühlendahl), U 870 (Hechler). From 5th U-boat Flotilla, U 991 (Balke). From 8th U-boat Flotilla, U 1202 (Thomsen). From 31st U-boat Flotilla, U 1006 (Voigt) and U 1231 (Lessing)."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re II (b):

The possibly damaged battleship lying in Vaenga Bay would be a valuable target for one of the new Schnorchel boats. Penetration into Murmansk Fjord seems quite possible, and moreover our U-boats have not been in that area for 3 years and the advantage of surprise might prove a telling factor.

(Signed) Suhren.

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8 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0445 to 0859, exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0501 to 1145. Faeroes not examined because of mist.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance to Jan Mayen from 0535 to 1227. Route 90%, Jan Mayen area 15% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: 1 ice-breaker.
Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper, 1 MO-boat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper, 1 guardboat, 1 motor minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Strikingly lively air activity by the Iceland Staffel.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 4 minesweepers.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 64 on passage.

Group "Dachs":

U 636)
U 995) in the operational area AT 70.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7182)
U 362 XA 7185) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7435)

U 703 AA 26 on special operation.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest,
U 307 Tromsö,
U 315, 363, 365, 425, 956, 965, 992, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1410 U 921 proceeding to AB 53.
U 312 proceeding from Harstad - Andfjord to AB 65.
U 711, 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Kara Sea.
U 703 on return passage from AB 83 to Andfjord - Narvik.

1000 U 968 put in to Hammerfest from AT 70.
0700 U 956 put in to Narvik from Harstad.
1100 U 965 put out from Narvik - Ramsund for Tromsö.
2320 U 313 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in Kara Sea.
2 boats approaching west of Bear Island passage.

0218 Radio message 0140/792 sent:

"1. U 312 (Nikolay) is proceeding from Andfjord to AB 65 as the second boat of group "Grimm".

2. "Werner": continue to AB 53."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

2 boats on a minelaying operation in Pechora Sea.

U 703 on return passage from meteorological operation "Edelweiss".

1517 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4597 A Ops. sent to Naval Communications Officer, Tromsö for "Haudegen":

"Naval Chief Command, Norway telegraphed in Most Secret 0219 F I Ops.: "Mondschein": proceed from "SR 1" via AG 89, from there to Olga Strait - Hinlopen Strait."

That was the sailing order for meteorological survey ship "Busch" escorted by U 307 (Herrle).
1601 The latter received the order in radio message 1525/610.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

0337 The results of the ice reconnaissance for the meteorological operation were received in teleprinter message Most Secret from the office of Bomber Geschwader 40, Banak:

"Re "Goldschmied":

1. No enemy activity on route Nordaustland -

Alexandra Land - Prinz Georg Land - North Cape, Norway. "Schatzgräber" hut undisturbed.

2. Landing possible in south of Harmsworth Peninsula, but it would not really be suitable as there is little chance of camouflage in the smooth glacier and on the flat foreland. More favorable position near the old "Schatzgräber" hut or further west at Cape Nimrod. If this place is chosen, the carrying of 2 extra heavy machine-guns is vital to gain the coastal area. Operational to "Haudegen":

No enemy activity from Hope Island - König Karl Land - Nordaustland - southern entrance to Hinlopen Strait. However, here visibility was limited. In the actual "Haudegen" operational area, no observation was made (route southern entrance to Hinlopen Strait diagonally across Nordaustland to North Cape, Nordaustland). North of North Cape, Nordaustland to 81° 30' N the sea was free of ice and there were no enemy forces."

1730 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4600 A Ops. sent to Naval Communications Officer, Tromsö for "Goldschmied":

"Naval Chief Command, Norway telegraphed in Most Secret 0220 F 1 A Ops.: Intended point of departure "SR 1" on 11 September."

1821 U 921 (Unverzagt) was informed in radio message 1821/611.

E. Organizational:

1630 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats Most Secret 7680 Order received:

"1. C-in-C Navy has approved the proposal that Captain U-boats, West should be transferred to Bergen and has given orders for this to be carried out.

2. Staff of Captain U-boats, West will assemble in Güstrov on 10 September. From there, they will travel to Norway.

3. 11th U-boat Flotilla is ordered to make the necessary preparations.

4. Naval War Staff, Second Division, is requested to determine the separating line."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re E:

After the loss of the French bases, Atlantic

operations must be carried out from Norway. Briefly, 11th U-boat Flotilla should be taken from the command of Captain U-boats, Norway, so that the Bergen dockyard is no longer doubtful for our boats. The northern bases are quite adequate for an increased number of Northern Waters boats.

(Signed) Suhren.

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9 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Banak from 0512 to 0847, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0456 to 1147. Northern part of Faeroes examined, no shipping identified.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Trondheim - AF 2835 - AB 7434 - AF 2835 from 0801 to 1804, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

In AS 4332 submarine attack on U 739 (Mangold). In XA 7541 U 739 (Mangold) missed with a T5 torpedo against destroyer of the "Gremyashchi" class.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0730 In AE 9596 1 merchant ship of 3-4,000 G.R.T. easterly course, speed 10 knots.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority from Belushya and Polyarno to Dikson, Dikson to Archangel and all naval forces in Northern Waters.

Iokanka area: 1 minesweeper, 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper, 1 guardboat.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper, 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53) in attack areas depth of sweep
U 312 AB 65) 50 miles.

Group "Dachs":

U 636 AT 70 in the operational area.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7182)
U 362 XA 7185) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 AF 80 proceeding eastwards.

In port:

U 668, 968 Hammerfest,
U 965 Tromsö,
U 363, 365, 425, 956, 992, 997 Narvik,
U 313, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711, 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Kara Sea.
0430 U 315 put out from Narvik for AB 91.
0400 U 307 put out from Tromsö on special operation.
U 703 on return passage from AB 83 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 995 on return passage from AT 70 to Hammerfest.
U 636 on return passage from AT 70 to Hammerfest.
0800 U 968 put out from Hammerfest for Tromsö.
0130 U 965 put in to Tromsö from Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island.

1529 Radio message 1451/720 sent:

"U 315 (Zoller) is proceeding from Andfjord to AB 91 as third boat in group "Grimm". Schnorchel boat."

3 boats in attack areas in Kara Sea.

0106 Radio message 2135/701 received from U 739 (Mangold):

"Position AF 8565, Kara Sea: as "Wedemeyer" reported, otherwise no sightings and no mines. Dikson: patrol by flying boats without location sets. Sea calm.
On 3 September met "Franz" in AS 1998. In AS 4332 evaded fan-of-four from submarine near a flying boat. Presume cooperation."

0138 Radio message 2342/702 received from U 739 (Mangold):

"Position AF 8553 line 2. No observations. On 5 September, failed to meet or hear "Franz" or "Franze" at Kravkovo. Impossible to lie on the bottom owing to stony ground. On 5 September in XA 7541 missed with T5 torpedo fired at a "Gremyashchi" class destroyer, probably "Trier". Made off to the northeast. "Herkules" probably a radio station. No air patrols. Radar set out of order. Propose as rendezvous: "north side of Beluji at 0400 on 12 September. Then position line from XA 7371 to 7379 to intercept traffic."

1121 Radio message 1044/707 sent:

"Group "Greif". New rendezvous as proposed by "Mangold" in radio message 2342 Officers."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The last 2 boats of group "Dachs" reported the execution of their minelaying operations in Pechora Sea and also that they were on return passage.

1647 Radio message 1454/711 sent:

" "Kohntopp", "Schendel": On the evening of 9 September, U 307 (Herrle) is putting out with coastguard ship "Busch" via Hammerfest for AG 89 and northwards. Description of

"Busch": 350 G.R.T., fishing vessel without mainmast, large bridge, davits amidships, after mast same height as funnel, wood pile in stern. May show Russian flag. Do not stop her."

2212 Teleprinter message received from "Haudegen":

"Sailing delayed by disembarkation until the evening of 10 September."

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 703 (Brünner) which, after leaving the pursued "Kehdingen", was ordered to cease chasing the coastal patrol cruiser "Northland", reported from Andf-jord.

V. Reports of successes:

After the short signals on the execution of the minelaying assignments had been received,

0110 teleprinter message Most Secret 4605 A Ops. 1 was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops:

"U 995 (Köhntopp) reports execution of operation "Hering I"."

1200 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4611 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"U 636 (Schendel) reports execution of operation "Forelle I"."

VI. U-boat reports:

2145 Teleprinter message 4623 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), seventh operation, (Mines: "Butt I"), see Appendix II/4.

2330 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4625 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 992 (Falke), second operation, (Mines: Sprotte I"), see Appendix II/5.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0148 Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats Most Secret 7622 to 11th and 13th U-boat Flotillas received:

"The following boats of 11th U-boat Flotilla are

re-allocated for duties with 13th U-boat Flotilla:

With effect from 15 September:- U 313 (Schweiger), U 315 (Zoller), U 363 (Nees) and U 425 (Bentzien). With effect from 1 October: U 716 (Dunkelberg), U 956 (Mohs), U 957 (Schaar), U 965 (Unverzagt) and U 992 (Falke)."

E. Plans:

1818 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. 00927 Most Secret received:

"1. Air reconnaissance reports 1 battleship observed in Vaenga Bay during reconnaissance of the Kola area on 6 September.

2. She is presumed to be damaged as the other units returned to the west with the QP convoy.

3. She may be the heavy unit, encountered and attacked by U 711 on 23 August. C-in-C Navy desires this suggestion to be sent by radio to U 711.

4. Report whether, according to your information, it would be possible for a Schnorchel boat to penetrate into Kola Bay to attack the battleship.

2316 In reply, teleprinter message Most Secret 4628 A Ops. was sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. and for information Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"Re your Most Secret 00927 teleprinter message F II:
If full advantage is taken of the performance of a Schnorchel boat, penetration of Kola Bay is considered possible. Our only Schnorchel boat "Zoller" can be employed after handing over torpedoes and secret material. Russian mines and net barrages not known. Most of our own moored mines of spring 1942 have probably been swept, also the aerial mines. Exact details requested. in the northern area, however, we have not the necessary torpedo net cutters."

0050 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0225 F I to Naval War Staff, First Division received:

"The extremely strained fuel situation in the German Air Force no longer permits of sea reconnaissance, thus enemy movements cannot be observed, even in the vicinity of the coast. Petrol necessary for sea reconnaissance could, in my opinion, only be procured at the expense of the daily meteorological flights. It is proposed to employ U-boats with "Radiosonde" apparatus

for meteorological observation. The number of boats and their disposition would be determined in agreement with German Air Force High Command, provisionally 2 boats. These boats would at the same time carry out reconnaissance and be available at any time for operations against the enemy. If no weather report came in from the U-boats, an aircraft (held in readiness) would have to take off. Request that you try out this proposal in view of the urgent necessity for improving sea reconnaissance."

F. Survey of the situation:

Most Secret S.O.s only 114/44 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops., Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff, for information Naval War Staff, First Division:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 9 September 1944:

1. Group "Trutz" put in after the action against PQ 32. Group "Grimm" forming west of Bear Island passage, up to now 3 boats.

2. After successful minelaying in Pechora Sea, Group "Dachs" is being equipped for operations against the next PQ convoy. 6 boats.

3. Group "Greif" (5 boats) in Kara Sea in expectation of traffic from the east. It is intended to keep 2 to 3 boats there even after Jelaniya is iced up, as the Russians hold back their ships in the east until then. Return passage via Kara Strait.

4. 3 boats on meteorological operations.

5. At present there are 25 Northern Waters boats. Of the proposed 10 new boats, six will be brought up shortly from the south."

Re IV (b):

As was mentioned earlier, the Russians have apparently stopped their merchant traffic since the renewed appearance of our U-boats in Kara Sea and have set submarines and destroyers to attack the U-boats. The whereabouts of U 278 (Franze) and U 362 (Franz) are uncertain.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

Air reconnaissance of Murmansk Bay. Slight patrol activity observed.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0520 to 1235, Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance in the direction of Jan Mayen from 0545 to 1653. Mission carried out on same route as on 9 September, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Very occasional transmission of messages from the Norwegian polar coast to submarines in the operational area.
Murmansk area: destroyer "E".
Pummanki area: 1 M.T.B.
Iokanka area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper, 2 minelayers, 3 guardboats, 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 4 guardships, 2 minesweepers, 1 ice-breaker.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
At 0004 Svanvik took a bearing of 272° on a British unit in communication with St. Johns.
Hammerfest, at 0342, took a bearing of 275° on another British unit in communication with Cleethorpes.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53)
U 312 AB 65) in the attack area, depth of
U 315 AB 91) sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7463)
U 362 XA 7549) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 AS 1381 on passage.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest.
U 965, 968 Tromsö,
U 363, 365, 425, 956, 992, 997 Narvik,
U 313, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 proceeding from Tromsö to AG 89.
U 711, 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Kara Sea.
1529 U 315 on return passage from AB 91 to Åndfjord - Narvik.
U 995 on return passage from AT 70 to Hammerfest.
0820 U 636 put in to Hammerfest from AT 70.
1940 U 703 put in to Harstad from AA 26.
0152 U 968 at anchor off Tromsö, at 0400 weighed anchor to proceed to Narvik, at 1800 put in to Narvik.
1600 U 313 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in formation southwest of Bear Island.
3 boats in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1 boat in support of operation "Haudegen".

(d) Miscellaneous:

0550 Radio message 0413/724 received from U 921 (Werner):

"Port electric motor I out of order. Maximum number of revolutions 160. Double charging time, 66 cubic meters, AB 6485."

The order to preserve radio silence was broken at 1520 when a message was sent.

1544 Radio message 1529/729 sent: see VI D.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports.

0115 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4626 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), fifth operation, see Appendix II/6.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. 01001 Most Secret S.O.s only:

"1. The execution of the Vaenga Bay operation by a Schnorchel boat is considered possible.

2. Bring U 315 to port immediately, discuss the assignment with the commander.

3. Captain U-boats will examine him and report if the commander is suitable for the special operation and if unsuitable will propose another commander, who will then be recalled to port.

4. Air reconnaissance is to make sure of the situation once again before the U-boat's penetration. Fairly strong air reconnaissance would endanger the project.

5. An attempt is being made to bring up the net cutters."

1544 As a result, radio message 1529/729 was sent:

"Zoller: return immediately to Andfjord - Narvik at high speed."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

U 315 (Zoller) seems suitable for the operation into Murmansk Fjord. Boat and crew are ready. It appears that there are adequate net pistols available in the area. The commander should be instructed and the boat should sail as soon as possible, so that the battleship will not have time to proceed to dock, to put out or to move to an unreachable spot.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the sea area west of the Faeroes from 0448 to 1148.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance on the same route as on 10 September from 0554 to 1538, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority from Belushya to Dikson, Dikson and Cape Jelaniya to Archangel. Striking British weather reports from the British home area to Murmansk and from Spitsbergen to the British home area.
Iokanka area: 1 guardship, 2 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski".
Belushya/Kara Sea: 3 guardships, 1 minelayer, 3 minesweepers.
Dikson area: 1 guardship.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53) in the attack area depth of
U 312 AB 65) sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7463)
U 362 XA 7549)in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739)

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest,
U 965 Tromsö,
U 363, 365, 425, 703, 956, 968, 992, 997 Narvik.
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 293, 716 Bergen,
U 310 Stavanger.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 307 proceeding from Tromsö to AG 89.
U 711, 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Kara Sea.
1445 U 995 put in to Hammerfest from AT 70.
1700 U 315 put in to Narvik from AB 91.
2230 U 425 put out from Narvik - Ramsund for Tromsö.
U 313 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
1900 U 293 put out from Bergen for Trondheim.
0020 U 703 put out from Harstad, at 0730 put in to Narvik.
0130 U 636 put out from Hammerfest, at 2045 put in to Harstad.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in the attack area west of Bear Island.
3 boats in patrol line in Kara Sea.
2 boats approaching.

Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 1101 received from Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Re Captain U-boats Norway S.O.s only 144 of 9 September:

1. Give the order to return for the further operations intended in Kara Sea before the unpredictable ice situation can trap the returning boats.

2. In these operations take no risks against the Russians, as successes only whet their appetite."

That referred to our intention to leave boats

in Kara Sea, even after Cape Jelaniya had iced up, so that they might intercept the traffic expected at that time and then return via Kara Strait.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Herrle" with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Most Secret 4652 A Ops. sent to U 992:

Sailing order for U 992 (Falke), see Appendix I/5.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

2315 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4669 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 968 (Westphalen), third operation, (mines: "Lachs I"), see Appendix II/7.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

In support of the operation by "Zoller", teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 149 was sent to Luftflotte Command 5 and Flieger Fuehrer 3:

"Request one more unobtrusive air reconnaissance of Kola Bay, concentrating on confirmation of the battleship's anchorage; information to reach Captain U-boats, Norway if possible by 17 September."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

The striking radio traffic with Dikson may be connected with operations of our Kara Sea boats or perhaps with mine successes, for example in Belushya.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0522 to 1335. Southern Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Carrier warning from Bergen as far as and including Bodö. Carrier formation was in the Stadtlandet sea area at 1300 on 12 September.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority, Belushya to Dikson, Dikson to Archangel.
On 11 September shipping in Gorlo Strait (Danilov light - AW 2944 - switched on from 2200).
Murmansk area: 1 minesweeper.
Iokanka area: destroyer "E", 4 minesweepers, 1 guardboat, 2 MO-boats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Uritski", 3 guardships, 1 minelayer, 1 minesweeper, 4 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53) in the attack area depth
U 312 AB 65) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7463)
U 362 XA 7549) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7431)

In port:

U 668, 995 Hammerfest,
U 425, 965 Tromsö,
U 315, 363, 365, 636, 703, 956, 968, 992, 997 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen,
U 310 Stavanger.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 711, 957 proceeding from Hammerfest to Kara Sea.
U 307 proceeding from Tromsö to AG 89.
2000 U 995 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
0245 U 425 put in to Tromsö from Narvik.
0200 U 636 put out from Harstad, at 0800 put in to Narvik.
U 313 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 293 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
1950 U 310 put out from Egersund for Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in the attack area southwest of Bear Island.
3 boats in Kara Sea.
2 boats approaching.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Herrle" with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Most Secret 4678 A Ops. sent to U 997:

Sailing order for U 997 (Lehmann), see Appendix I/6.

The following Sailing order (radio message 1115/748) was sent to "Bentzien" who was proceeding to Hammerfest:

1140 "U 425 (Bentzien): put out from Hammerfest on the evening of 12 September for AB 65 as the third boat of group "Grimm". Economical speed."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1300 Most Secret teleprinter message 4680 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, First Division:

"Proposal of Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0225 F I of 8 September concerning meteorological reconnaissance by U-boats is not approved.

1. The daily flights of the meteorological Staffel are the last regular part reconnaissance against PQ convoys; they have already intercepted formations several times promptly and are considerably more effective than U-boat reconnaissance.

2. As means of reconnaissance, U-boats would have to be moved further south. Each transmission of weather reports would be immediately located by the enemy and the boats would be scattered by strong air patrol. Boats which, on intercepting a convoy, did not lie far enough ahead, would be useless for attacking purposes on that day. It is therefore decisive in convoy attacks to have air reconnaissance if possible ahead of our U-boat formation."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The urgent radio traffic from Belushya may be connected with mine successes scored by "Mohs". The shipping movements in Gorlo Strait may be connected with the assembling of a return convoy."

Re IV (d):

"U 425 (Bentzien) and U 997 (Lehmann) are the first of the six boats to join group "Grimm" after the execution of their minelaying operations. They will strengthen the patrols in Bear Island passage, where there are still very few boats."

(Signed) Suhren.

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13 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Billefjord - Bear Island - Billefjord from 0621 to 1134, exhaustive, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Radio messages of first priority: Belushya to Dikson and Archangel, Dikson to all naval forces in Northern Waters.
Iokanka area: 4 guardships, 3 minesweepers, 2 guardboats, 2 MO-boats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 1 guardboat, 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper.
Dikson area: 1 minesweeper.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
At 1716 Archangel transmitted an urgent operational message to Britain.
18th Group: lively air activity.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53) in the attack area, depth
U 312 AB 65) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 278 XA 7463)
U 362 XA 7549) in patrol line in Kara Sea.
U 739 XA 7431)
U 711 AF 89)
U 957 AF 89) on passage.

U 307 north of AG 89 on special operation.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest,
U 965 Tromsö,
U 997 Harstad,

U 315, 363, 365, 636, 703, 956, 968, 992 Narvik,
U 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 992 put out from Narvik - Ramsund for AA 93.
0015 U 425 put out from Tromsö, at 1600 put in to Hammerfest.
0200 U 997 put out from Narvik, at 0800 put in to Harstad, at 1000 put out from Harstad, at 1800 put in to Tromsö, at 2400 put out for Hammerfest.
1120 U 315 put out from Narvik - Ramsund, at 2100 put in to Tromsö, at 2400 put out for Hammerfest.
1000 U 995 passed Tromsö, at 1705 put in to Harstad.
U 313 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.
U 293 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.
1700 U 310 put in to Bergen from Egersund, at 2100 put out for Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in the attack area west of Bear Island.
5 boats in Kara Sea.

0159 Radio message 2332/762 sent to Group "Greif":

"1. New pack frequency on 36 meter wave: routine hourly from 6 to 10 minutes past the hour. Tuning daily at 2200, callsign "Alpha", series number in accordance with Communications Order for Baltic boats.

2. In a short signal, "Schaar" informed us of rendezvous with "Franze", "Franz" and "Mangold" for 0600 on the next day. For this purpose, new system: yyy equals "Kaminskovo Bay", ggg equals "Belukha", uuu equals "Rinenes", ooo equals "Gerbershtein". Confirmation by ccc equaling "Yes". "Schaar" is bringing further directions for radio communications.

3. At the rendezvous, equip a third boat for further operations. The other 2 boats will operate according to the situation off Dikson and Yugorski Strait. On return passage, report least distance from the ice northeast of Jolaniya.

4. "Lange" assumes command of group "Greif"."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Herrle" with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen".

1820 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0410 to "Edelweiss" received by radio:

"If the enemy situation permits, answer with following short signal:

1. Landed according to plan, ship nearby. Short signal: W L A.

2. We are standing by off the coast with emergency equipment and auxiliary unit, ship sunk. Short signal: B I P."

No answer was received. The coastguard ship "Kehdingen" might be lost or she might be lying hidden off the coast, unwilling to betray her position by radio.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 703 (Brünner), see Appendix I/7.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1307 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0390:

"Subsequently to Luftflotte 5 I W 200/44 Most Secret of 5 September, Luftflotte 5 proposed the following sailing dates for the U-boats from Tromsö to pick up the meteorological units:

1. Hope Island: 20 September.

2. Bear Island: 26 September.

3. Spitsbergen: after the boat returns from Bear Island, at the latest 5 October. Request approval."

1405 In reply, teloprinter message Most Secret 4704 was sent to Naval Chief Command, Norway and Luftflotte 5:

"Boats are being allocated, but are to be employed

against convoys. U 636 (Schendel) will arrive at Tromsö provisionally on 17 September for loading and discussion."

E. Organizational:

1727 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 7005 received:

"A) The following ruling is intended for Captain U-boats, West after his transfer to Bergen:

1. Captain U-boats, West, with his H.Q. in Bergen, assumes command of the U-boats in the area south of 66° 30' N and east of 2° W. Transfer of boats to command will be arranged through C-in-C U-boats Ops. and Captain U-boats, Norway with frequency alteration.

2. Captain U-boats, West remains under the operational command of C-in-C U-boats (Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.)

3. For command of the boats proceeding in escort, he is directed to cooperate closely with Flag Officer, Baltic Defenses in the home waters as far as Kristiansand (South), and with Admiral Commanding the west and north coast north of Kristiansand (South).

4. Captain U-boats, West is responsible for anti-submarine measures in his area.

5. Captain U-boats, West will inform the boats in his area of any important news (e.g. mine situation, Swedish ships, German and enemy aircraft and naval forces). Naval Chief Command, Norway remains responsible for transmitting this information to Captain U-boats, West.

6. In enemy operations in Admiral Skagerrak's area, group Central remains the responsibility of Naval Chief Command, East.

B) If any alterations are to be proposed, submit them by return.

C) Authorities concerned have been informed."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"Striking radio traffic from Bolushya continues."

Re IV (b):

"2 boats from group "Greif" were withdrawn from Kara Sea, since the serious ice situation apparently precludes much traffic this year, indeed not enough to justify the presence of more than 3 boats. On the other hand as many boats as possible had to be held in readiness for attacks against the convoy traffic between Britain and Russia which has started again. So far this year, a specially high number of boats has been withdrawn from operations against convoys to perform the many special assignments."

Re E:

"The installation of Captain U-boats, West in Bergen affects us principally as follows:

(a) The flotilla, base and dockyard at Bergen are gradually being closed to Northern Waters boats.

(b) Anti-submarine measures in the southern part of Northern Waters are henceforth the responsibility of Captain U-boats, West instead of Naval Chief Command, Norway."

(Signed) Suhren.

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14 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Billefjord - Bear Island - Billefjord from 0604 to 1025, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0448 to 1321, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

On the night of 13 September, shipping movements

in Gorlo Strait in an east-north direction. (Danilov light - AW 2944 - extinguished at 2300: Terski Orlov - AW 2678 switched on from 0200 to 0300.)
Iokanka area: 2 guardships, 1 guardboat, 2 MO-boats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "B" and "J", 4 guardships, 1 minesweeper, 5 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper, 2 guardboats.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
In the evening the British radio station at Archangel transmitted several urgent operational messages with distinguishing word "Smack" to the British home area.
At 0800 on 14 September Cleethorpes broadcast 4 operational radio messages to each of 3 distributors, 4 radio messages to each of 7 distributors, 1 radio message to 5 distributors, Admiral Orkneys/Shetlands and Rosyth H.Q.
Probably a formation at sea in the North Sea/Northern Waters area.
Also probable carrier traffic.
18th Group: lively flying activity.

(c) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 53) in the attack area, depth
U 312 AB 65) of sweep 50 miles.

Group "Greif":

U 711)
U 278)
U 362) in attack areas in Kara Sea.
U 739)
U 957)

U 307 north of AG 89 on special operation.

In port:

U 668 Hammerfest.
U 965 Tromsö,
U 363, 365, 636, 703, 956, 968 Narvik,
U 293, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1203 Group "Grimm" proceeding to new attack

areas, U 921 to AB 3575, U 312 to AB 3885, U 425 to AC 4146.

0400 U 425 put out from Hammerfest for AB 65.

2330 U 668 put out from Hammerfest for AC 4773.

0945 U 997 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsö, at 2330 put out for AC 4495.

U 992 proceeding from Narvik - Ramsund to AA 93.

0945 U 315 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsö, at 2330 put out eastwards.

0400 U 995 put out from Harstad, at 0830 put in to Narvik.

2100 U 313 put in to Narvik after open water passage from Trondheim.

0300 U 293 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.

U 310 proceeding from Bergen to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2 boats in attack areas southwest of Bear Island.
3 boats approaching.

1222 Radio message 1135/769 sent:

"U 668 (v. Eickstedt): put out from Hammerfest for AC 44 on the evening of 14 September. Boat No. 6 of group "Grimm". Economical speed."

1400 Radio message 1203/770 sent:

"Group "Grimm":

1. Indications of a probable new westbound convoy.

2. Proceed immediately to attack areas, depth of sweep 50 miles: "Werner" AB 3575, "Nikolay" AB 3885, "Bentzien" AC 4146.

3. On the evening of 14 September, U 956 (Mohs) will put out from Narvik for AB 6664, U 997 (Lehmann) from Hammerfest for AC 4495 and U 668 (Eickstedt) for AC 4773, economical speed."

The reasons for supposing that another westbound convoy was about to run were the increased traffic in Gorlo Strait and the British radio traffic (starting up again) from Archangel to the home area.

5 boats in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Herrle" with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs), see Appendix I/8.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

1653 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4724 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 703 (Brünner), twelfth operation, see Appendix II/8

1650 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4723 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 636 (Schendel), ninth operation (Mines: "Forelle I"), see Appendix II/9.

2130 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4726 A Ops. sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

Short report from U 995 (Köhntopp), third operation (Mines: "Hering I"), see Appendix II/10.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1157 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0413 to Naval War Staff, Second Division received:

"Since enemy submarines have again been operating against convoy traffic in the west coast area, an extension of this activity can shortly be expected in the north coast area. Request that another U-boat be made available for the preparation of the operation so that we can oppose the enemy immediately. Early operations intended to counter submarine attacks off the north coast."

1810 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, First Division, Most Secret 28368 to Naval Chief Command, Norway received:

"Re "Edelweiss": C-in-C, Navy has decided that "Edelweiss" is to be replaced by "Goldschmied". Naval Chief Command has requested that Captain U-boats should make a U-boat available. Details will be settled by the authorities concerned."

E. Organizational:

2216 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 01428 received:

"U 771 (Block) will come under Captain U-boats, Norway from 15 September.
Transfer and sailing order through Captain U-boats, Norway. Flotilla allocation through Admiral Commanding U-boats."

F. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d) and IV (b):

In addition to the shipping movements in Gorlo Strait reported on 11 September and the striking weather reports from Britain to Murmansk, the later radio intercept reports seem to indicate preparation for the sailing of a return convoy.

(Signed) Suhren.

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15 September, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

Photographic and visual reconnaissance of Kola Bay carried out. No shipping traffic in Ura Bay or Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0522 to 0624. Abandoned owing to engine trouble. At 0738 another Ju 188 took off on the same assignment. Southern part of Faeroes and Thorshavn examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

According to a photographic report, 1 battleship of the "R" class between Cape Pinagori and Vaenga Bay. (The 4 destroyers sighted in Vaenga Bay on 6 September were no longer there.)

1 Liberty freighter of 7,000 G.R.T. Visual reconnaissance in Kola Bay north of Vaenga showed 4 small coastal vessels on a northerly course, a small coastal vessel in Ara Bay and one in Eina Bay, 2 small coastal vessels at anchor in Motka Bay.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: destroyer "B", 1 minesweeper.
Iokanka area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper, 2 guardboats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 3 guardships, 3 minesweepers, 2 guardboats, 1 ice-breaker.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship.
Dikson area: 1 guardboat.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: at 2044 on 14 September, Svanvik took a bearing of 225° on a British unit, at 0014 on 15 September British unit in 229°, at 0352 British unit in 263°.
18th Group: lively flying activity (32 aircraft).

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 921 AB 3735)
U 312 AB 6228) on passage.
U 425 AB 6635)

Group "Greif":

U 711)
U 957)
U 278) in attack areas in Kara Sea.
U 362)
U 739)

U 307 north of AG 89 on special operation.

In port:

U 965 Tromsö,
U 956 Harstad,
U 313, 363, 365, 636, 703, 968, 995 Narvik,
U 293, 387, 737 Trondheim,
U 716, 771 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 315 proceeding east from Hammerfest.
U 668 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4773.
U 997 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 4495.
U 992 proceeding from Narvik - Ramsund to AA 93.

0000 U 956 put out from Narvik, 0550 put in to Harstad, 0935 put out for AC 4773.

1510 U 310 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats in formation west of Bear Island passage.
3 boats approaching.

1149 Radio message 1112/789 sent:

"Altered attack areas for group "Grimm": "Lehmann" AB 6664, "Eickstedt" AC 4495, "Mohs" AC 4773."

3 boats in Kara Sea.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"Herrle" with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen".

"Zoller" on operation "Dachs".

1249 Radio message 1151/790 sent to "Dachs":

"1. Results of renewed air reconnaissance expected by 17 September.

2. "Dachs" radio messages will be repeated at 0100 and 1000 at the beginning of the very long wave program."

(d) Miscellaneous:

0230 Radio message 0206/782 sent:

"Officer radio messages to "Dachs" not to be decoded by other boats."

Transfer order for U 636 (Schendel):

"1. Put out from Narvik for Tromsö on the forenoon of 16 September. Report sailing by short signal on "MC".

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Finnsnesronnen. Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Tromsö.

3. Boat is expected in Tromsö by Admiral Polar Coast, Naval Officer in charge and the Naval Harbor Master. After making fast, the commander will report personally to the Naval Officer in charge and the Naval Harbor Master and by telephone to Admiral Polar Coast.

4. Take on canteen at Harstad. Report times of putting in and out on "MC".

5. Radio frequency as far as and including Harstad "MC", 479 kc/s., from Harstad "Anton I". Switch to Northern Waters very long wave on leaving Narvik.

6. Enter Tromsö in accordance with sailing order."

Sailing order for U 636 (Schendel), see Appendix I/9.

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler) and U 737 (Brasack):

"1. Put out from Trondheim for AB 65 on 16 September.

2. Proceed via Frohavet and further at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.

3. Report passing of 67° N by time short signal; up to there in accordance with Order No. 13.

4. Operational Order No. 15 in force in the operational area. Surface only for charging. Preserve radio silence except for enemy sighting reports.

5. U-boat Northern Waters frequency."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

1345 In radio message 1255/49 1st Battle Group reported:

"Heavy air raid on 1st Battle Group in Kaafjord."

1842 Radio message 1618/191 received from 1st Battle Group:

"In view of the large-scale air raid by four-engined bombers and its grave consequences, fighters must be sent immediately to the Alta area."

D. Plans:

2323 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0443 received:

"In accordance with the decision of C-in-C Navy, operation "Edelweiss" will be repeated by "Goldschmied". The operation will be called "Edelweiss II". Former "Edelweiss" operation will be called "Edelweiss I". Admiral Polar Coast will provide the "Edelweiss" operational order. Captain U-boats, Norway will report escorting U-boat and earliest sailing date. Further information follows, in particular regarding the place of landing."

Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway S.O.s only 1160:

"1. The repetition of "Edelweiss" by "Goldschmied" is ordered in Most Secret Naval War Staff, First Division I W 28368/44 of 14 September. Since the enemy has already intercepted operation "Schatzgräber" on Shannon and shortly afterwards "Edelweiss" at Koldewey, it can be assumed that this area will be strictly patrolled for the whole of the time in question. Even if the landing is successful, more difficult conditions are to be expected. The area to the south as far as Scoresby Bay is reported to be even more unfavorable from the point of view of enemy patrols.
It is therefore intended to reconnoiter and set up the station on Germania Land or Ile de France.

2. Re my Most Secret teleprinter message 0342 F I M of 11 September: contrary to the intention of Luftflotte 5, it is planned to carry the automatic meteorological transmitter in a U-boat, either to South Koldewey or Shannon according to the ice conditions. The boat will be on a special operation. The ice will allow execution until the end of September: the operation will not be combined with "Edelweiss II", but will depend on whether Captain U-boats, Norway makes another U-boat available.
Additional note for Captain U-boats: teleprinter information is requested as to whether another U-boat can be made available and when."

In reply, teleprinter message Most Secret 4748 was sent;

"1. The boat for "Edelweiss II" is operating against the expected PQ convoy.

2. Another boat can be made available at the end of this operation."

E. Survey of the situation:

In reply to yesterday's radio message to group "Grimm", teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 01523 was received:

1912 "1. Indications of the approach of a westbound convoy should again be reported here in detail, as we have no particulars.

2. The recent lively enemy activity in the Norwegian area presupposes operations against Norway on a fairly large scale. This must be taken into consideration when holding boats in readiness or when allocating them."

2335 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4742 A Ops. to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. was sent:

"Reasons for presuming westbound convoy on the basis of radio intercept reports:
On 11 September striking British weather report from Britain to Murmansk and shipping movements in Gorlo Strait. On the evening of 13 September British radio station at Archangel sent several urgent operational radio messages with codeword "Smack" to Britain, and shipping movements from Gorlo Strait northwards. On the morning of 14 September very lively urgent radio traffic between Britain and Murmansk - Archangel."

(Signed) Suhren.

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APPENDIX I/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway. On board, 1 September 1944.
Serial Number Most Secret
4465 A Ops.

Sailing order for U 711 (Lange).

1. Put out from Narvik for Ramsund on the afternoon of 2 September. Report time of sailing promptly on "MC". Take in 8 T5 and 2 T3 torpedoes.

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen to Tromsö: pilot from Lödingen.

3. Personnel of the sub-G.I.S. station will come on board at Tromsö. Crew will not go ashore.

4. Proceed further to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Hand over 3 T5 for U 668. After interrogation of the prisoners, proceed with group "Kentmann" via "SR 1" and AF 88 to AS 20 in accordance with Operational Order No. 16.

5. Enemy situation:

   (a) PQ 32, strongly escorted by carriers and heavy units, ran between 21 and 24 August. Expect heavy fighters and carrier-borne aircraft. Increased danger from submarines off "SR 1".

   (b) On 29 August, 5 escort boats put out eastwards from Dikson, probably to pick up a convoy. The West Siberian Sea route was, according to "Schaar"'s report, patrolled by 4 "Catalinas" and minesweepers without radar.

   (c) Urgent radio traffic in the Kara Sea area indicated enemy encounters with group "Greif".

   (d) Ice situation: "Schaar" reported drift ice at Russki and the Matissena Passage. Bad ice year.

6. Own forces:

   (a) U-boats: U 394 (Borger) and U 363 (Neos) are operating in AB 60 against a formation with a southwesterly course. Bearings have been obtained. U 997 (Lehmann) returning from AB 61 to Andfjord.

U 921 (Werner) is putting out from Andfjord for AB 65 on 2 September.
At 2200 on 3 September group "Greif" will be in position line AS 1982 to 4332, in the following order: U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold), group radio frequency, control U 278.
U 957 (Schaar) returning from AT 21 to Hammerfest - Tromsö.
Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.
Group "Dachs": U 956 (Mohs), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Köhntopp), U 992 (Falke), U 636 (Schendel), U 425 (Bentzien) on special operations in AT 70.
U 703 (Brünner) on a special operation in AA 30.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be reported.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret -
4463 - A Ops.

On board 1 September 1944.

Sailing order for U 921 (Werner)

1. Put out from Narvik via Ramsund on the forenoon of 2 September. Report time of sailing on "MC".

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord to attack area AB 65. Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Harstad. Increased danger from submarines and aircraft off Andfjord.

3. Operational Order No. 15, Northern Waters radio frequency. In the operational area, surface only to charge and to take fixes. Preserve radio silence except for reports on the enemy.

4. Enemy situation:

After an interval of 3 months, the first PQ convoy (32) ran with a strong carrier escort from 21 to 24 August. At the same time, other carriers attacked Altafjord ("Tirpitz"). Further convoys and carrier formations are to be continually expected. Attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8. For air situation, see Northern Waters Directions No. 30.

5. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

U 394 (Borger) and U 363 (Nees) are operating in AB 60 against a formation with a southwesterly course. Bearings have been taken. U 997 (Lehmann) returning from AB 61 to Andfjord.
Group "Greif": U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold) in Kara Sea. U 957 (Schaar) returning to Hammerfest from AT 21. Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Group "Dachs": U 956 (Mohs), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Köhntopp), U 992 (Falke), U 636 (Schendel), U 425 (Bentzien) on special operations in the east. U 703 (Brünner) on a special operation in AA 30.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights to Jan Mayen and Bear

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Island (Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be reported.

p.p. Rechc.

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APPENDIX I/3

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret -
4559 - A Ops.

On board 6 September, 1944.

Sailing order for U 312 (Nikolay).

1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 7 September, report time of sailing on "MC".

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund with pilot from Lödingen to Harstad. From there via Andfjord to attack area AB 65. Increased danger from submarines and aircraft off Andfjord. Economical speed.

3. Operational Order No. 15. Remain unobserved. Surface only to charge. Attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

4. U-boat Northern Waters frequency, "MC" as far as Harstad. Preserve radio silence except for reports on the enemy.

5. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32), strongly escorted by carriers and destroyers, ran from 21 to 24 August. Aircraft reported: "Swordfish", "Corsairs","Fulmars" and "Catalinas". Simultaneously another carrier formation attacked the "Tirpitz" in Altafjord. ("Seafires", "Martlets" and "Barracudas" also took part.) Another appearance of westbound or eastbound convoys and carrier formations can be expected at any time. For air patrol, see Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

6. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in the attack area: U 921 (Werner) in AB 65.

Group "Dachs" on a special operation in the east: U 995 (Köhntopp), U 636 (Schendel) returning: U 968 (Westphalen) to Hammerfest.

Group "Greif" in Kara Sea: U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold). Putting out from Hammerfest: U 711 (Lange), U 957 (Schaar). From Narvik: U 365 (Wedemeyer). Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operation: U 703 (Brünner) returning to Andfjord from AB 10.

(b) Daily meteorological flights by He 111s or Ju 88s from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island - Spitsbergen.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/4

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway. . . On board, 7 September, 1944.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4574 - A Ops.

Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller).

1. Put out from Narvik for Ramsund on the morning of 8 September to take in torpedoes. Promptly report time of sailing on "MC".

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund, pilot from Lödingen to Harstad. Then via Andfjord to attack area AB 91. Increased danger from submarines and aircraft off Andfjord. Economical speed.

3. Operational Order No. 15. Remain unobserved. Surface only to charge. Attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

4. U-boat Northern Waters frequency, "MC" as far as Harstad. Preserve radio silence except for reports on the enemy.

5. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32), strongly escorted by carriers and destroyers, ran from 21 to 24 August. (Aircraft reported: "Swordfish", "Corsairs", "Catalinas", and "Fulmars"). Simultaneously another carrier formation attacked the "Tirpitz" in Altafjord. ("Seafires", "Martlets" and "Barracudas" also took part). Another appearance of westbound or eastbound convoys and carrier formations can be expected at any time. For air patrol, see Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

6. Own forces:

   (a) U-boats:

   Group "Grimm" in the attack area: U 921 (Werner) AB 65, U 312 (Nikolay) on passage to AB 65.

   Group "Dachs" on a special operation in the east: U 995 (Köhntopp), U 636 (Schendel). U 968 (Westphalen) returning to Hammerfest.

   Group "Greif" in Kara Sea: U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold). Putting out from Hammerfest: U 711 (Lange), U 957 (Schaar). From Narvik: U 365 (Wedemeyer). Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operation: U 703 (Brünner) returning to Andfjord from AB 10.

(b) Daily meteorological flights by He 111s or Ju 88s from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island - Spitsbergen.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/5

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4652 - A Ops.

On board, 11 September, 1944.

Sailing order for U 992 (Falke).

1. Put out from Narvik via Bogen - Ramsund on 12 September. Report time of sailing at a given time on "MC".

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AA 93. Pilot necessary from Lödingen to Harstad. Increased danger from submarines and aircraft off Andfjord.

3. Remain unobserved on passage. Setting-up of the meteorological shore transmitter "Walter" on the northern tip of Jan Mayen on the directions of the accompanying advisor Dr. Stöbe. Make adequate pre-reconnaissance of the coast and patrols. While transferring the set to land, post look-outs in elevated positions. Make certain of communication by signaling. Anti-aircraft guns at full readiness. Listen to the set's transmission and report execution from AB 72 on frequency "Anton" by short signal.

4. Then proceed to AB 58 to group "Grimm".

5. Operational Order for Northern Waters boats No. 15 is in force. Disposition against convoys is possible at any time. Attacks in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

6. U-boat Northern Waters frequency, as far as Harstad "MC" and very long wave. Preserve radio silence except to report main targets or if observed.

7. Enemy situation:

After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32) with strong carrier and destroyer escort and some 20 ships ran from 21 to 24 August. Simultaneously, another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Then a smaller return convoy ran. Further convoys and carrier formations can be expected now. Types of participating aircraft: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?), with the convoy; "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

8. Own forces:

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(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas: U 921 (Werner) AB 53, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 65. Surface only to charge and to take fixes.

Group "Greif" in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold). Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operation: U 307 (Herrle) with coastguard ship "Busch" in the north.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/6

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4678 A Ops.

On board, 12 September, 1944.

Sailing order for U 997 (Lehmann).

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 12 September. Report passing of boom on "MC".

2. Proceed via Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen to Hammerfest, pilot from Lödingen to Tromsö, then escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Pilot and escort have been arranged. No unnecessary delay.

3. Put out from Hammerfest as quickly as possible with escort as far as "SR 1", then at economical speed proceed to AB 69 to join group "Grimm".

4. Operational Order for Northern Waters boats No. 15 is in force: attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

5. Northern Waters very long wave from Narvik, also "MC" as far as Harstad, then frequency "Anton I" as far as Hammerfest and after putting out from Hammerfest, Northern Waters frequency. Preserve radio silence except to report main targets, first appearance of carrier-borne aircraft or if observed.

6. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32) with strong carrier and destroyer escort and some 20 ships ran between 21 and 24 August. Simultaneously another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Then a smaller return convoy ran. Further convoys and carrier formations can be expected now. Types of participating aircraft: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?) with the convoy; Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

7. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas: U 921 (Werner) AB 53, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 65. Surface only to charge and to take fixes.

Group "Greif" in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz) U 739 (Mangold). Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operation: U 307 (Herrle) with coastguard ship "Busch" in the north.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/7

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4691 - A Ops.

On board, 13 September, 1944.

Sailing order for U 703 (Brünner).

1. Put out from Narvik on the afternoon of 14 September, report time of sailing.

2. Outward passage through Westfjord via AE 30. Possible increased danger from submarines and aircraft (also carrier-borne aircraft) off Westfjord.

3. Lay meteorological buoy No. 133 (Ernst) unobtrusively on East Shelf off Iceland, if possible in 64° N, 15° W. Remain unobserved even at the cost of speed. Take precautions against location close in to the coast.

4. Then proceed on the Great Circle to lay meteorological buoy No. 132 (August) in 76° N, 51° E. More details according to the advice of the accompanying Inspector Ernst. Report laying of buoys on frequency "Anton" by short signal, using your series number, once you are far enough away. (No. 133 from AE 30).

5. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32) with strong carrier and destroyer escort and some 20 ships ran from 21 to 24 August. Simultaneously, another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Then a smaller return convoy ran. Further convoys and carrier formations can be expected now. Types of participating aircraft: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?) with the convoy; "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

6. After laying the buoys, you are free to attack valuable targets in the area concerned. Disposition against reported enemy formations is also possible at all times. Attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

7. Orders for further operations or return passage will follow after the two buoys have been laid.

8. Further details and procedure in accordance with Operational Order No. 15.

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9. U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Preserve radio silence except to report main targets or if observed.

10. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas: U 921 (Werner) AB 53, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 65. Surface only to charge and to take fixes.

Group "Greif" in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold).
Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operation: U 307 (Herrle) with coastguard ship "Busch" in the north.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX I/8

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4714 - A Ops.

On board, 14 September, 1944.

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs).

1. Put out from Narvik via Ramsund at noon on 14 September. Report time of sailing from Ramsund promptly on "MC".

2. Proceed further through Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AC 44. Pilot from Lödingen to Harstad. Possible increased danger from submarines and aircraft off Andfjord. Boat joins group "Grimm" as boat No. 4.

3. Operational Order No. 15. Remain unobserved. Surface only to charge.

4. U-boat Northern Waters frequency, "MC" as far as Harstad. Preserve radio silence except for reports on the enemy.

5. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32) with strong carrier and destroyer escort and some 20 ships ran from 21 to 24 August. Simultaneously, another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Then a smaller return convoy ran. Further convoys and carrier formations can be expected now. Types of participating aircraft: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?) with the convoy; "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

6. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas: U 921 (Werner) AB 53, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 65, U 425 (Bentzien) AB 69. Surface only to charge and to take fixes.

Group "Greif" in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold).
Radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for others.

Special operations: U 307 (Herrle) with coastguard ship "Busch" in the north.
U 992 (Falke) on passage to AA 93.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). Further reconnaissance will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/9

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats Norway. On board, 15 September, 1944.
Serial No. Most Secret
- 4739 - A Ops.

Sailing order for U 636 (Schendel).

1. Move from Narvik to Tromsö via Harstad on 16 September on receipt of order.

2. Make fast at the Naval Air Station at Tromsö and report. Take in 7 tons of gear and 2 men belonging to the meteorological station "Hope Island".

3. Then put out via Hammerfest, escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit as far as "SR 1".

4. Unobserved, economical passage to Hope Island. Approach with caution (cf. sketch of U 703 (Brünner)). After determining that there are no enemy forces on the island, disembark the unit and give support for their installation. Do not leave until the Station can transmit.

5. After execution of the landing, send position short signal from AC 19. Thereafter further disposition in accordance with Operational Order No. 15.

6. U-boat Northern Waters frequency: from Narvik also listen out on very long wave. Preserve radio silence north of 75° N except for reports which are vital to the landing of the meteorological unit, or to report main targets and the first appearance of carrier-borne aircraft, or if observed.

7. Enemy situation: After an interval of 3 months, another PQ convoy (32) with a strong carrier and destroyer escort and some 20 ships ran from 21 to 24 August. Simultaneously, another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Then a smaller return convoy ran. Further convoys and carrier formations can be expected now. Types of participating aircraft: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?) with the convoy; "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30. At noon on 15 September Altafjord was attacked by four-engined aircraft.

8. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas depth of sweep 50 miles: U 921 (Werner) AB 3575, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 3885, U 425 (Bentzien) AC 4146, U 997 (Lehmann) AB 6664, U 668 (v. Eickstedt) AC 4495, U 956 (Mohs) AC 4773. Surface only to charge and to take fixes.

Group "Greif" in Kara Sea: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold).

Special operations: U 307 (Herrle) in the north, U 315 (Zoller) in the east, U 703 (Brünner) in the west, U 992 (Falke) proceeding to AA 93. Radio messages to "Kent" and "Dachs" have no importance for others.

(b) German Air Force: Daily meteorological flights in accordance with Northern Waters Directions No. 6.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX II/1

COPY

Most Secret

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret

Short report from U 997 (Lehmann), second operation.

18 July, 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
20 July	Put in to Hammerfest, as the convoy report was false.
6 August	Put out from Hammerfest.
2 September	Put in to Narvik.
8 - 21 August	Attack area. Group "Trutz".
17 - 18 August	Safety service vessel for FW 200.
From 21 August	Operated against PQ 32.
22 August	"Swordfish" shadowing. After 45 minutes, surprise attack by 3 "Fulmars". 3·7 cm. gun only semi-automatic. Attacked head on in line astern. After the seventh run-in, submerged because of 3 "Fulmars", 1 twin-engined monoplane and 3 "Swordfish". Radiolocation shaft and port external fuel tank IV pierced by shot. 10 penetrations of the tower cover by 2 cm. or 3·7 cm. guns. Many light machine-gun hits. Probably rocket shells past the tower: no wounded. Submerged 6 more times from carrier-borne aircraft.
23 August	Submerged 11 times from carrier-borne aircraft. A "Swordfish" which was shadowing us at twilight had 3 fighters on to us in 15 minutes. Once there were 4 fighters in line abreast, then 4 "Swordfish" in twos, one above the other. Several times 2 aircraft together. "Swordfish" dropped 1 or 2 depth charges when the boat was submerged; the fighters did not drop any. A "Swordfish" forced us to withdraw by firing 3·7 cm. guns and we

submerged at the most favorable moment. Although it was never established that they had radar, they still ran in even in the twilight whenever they sighted us. From 1700 to 1900 in AC 4360 clouds of smoke, bearing 160°. Pursued, lost contact, as the vessels were too fast.

24 August — In AC 5499 made submerged attack on 2 destroyers and 2 frigates. Missed with a fan-of-two on a frigate, 1 tube-runner. 2 T5 torpedoes fired at a destroyer and a frigate. Explosions after 7 and 9 minutes respectively. Sinking noises twice. No depth charges until an hour later, then every half hour for 24 hours. 176 depth charges. No Asdic. Circling procedure. At times a vessel with mortars or map firing device. Few of the depth charges were near. After 20 hours, we lost pursuers probably owing to the rising seaway. Ju-compressor out of order, slight damage.

26 August — On the return passage over the convoy route we heard locations by explosive soundings and similar noises up to signal strength 5 for 10 hours over 15 miles. Loud rhythmical echoes (roughly a second apart) as from a smithy. Loud, fast deviation. As it could not be an enemy submarine, it was taken to be enemy decoys. We identified several of these apparatus from clear hydrophone bearings.

28 - 30 August — Attack area south of Bear Island.

31 August - 1 September — Operated against "Borger"'s formation. Then commenced return passage. 8 cubic meters. On the forenoon of 1 September in AB 6811, submerged from 1 "Swordfish" and 2 fighters.

Experiences:

Submerge as quickly as possible from carrier-borne aircraft, as shadowers usually bring many aircraft up in a short time. Bi-planes observed 3 times with fighters. Tactics: fighters attempt to keep the boat on the surface by attacking immediately, while summoning reinforcements. If the boat dives, the bi-plane drops 2 depth charges. If the boat remains on the surface the shadower must be kept at a distance with the 3·7 cm. gun only. Do not man the 2 cm. gun. As few men as possible on the bridge, so that if more fighters approach, quick submerging is possible.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed convoy operation. The order to remain on the

surface to fire the anti-aircraft guns could not be given in view of the small number of boats.

Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret - 4536 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/2

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), fifth operation.

23 July 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
3 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded via ÄF 88 to Kara Sea.
1 August	Off Kara Strait, still impassable.
2 August - 6 August	Submerged off Yugorski Strait. No ice. Sighted several small vessels and patrol vessels.
6 August	In AT 8597 missed with a T5 torpedo fired at a medium transport. Blowing head failure before gaining the necessary range. Unobserved. Reconnaissance of the eastern route.
9 August	Sighted probable fishing vessels off Dikson.
11 - 14 August	Ice reconnaissance. Refuelled in AS 2125 at rendezvous with "Lange". Ice reconnaissance.
15 - 22 August	Confined to XA 40 and XA 70 for 3 days. Reconnoitered the coastal routes, again in an easterly direction. (Lights, courses, etc.)
24 August	Drift ice boundary (XA 7528).
26 August	Camouflaged boat. Look-out put down on the island reported a mast top. Hauled ahead. Sudden burst of fire on special

survey ship "Nord", 200 G.R.T., in XA 7553, not seen from land. Radio transmission interrupted. Ship was set on fire. Took prisoners, among them the Communications Officer, immediate interrogation. Convoys were to come from the east. Provisions at Dikson were short, as supply ship "Marina Raskova" was sunk by another U-boat. Important pronouncements on convoy routes, lights, harbor occupation, entering, defenses, etc.

27 August — At Matissena drift ice: ships were able to pass, but it was not known if this would be possible at Wilkitzki. Sighted "Catalina". Unobserved. On 28 August ice was breaking. Sighted "Catalina". Unobserved.

28 August — Off Belushya in XA 7295 5 patrol vessels; pursued them eastwards, but lost them as their speed was 18 knots and they disappeared in the ice.

30 August — Had to report position, as we had had no radio contact and other boats had to be brought up. Reconnoitered along the coast as far as AS 2499 at high speed. At Jelaniya sighted several "Catalinas", unobserved.

31 August — In AS 33, no radio communication. Sent radio message west of Jelaniya, no confirmation.

1 September — Return passage. Intention: to pass on our experiences, disembark the Communications Officer, exchange torpedoes and put out again. No locations.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-planned, decisive special operation full of incidents.
Very valuable reconnaissance data.
Result: Russian survey ship "Nord" destroyed, valuable prisoners taken.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4537 A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/3

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 363 (Nees), second operation.

5 August	Put out from Harstad.
2 September	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded to attack area AB 9189, depth of sweep 50 miles, group "Trutz".
6 August	Made for AB 5967.
7 August	Made for AB 6795. 3·7 cm. gun out of order (barrel premature).
19 August	Distant explosions since 1500. Up to 21 August no sighting or location.
21 August	At 1033 operated at maximum speed against convoy (PQ 32) reported by U 344 in AB 5450. At 1850 in AB 6149 "Swordfish" at a distance of 8,000 meters from us, submerged, depth charges.
22 August	Submerged 4 times because of carrier-borne aircraft.
23 August	Submerged several times from carrier-borne aircraft. At 2330 proceeded from AC 5417 to AC 5860.
24 August	At 0309 in AC 5491 4 destroyers, speed 14 knots, double lines astern. 2 bow-T5 torpedoes fired at the 2 leading destroyers. Submerged as a third turned towards. Noise boxes. 1 explosion after 10.15 minutes, another after 11·06 minutes. Sinking noises. Asdic. Withdrew to reload. 1 depth charge. At 0505 surfaced.

Only 2 destroyers at the place of torpedoing, cross course, slight speed. Submerged some 4 to 5 miles from there.
At 0530 depth charges. Immediately went to 2A. Presume they came from an aircraft which had been summoned to the position.
At 0643 T5 torpedo fired at searching destroyer, range 5,000 meters. After 84 seconds a weak explosion, presumably a ground-runner.
At 0651 missed with a stern T5 torpedo owing to depth charges.
At 0920 destroyers out of sight. Proceeded via position lines.

26 August — AC 1939.

27 August — Proceeded from AB 3834 to attack area AB 6816.

29 August — Safety service vessel for ice reconnaissance in AB 6780.

31 August — Operated on reported formation. (AB 61, southwesterly course).
At 2210 in AB 6491 location on "Naxos". Submerged. After surfacing,

1 September — "Naxos" location at 0014, loud continuous lowing note. Presume it is our own boat.
From 0503 in AB 6763, at 1433 proceeded to AB 9214; submerged 4 times from "Swordfish", which circled round our diving position. Returned regularly to the diving position every 30 to 40 minutes.
At 2000 in AB 9571 abandoned the operation because of lack of fuel. Return passage.

Experiences:

1. "Swordfish" ran in without location at altitudes up to 2,500 meters. Smoke float at diving position. Shortly afterwards 3 aircraft which took turns of shadowing. No depth charges.

2. Search formation of 4 destroyers in double lines abreast, range some 1,000 meters. Apparently only the first two had noise boxes, the last two had hydrophones. First depth charge 23 minutes after the torpedo explosion, then several at intervals of 5 to 10 minutes. Asdic only in search procedure.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

The commander acted too cautiously in his first encounter with the enemy. The 2 destroyers were probably sunk.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4575 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/4

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 956 (Mohs) seventh operation. (Mines: "Butt I").

29 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
5 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded via AC 51 and AC 69.
30 August	At 0630 in AC 4683 submerged because of location.
1 September	At 0908 in AT 7213 submerged to observe Kostin Strait. No patrol vessels or barriers identified. At 2348 in AT 7229 alarm: patrol vessel at the entrance to Kostin Strait. Then submerged and proceeded to off Belushya Bay for purposes of observation. (No patrol vessels or barriers). Visibility good. No enemy aircraft.
2 September	At 0720 in AT 7238 lay on the bottom to wait for daybreak to lay mines.
3 September	At 0120 proceeded inside Belushya Bay. Breeze up. From 0301 to 0500 laid mines. Then put out submerged. Patrol vessel in Kostin Strait was not seen again. At 1150 in AT 7228 surfaced, commenced return passage. No further sightings or locations.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well planned minelaying operation in an important Russian base.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4623 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/5

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret

Short report from U 992 (Falke), second operation.
(mines: "Sprotte I").

29 August, 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
6 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
29 August	At 2308 in AC 7219 location on "Wanze". Alarm.
30 August	At 0452 in AC 4855 short location on "Naxos". Nothing sighted. Alarm. At 0940 in AC 4835 aircraft. Flew past. Type not identified. Alarm. At 1425 in AC 4657 aircraft. Type not identified. Alarm. At 1614 in AC 4635 aircraft sighted for a short time. Bi-plane. Alarm.
31 August	At 0541 short location on "Naxos". Alarm.
1 September	At 0230 in AC 6959 submarine. Presume it to be German. Alarm. At 1130 in AT 7154 aircraft. Flew past. Type not identified. Alarm.
2 September	From 2143 until 0035 on 3 September laid mines north of Kolguev from submerged position. East of AC 56 neither locations nor continuous aircraft. No traffic observed. Coastal lights were not burning.
5 September	At 1600 in AC 5793 aircraft. Flew past. Type not identified. Alarm.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Fairly simple, well-executed minelaying operation.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 4625 - A Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/6

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien). fifth operation, (mines: "Dorsch I").

29 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
5 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded via AC 51 and AC 69.
31 August	In AT 7976 lay on the bottom in water, depth 26 meters.
1 September	At 0340 in AT 7976 2 vessels, bearing 030°; lost sight of them in the direction of the Pechora entrance. At 1402 in AT 7972 aircraft, bearing 080°, course 320°. At 1655 in AT 7973 land-based aircraft, bearing 000°, course 200°. From 2140 to 2310 on the surface, laid 12 TMC mines at the west entrance to Pechora Bay. Coastal lights burning.
2 September	At 0603 in AT 7589 a masthead, bearing 040°. Submerged to attack, but did not sight it again. At 1108 in AT 7585 convoy of 4 steamers in two columns, course 120°, 5 escorts. Fired 2 F.A.T. torpedoes from tube I at the first column: enemy bow right, angle 80°, speed 8 knots, range 3,000 meters. At 1116 fired 2 F.A.T. torpedoes from tube V at the same column: enemy bow right, angle 93°, speed 9 knots, range 4,000 meters. Both missed through under-estimation of the distance. Return passage uneventful.

Drifting mines: 29 August AC 4875,
31 August AT 7185.

Presume them to be Russian.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed minelaying operation under favorable conditions.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4626 -
A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/7

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 968 (Westphalen) third operation, (mines: "Lachs I").

29 July 1944 — Put out from Hammerfest.

8 September — Put in to Hammerfest.

Proceeded via AC 51 and 69 to AW 31. 2 days' reconnaissance in the Kanin Nos area. 1 patrol vessel (large fishing vessel). Stood on and off at 10 miles from the coast. One boom defense ship near the coast, temporarily at anchor. Kanin Nos signal station beside the lighthouse manned continuously, radio station carried on lively traffic between the various buildings. In all, some 12 houses. Tidal current up to 5 miles, strong eddy current off the headland at the turn of the tide.
No steamers observed.

4 September — From 0430 to 0712 laid mines at periscope depth. Doubtful whether the mines will remain in position in view of the strong ground current. Withdrew at ebb tide. Patrol vessel was not seen again owing to the bad weather.
Return passage via AC 68, 45.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed minelaying operation in shallow water in very difficult conditions.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4669 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/8

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 703 (Brünner), twelfth operation.

21 August 1944	Put out from Tromsö.
10 September	Put in to Harstad.
21 August	Proceeded to AC 18. At 2045 operated on PQ convoy in AB 5450 with group "Trutz".
22 August	From 1551 to 2347 in the southern part of AC 18, submerged several times from barrier-borne aircraft.
23 August	At 0144 joined patrol line. Steered from AC 2546 to 2785. At 0608 in AC 2771 submerged from carrier-borne aircraft, later a search formation: 4 destroyers were searching in various directions from a smoke float, slight speed, continually altering courses, impossible to fire a torpedo. Surfaced at 1039 and hauled to the south. From 1130 until
24 August	0349 continuous carrier-borne aircraft and "Catalinas". In AC 5480 numerous explosions. Proceeded further until 1409, when in AC 3897 we could gain no contact. Operation abandoned, withdrew. At 1803 and
25 August	0158 a destroyer in AC 5892 and another in 5957. Return passage via position lines.
26 August	At 1330 in AC 19 operated on "Lohmann"'s report of Asdic location. At 1727 in AC 1984 very loud location on multi-hydrophone set, but no sighting; presumed it to be an enemy submarine.

Periodicity 1 second, loud cracking like the breaking of dry twigs, often intervals of 3 to 15 seconds.

27 August — Steered to AB 9630.

28 August — At 2000 in AB 9665 assumed escort of meteorological ship "Kehdingen" (start of operation "Edelweiss".) Proceeded via AB 28 to AA 3570.

1 September — At 0521 in AA 3415 U.S. coastguard ship "Northland" in sight; at 0620 missed twice with T5 torpedoes (1 circle-runner, 1 steering failure, apparently caused by noises in the ice).
At 1120 lost sight of "Northland" after pursuit in thick ice (pursuing "Kehdingen").
At 1734 in AA 2629 forced under the ice by gunfire from "Northland". Lost contact.

2 September — At 1420 intercepted by shipborne aircraft ("Walrus"). Lurked in AA 2690 until

4 September — 0035. Searched east and west coasts of South Koldewey.

5 September — Searched Besselsfjord. Only possible clue in AA 2619 one circular patch of new ice formation, diameter 300 meters: no trace of oil or wreckage.
Presumed "Kehdingen" had fled further north.

6 September — At 1250 commenced return passage via AB 43 and 56.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Unsuccessful operation by experienced Northern Waters commander. Boat came upon PQ 32 in the immediate vicinity of the carrier escort and did not manage to fire owing to the strong defenses.

2. It was wrong to use T5 torpedoes in ice, as there would probably be an echo effect. T3 torpedoes would have been more reliable.

3. Whereabouts of "Kehdingen" still an open question.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4723 - A Ops.

APPENDIX II/9

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 636 (Schendel), ninth operation, (mines: "Forelle I").

29 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
10 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded via AC 51 and AC 69 to AU 2124.
30 August	At 0010 "Naxos" location.
	At 0210 in AC 5423 3 destroyers, apparently Russian. Boat evaded them, destroyers turned towards at 300 meters, no depth charges.
5 September	From 2007 to 2105 we laid 12 TMC mines according to plan from the surface in water of 10 - 16 meters depth. We were not disturbed.
Drifting mines:	29 August AC 4911, AC 5417, 30 August AC 5435 (2), 9 September AC 4914.
Experiences:	Lights burning in Pechora Bay. No enemy aircraft or patrols.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed, fairly simple operation.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4724 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX II/10

COPY

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.
Admiral Commanding U-boats.
For information Naval War Staff, First Division.
For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report of U 995 (Köhntopp), third operation, (mines: "Hering I").

29 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
11 September	Put in to Hammerfest.
	Proceeded via AC 51 and AC 69 to Yugorski Strait.
29 August	At 1758 in AC 4633 "Fliege" location, submerged. At 1935 several explosions.
30 August	At 0600 in AC 5148 hydrophone bearing in 120°; 2 destroyers, class "AI", distance from us 3,000 meters, slight speed. They approached the boat with slight zig-zagging to zero position. Dived to A plus 60 meters. Also a corvette with Asdic. None of the vessels was making more than 50 revolutions, some stopped. Destroyer turned, passed ahead of the boat and stopped. 1 depth charge, inexact. After altering course by 90°, we apparently lost them. At 1140 "Wanze" location in AC 5191, submerged. At 1700 several explosions.
31 August	At 0037 in AC 5279 "Fliege" location, submerged. At 1951 in AC 5695 "Fliege" location, submerged. The range of the well-operated "Fliege" and "Wanze" was so accurate that even when signal strengths were high, we still had time to salvage the ammunition and dive without going too vertically.

1 September	At 1138 "Fliege" location in AC 6854, submerged.
4 September	In the morning off Matveev Island. Reconnoitered for traffic. Russian radio beacons in Yugorski Strait gave good bearings. Searchlight activity off Cape Greben. Apparent patrol vessels close in to land. Morse traffic. Assignment carried out undisturbed on the surface between 2100 and 2200 on 4 September. Depth of water 21 - 22 meters. On return passage no chance to use torpedoes.
9 September	At 1215 3 land-based aircraft in AC 6955 (type not identified), submerged.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed minelaying operation in shallow water.

- Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 4726 - A Ops.

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APPENDIX III

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message U-boat base Hammerfest (Schaar) Most Secret 398 of 3 September:

Emergency. Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Situation report, Kara Sea: August 1944 (U 957).

A) 1. Shipping at Dikson: several merchant ships in the harbor, some of them with steam up, some to be repaired. Principally eastbound convoys expected, since Dikson is at present experiencing a shortage of food.
Entering directions: Approach from the north, have 2 beacons in line on longitude 80° 22', then close to the coast, proceed to port on roughly 110°; to the north lies a boom. Mine positions unknown west of Dikson Island. Avoid it at all costs. Ob and Yenisei estuaries are not to be approached. Remain 10 miles north of Dikson.

2. East Siberian Sea route traffic: when the sea route becomes freed, convoys are to be expected from the east, also leaving for the east, some of them using it as a through passage. Primarily only patrol vessel traffic.

B) Defenses:

(a) Aircraft: 4 "Catalinas" are stationed in Dikson. Reconnoitered to the east and west, recently principally to the east openly without radiolocation. No strict patrol.

(b) Ships: minesweepers and patrol vessels of a fairly old type, some of them converted. Fairly small fishing vessels in the same condition. Light guns and depth charges. Reported that 4 U.S. anti-submarine motor vessels arrived (speed 18 knots). We observed: boats of 400 - 600 G.R.T., oblique mast, 4 covered bridges, no funnel, aft a cutter gear for otters, Diesel engine, speed 15 - 18 knots, said to be made of wood.

C) Mines: presume barrier off Yugorski Strait, off Dikson as given out. No personal observation. Stay away from Beli/Yamal.

D) Bearing: short wave D/F set intercepted, probably from Dikson. The bearing was very inexact.

E) Ice situation: generally bad this year because of the late spring. Wind alters it very quickly. Boundaries identified on 28 August from Matissena to Russki Islands. Impassable for U-boats. Fairly strong drift ice boundary. Wilkitzki Strait is now presumed to be free. Icebergs encountered only northwest of Russki.

F) Convoy route: two routes, inner leads and open water routes. The former is from Dikson close to the coast at a distance of 8 to 12 miles passing between island "Hb.Bd.-Land" (?). Through Matissena to Wilkitzki Strait. Open water route from Dikson to Scott-Hansen; have Yermak Bank on the starboard side. In the open sea to Russki Islands, from there through Wilkitzki Strait. The routes are used depending on the ice position and the U-boat situation.

Lights: definitely lit: Kamenni, Morjevo, Wardroper, Ploski, Scott-Hansen, Mikhailova, Sterlegova (only switched on if traffic is expected), Ringnes, Kravkova (with a new beacon).
Shore stations: see Operational Order No. 16, also new signal station on Mikhailova. Mostly also radio stations. In addition some hunters and provision stations at unmentioned places on the uninhabited coast. All islands uninhabited.
Details of depth: the depths on the charts (Russian) are mostly accurate. Caution is advised in the completely uncharted areas and in the vicinity of land. Favorable positions: off Wardroper, Scott-Hansen, Kravkova, Kaminskogo, Kursenstern, Beluji and Pravsy Island (look out for patrols) off Russki Island and Wilkitzki Strait.

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APPENDIX IV

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret
148 S.O.s only A Ops.

On board, 12 September, 1944.

Operational Order for U 315 (Zoller).

I. Task:

To penetrate to Kola inlet to attack a battleship in Vaenga Bay and any other valuable targets there, particularly behind the net barrier.

II. Enemy situation:

(a) After an interval of 3 months another PQ convoy (32) with strong carrier and destroyer escort ran from 21 to 24 August. Simultaneously another strong carrier formation attacked the coast (particularly Altafjord). Further convoys and carrier formations can now be expected. Types of participating aircraft "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?) with the convoy. "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" over the coast. Also note Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

(b) Aerial photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay on 6 September showed 1 "R" class battleship and 4 destroyers in Vaenga Bay. It may be the heavy unit torpedoed by "Lange". No patrols intercepted in Kola inlet on 6 or 7 September except the boom defense vessel at the north entrance to Polyarno. Middle positions of the net barriers observed:

1. Polyarno entrance: (a) 69° 13' N, 33° 26·5' E from eastnortheast to westsouthwest over the fjord. (b) 69° 12·4' N, 33° 29·2' E from eastnortheast to westsouthwest over the fjord.

2. Kislaya Bay: 69° 11·4' N, 33° 30' E from northeast to southwest over the bay.

3. Vaenga - Alish Bay: 69° 05·2' N, 33° 26·2' E from east to west in a semi-circle across the bay.

4. Varlamova Bay: 69° 4·3' N, 33° 22·8' E by east to west over the bay from Krasnoshchole point.

5. Mishukov Bay: 69° 02·7' N, 33° 02·8' E from

northnortheast to southsouthwest over the bay.

6. Murmansk: (a) Selony-Point 68° 59·5' N, 33° 04' E over the bay to Kai Point from northnortheast to southsouthwest in a westerly direction.
(b) Petushikhin Point: 68° 57' N, 33° 02·5' E running from a northerly direction across the bay.

(c) Mine situation:

AC 8851 through 8855 to 8864 presumed to be mined. Gaps in the fields 4 miles from the northwest point of Kildin Island. Patrolled by torpedoboat. Outward route course 040° via AC 8865. Also a passage for large ships in the western part of Kola Bay. Ships coming from the east must take on pilots at Teriberka: 6 anti-submarine vessels there. A convoy was steering to Set Point 70° N, 40° E, then on a southerly course in the middle of the fjord. (Further navigational procedure in accordance with the attached British chart 2966).
Our own old minefields lie in AC 8580 and from 8826 to 8839. (The aerial photographs of 6 September are on the way from Kirkenes to Hammerfest; if they do not arrive before sailing time, details will be sent by radio).
Old aerial mines laid on 1 March 1942 lie in the middle and in the western part of the fairway between 69° 01' N and 69° 02' N.

III. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Group "Grimm" in attack areas: U 921 (Werner) AB 53, U 312 (Nikolay) AB 65, surfacing only to charge and to take fixes. Attacks on convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8. U 425 (Bentzien) and U 997 (Lehmann) putting out from Hammerfest.

Group "Greif" in the east: U 957 (Schaar), U 711 (Lange), U 278 (Franze), U 362 (Franz), U 739 (Mangold); radio messages to "Kent" have no importance for the others.

Special operation: U 307 (Herrle) in the north.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s). After sailing, another reconnaissance of Vaenga Bay is intended.

IV. Execution:

1. Put out from Narvik - Ramsund on 12 September. Report time of sailing on "MC".

2. Proceed to Hammerfest on route "Rot", pilot from Lödingen to Tromsö, escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit from Tromsö to "SR 1". If it is necessary to wait at Hammerfest, a radio order will follow. Report passing of "SR 1" on frequency "Anton I".

3. Proceed at increased speed to AC 86 at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.

4. After a short reconnaissance, penetrate into Murmansk Fjord as quickly as possible, as the battleship is expected to put out again soon. More exact findings of air reconnaissance will be transmitted.

5. After the execution, withdraw to report the result. If the boat has to be abandoned, it is to be blown up and all the secret materiel destroyed. The T5 torpedo is to be launched. As many other torpedoes as possible at the main target.

6. After reporting the result, orders will be given by radio for further operations or return passage. Further procedure and data in accordance with Operational Order No. 15.

V. Communications arrangements:

U-boat Northern Waters frequency. "MC" as far as Harstad, from there to Hammerfest switch to "Anton I". Special keys in force for the operation. In encoding for Officers only, all 4 sections are moved 8 letters forward. Codeword "Dachs". Short signals are to be ready for transmission of success or failure.

VI. Equipment: Shallow water equipment, delivery of any extraneous printed matter in Hammerfest.
Torpedoes: 9 T3 torpedoes with Pi IIc (pistol), 1 T5 torpedo in stern tube.

VII. The crew is not to be informed of the aim of the operation and should be expressly instructed to keep it secret after the operation.
This order is to be destroyed if the boat is abandoned, otherwise it should be returned to Captain U-boats on return.

p.p. Recho.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

1 - 15 OCTOBER, 1944

PG/31866

CONFIDENTIAL

1 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0620 to 1315. South Faeroes examined, no shipping apart from fishing vessels.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

2 BV 138 on coastal inshore waters reconnaissance. First aircraft in sea area AB 9516 - AC 4776 - 1753 - AB 9644 from 0059 to 0442. Second aircraft in sea area AB 9633 - 9845 - AF 3731 - AB 9858 from 0453 to 1033. Operation broken off because of insufficient cloud cover. Areas exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Report of convoy from "Ley". Destroyer sighted by "Ley". U 956 (Mohs) reported hydrophone pursuit by 2 minelayers. (For radio messages, see IV (a)).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

An aerial photograph of Murmansk harbor taken on 30 September showed almost the same number of merchant ships as on the previous days, but the "Nelson" class battleship was missing and also the 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers and 7 destroyers. This confirms the assumption that most of the QP convoy now under way sailed from Archangel while the escorting forces sailed from Murmansk to meet it.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: 1 guardship, 2 guardboats.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Deyatelni", 1 guardship, 1 minelayer, 3 minesweepers, 2 guardboats.
Dikson area: 3 minesweepers.
Britain: on 30 September 2 British carriers were picked up in radio traffic with aircraft, Svanvik obtained bearings of 315° at 0825 and 293° at 1945. Svanvik took a bearing of 256° on a British unit at 0544 on 30 September.

Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/ Archangel area.
The battle group already intercepted in the northern part of Northern Waters received an operational radio message from Cleethorpes in the North Sea/Northern Waters broadcast. The formation had apparently been transferred from the northern part of Northern Waters to the North Sea/Northern Waters area. Radio messages to probable convoy escort forces are still only transmitted in the North Sea/Northern Waters broadcast.
At 1415 Belushya sent a message to subordinate stations, warning of surprise attacks by U-boats and issuing regulations for procedure (destruction of "Sterlegova" by U 957).
18th Group: very lively flying activity (40 aircraft) with greatest concentration in the afternoon and evening.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Grimm":

U 312 AB 6750)
U 425 AB 9440)
U 997 AB 9350) operating on QP 30.
U 737 AB 9410)
U 956 AB 9720)

Group "Zorn":

U 968 AB 9430)
U 668 AB 9450)
U 310 AB 9540)
U 995 AB 9150)
U 293 AB 90)
)
U 363 AB 9430) operating on QP 30.
U 636 AB 8640)
U 365 AB 9430)
U 315 AB 9240)
U 921 AB 90)
U 992 AB 9170)
U 965 AB 4920)

U 307 north of AG 89 on special operation.
U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.
U 313 AC 88 on special operation.

In port:

U 771 Narvik,
U 1163 Trondheim,
U 295 Stavanger,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0615 U 965 on return passage from AB 4595 to join in the convoy operation.

0811 U 997 on return passage from AB 9542 to Andfjord - Narvik.

1125 U 921 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.

1147 U 312 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.

2245 Group "Grimm" on return passage: U 315, U 293, 992, to Hammerfest: U 310, 363, 387, 365, 425, 636, 668, 737, 965, 968, 995, 956 to Narvik.
U 307 on return passage from AG 80 to Hammerfest.

1930 U 739 put in to Hammerfest from Kara Sea.
U 362, 711, 957 on return passage to Hammerfest from Kara Sea.

2100 U 295 put out from Stavanger on transfer passage to Trondheim via Bergen.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Operation against QP 30 convoy:

Flieger Fuehrer 5 announced that there would be a reconnaissance by 1 BV 138 at 0200. At our request, however, it took off at 0100 on coastal inshore waters reconnaissance.

0240 Short signal 0220/753 received from U 310 (Ley):

"Convoy bearing 090° according to hydrophone. My position is AB 9251."

0330 Short signal 0310/754 received from "Ley":

"Convoy bearing 190° according to hydrophone. My position is AB 9258."

0648 Short signal 0528/755 received from "Ley":

"1 destroyer. My position is AB 9518."

0640 Flieger Fuehrer 5 reported that 1 BV 138 had taken off at 0453 on another coastal inshore waters reconnaissance.

0705 Short signal 0643/757 received from "Ley":

"1 destroyer. My position is AB 9545."

0730 Short signal 0653/758 received from "Ley":

"Reported destroyer was German U-boat."

0950 Flieger Fuehrer 5 reported that the coastal inshore waters reconnaissance aircraft had not sighted the enemy. However, reconnaissance by 1 aircraft covered only one sea area through which the convoy, given a northerly course, might already have passed.

1150 Radio message 0930/762 received from "Ley":

"Nothing found on southerly search courses, suspect sharp northwesterly deviation this morning. Operating further in 250°. My position is AB 9519."

1226 Radio message 1003/765 sent:

"1. Air reconnaissance on northwesterly courses had no results. Presume convoy made a sharp deviation to the north to shake off U-boats during darkness.

2. If no other information is available, make for patrol line from AB 5816 to 8669 at high cruising speed, in the following order: "Unverzagt", "Falke", "Zoller", "Wedemeyer", "Büchler", "Nees", "Westphalen", "Eickstedt", "Schendel", "Köhntopp", "Klingspor", "Ley", "Nikolay", "Bentzien", "Lehmann", "Brasack", "Mohs". Form new group "Grimm".

3. Report immediately if four-engined land-based planes or flying boats appear. Avoid unnecessary air attacks."

After signals had been received from U 997 and U 312 reporting operations broken off,

1259 radio message 1214/768 was sent:

"Group "Grimm":

"Lehmann" and "Nikolay": return to Andfjord. U-boats from "Bentzien" to "Unverzagt" close in in a southerly direction to fill the empty positions."

2152 Radio message 1915/776 received from "Mohs":

"Hydrophone pursuit from 2 minelayers in AB 8666, otherwise no information regarding convoy."

As the convoy was no longer within range of our shore-based planes, the U-boats were ordered to return to avoid unnecessary losses.

2343 Radio message 2247/779 sent to group "Grimm":

"1. Cease operations.

2. "Zoller", "Klingspor" and "Falke": put in to Hammerfest.

3. "Ley", "Nees", "Büchler", "Wedemeyer", "Bentzien", "Schendel", "Eickstedt", "Brasack", "Unverzagt", "Westphalen", "Köhntopp", and "Mohs": put in to Narvik.

4. The failure of this operation cannot shake us off and offers us more chance of gathering all our forces for the next PQ convoy.

5. Plan: to have as many U-boats as possible ready by the middle of October."

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

15 boats (groups "Grimm" and "Zorn") operating on QP 30.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 307 (Herrle) with coastguard ship "Busch" on operation "Haudegen"
U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".
U 313 (Schweiger) in Kola Bay as group "Fuchs".

0640 Radio message 0615/756 received from U 965 (Unverzagt):

"Have completed mission. My position is AB 4559."

"Unverzagt" thus reported completion of operation "Edelweiss II", no special features mentioned. The U-boat was already on return passage and was immediately detailed to operate on the convoy.

(d) Miscellaneous:

A radio message from "Schaar" was transmitted to "Lange" and "Mangold".

1855 Radio message 1648/51 received from U 957 (Schaar):

"Request strict secrecy regarding operation "Sterlegova". No booty to be disembarked in Hammerfest."

1010 Radio message 0811/760 received from U 997 (Lehmann):

"Ceased operations in AB 9542. Very loud noises for seven hours when submerged, even at

slowest speed, apparently caused by rattling of radio receiver. These make all hydrophone bearings and unobserved underwater attack impossible. Cannot be attended to with tools on board."

1200 Short signal 1147/763 received from "Nikolay":

"Am ceasing operations because of fuel shortage."

1225 Radio message 1125/766 sent:

" "Werner": continue return passage."

"Werner" had already reported some time ago that his boat was no longer at full operational readiness. At the beginning of the operation, he was already homeward bound and should have transmitted this report before he was ordered to position as escort boat.

V. Reports of successes:

U 965 (Unverzagt) reported operation "Edelweiss II" completed.

C. Surface forces:

0415 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 0994 to 4th Destroyer Flotilla received:

"In view of the enemy situation, transfer immediately to Tromsö."

1400 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 01033 to 4th Destroyer Flotilla received:

"4th Destroyer Flotilla at normal readiness. Intend to move it back to Alta shortly. 4th Destroyer Flotilla proposes execution in view of repairs intended in Bogen Bay."

D. Organizational:

Captain U-boats, West will take over command of U-boats in his area from 11th U-boat Flotilla at 1200 on 1 October.

E. Survey of the situation:

0415 1. Naval Chief Command, Norway wired:

"U-boat reported convoy at 2107 in AB 9386, course 210°, speed 9 knots. Battleship or carrier formation at 2105 in AC 4784. Both formations presumably turned off to the northwest. Contact lost. Suspect our U-boats were outmanoeuvered by wide tacking. However, as the first sighting

was made near land, the formation might be operating against the coast. Luftflotten promise reconnaissance of inshore waters to a breadth of 25 miles from 66° N to 20° E tomorrow if there is cloud cover."

2. U-boat situation in Northern Waters at 2300:

QP 30:

"After contact was lost by "Bentzien", the convoy was not intercepted again either by aircraft or by the boats, although they searched independently for 14 hours. Patrol line ordered for noon on 1 October also obtained no information apart from sighting 2 minelayers at 1915 in AB 8666. Operations broken off because of lack of information and danger of anti-submarine sweeps by enemy aircraft."

The convoy's disappearance is puzzling as most of the boats have meanwhile come up and must be searching. The air reconnaissance flown again by 1 aircraft after U 425 lost contact was very inadequate and, given northerly or southerly course, a convoy could have passed unobserved. When boats are searching independently, there is a danger that they all collect in the same sector, the enemy recognizes the gap by locating planes and so the convoy escapes. As the U-boats' positions are uncertain, the order for a planned search would probably be of doubtful value. If the convoy had made a northerly deviation, the patrol line to which the boats were ordered would still have had a chance of intercepting it. It now seems as if it might have forced its way through to the south close under the coast, a possibility with which the U-boat commanders probably did not reckon.

(Signed) Suhren.

---

2 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0528 to 1340. North Faeroes inexhaustively examined because of thin drifting clouds.

II. Reports on the enemy.

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

2 operational and 2 very urgent radio messages to probable convoy escort, 1 operational radio message to suspected British battle group. More radio messages probably to smaller group. Radio message transmission still only for North Sea/Northern Waters area. Escort has therefore reached the more northerly North Sea area. No information regarding presence of British naval forces in the northern part of Northern Waters. In the evening lively operational radio traffic, probably to the southeast coast of England, escort and carrier frequencies.
For North Sea/Northern Waters area: at 0610 very quiet transmission on escort wave, so the escort is still at sea. Very lively flying activity by 18th Group, reconnoitering the southwest coast of Norway.
Iokanka area: 2 guardships, 1 guardboat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "E", 2 guardships, 2 guardboats, 1 motor minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 4 minesweepers.
Dikson area: 1 minelayer, 2 guardboats.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Radio messages of first priority from Archangel to all naval forces in Northern Waters, from Solovets to all naval forces in the White Sea and from Belushya to Dikson.
Bearings: Svanvik took a bearing of 259° on a British unit at 0225 on 2 October.
Hammerfest took a bearing of 316° on a U.S. formation or vessel at 1730.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88 in the attack area.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 278, 739, 957 Hammerfest,
U 771, 997 Narvik,
U 1163 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 992, 293, 315 on return passage from AB 90 to Hammerfest.
U 307 on return passage from AG 80 to Hammerfest.
U 362, 711 on return passage from Kara Sea to Hammerfest.
0700 U 278, 957 put in to Hammerfest from Kara Sea.
1700 U 425 put in to Harstad from operational area.
U 921 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.
1600 U 956 put in to Harstad from the operational area.
U 310, 363, 365, 387, 668, 737, 965, 968, 995 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.
1830 U 278, 739, 957 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
1900 U 771 put out from Narvik - Bogen for Hammerfest.
1900 U 636 put in to Harstad, at 2300 put out again for Tromsö.
0245 U 997 put out from Harstad, at 0700 put in to Narvik.
1020 U 312 passed "Schwarz 25" on passage to Harstad, at 1205 put in to Harstad, at 1610 put out for Narvik.
U 295 proceeding from Stavanger via Bergen to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".
U 313 (Schweiger) in Kola Bay as group "Fuchs".

(d) Miscellaneous:

As "Werner" ought to have put in and no information had been received since 24 September,

0042 radio message 0013/715 was sent:

" "Werner": report position immediately."

1245 Radio message 1117/800 sent:

"U 307 (Herrle): continue return passage from AC 16 with coastguard ship "Busch" to Hammerfest. "Busch" is a fishing smack of 350 G.R.T., no foremast, after mast of same height as funnel, davits and large bridge amidships. Do not stop her."

Transfer order for U 771 (Block):

"1. Put out from Narvik - Bogen on the evening of 2 October. Report time of sailing promptly on "MC".

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen to Tromsö. With pilot from Lödingen to Tromsö. From Tromsö to Hammerfest with escort of 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit has been informed. Current escorts can be used.

3. Radio frequency: "MC" as far as Harstad, "Anton I" from Harstad. Northern Waters very long wave is to be covered continuously from Narvik onwards.

4. 12 hours' readiness in Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Teleprinter message Most Secret 5039 sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats:

Short report from U 997 (Lehmann) third operation, see Appendix II/1.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"The swift advance of the QP convoy seems to confirm the assumption that it escaped from our U-boats to the south under the coast.
According to experience we may expect the next convoy again in the middle of the month. Before then as many boats as possible will be made ready and, if possible, receive intermediate wave D/F sets. U 394 (Borger) used it to good effect against PQ 32 and it can probably replace air reconnaissance to a large extent in the taking of bearings on convoy radio traffic.

Meanwhile a few meteorological operations are being carried out. Only Schnorchel boats in Kola Bay are finding what we hope are more profitable operations."

(Signed) Suhren.

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3 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AB 6751 - AB 4861 - Tromsö from 0509 to 1315. Route exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: destroyer "B".
Pummanki area: 3 M.T.B.s.
Iokanka area: 3 guardboats, 1 MO-boat.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 guardships, 1 minesweeper, 3 guardboats.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship, 2 minelayers, 2 minesweepers.
Britain: no units intercepted in the Polyarno/Archangel area.
Bearings: Hammerfest took a bearing of 316° on an Allied unit at 1730 on 2 October.
Svanvik took bearings of 257° on a British unit at 1747 on 2 October and 265° on British radio traffic (presumably carrier) at 1835.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88 in attack area.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 312, 997 Narvik,
U 1163 Trondheim,
U 295 Bergen,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 362 on return passage from Kara Sea to Hammerfest.
U 307 on return passage from AG 80 to Hammerfest.
U 921 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.
U 293 on return passage from AB 90 to Andfjord - Narvik.

1055 U 995 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1420 put out again, at 2015 put in to Narvik.
0824 U 737 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1104 put out again, at 1630 put in to Narvik.
0630 U 387 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1000 put out again, at 1500 put in to Narvik.
0840 U 310 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1420 put out again, at 2000 put in to Narvik.
0945 U 363 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1420 put out again, at 2015 put in to Narvik.
0945 U 968 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1532 put out again, at 2200 put in to Narvik.
1000 U 965 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1420 put out again, at 2000 put in to Narvik.
1100 U 711 put in to Hammerfest from Kara Sea, at 1630 put out for Narvik.
2028 U 668 put in to Narvik from AB 90.
1520 U 315, 992 put in to Hammerfest, U 992 put out at 1700 for Narvik.
1100 U 771 put in to Tromsö from Narvik, at 1630 put out for Hammerfest.
0900 U 636 put in to Tromsö from Harstad.
0535 U 278, 739, 957 passed Tromsö, at 1630 put in to Narvik.
0400 U 425, 956 put out from Harstad, at 0900 put in to Narvik.
0652 U 365 passed Harstad.
1930 U 1163 put out from Trondheim for Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 boat in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 313 (Schweiger) in Kola Bay as group "Fuchs".

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

(d) Miscellaneous:

In reply to queries to the Main Naval D/F Station, Kirkenes as to whether the sinking of the destroyer of "Grosny" class by "Schaar" had been mentioned by radio,

1255 teleprinter message Main Naval D/F Station, Kirkenes Most Secret 00302 was received:

"Reference your Most Secret 5042 of 2 October: We have no information from radio traffic or any other source to the effect that a destroyer was sunk in Kara Sea between 15 and 28 September."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (c):

"U 703 (Brünner) is keeping us waiting for his first signal on the laying of meteorological transmitting buoys off Iceland. Above all, he requires exceptionally favorable weather conditions as he must open the torpedo hatch and at the same time be as secure as possible from surprise by enemy aircraft. As the boat was approaching from the north, there were not likely to be strong enough forces of aircraft to force underwater procedure. He could then be comparatively safe from location from the air by keeping close under the coast."

(Signed) Suhren.

---

4 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Fliegor Fuehrer 3:

1 BV 138 on metoorological reconnaissance, route Billefjord - Bear Island - Billefjord from 0441 to 0742. Broken off in AC 4468 because of lack of cloud cover. Route exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

1 BF 109 on visual reconnaissance of Kola Bay. Examination made from 5,600 meters from Murmansk to Pinagori point from 1350 to 1355. Vaenga Bay not examined because of dense clouds.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AA 9367 - Tromsö from 0421 to 1339. Route exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

5 freighters of 8,000 G.R.T. in Murmansk harbor.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: destroyer "B".
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "E", "J", "P", "Deyatelni", 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper.
Bearings: Hammerfest took a bearing of 312° on a U.S. unit at 0210 on 4 October.

1155 1st Battle Group reported:
"Cleethorpes transmitted 3 radio messages of no special priority, presumably to forces with QP convoy. 2 operational messages were probably directed to a smaller group at sea. The battle group, observed until now in radio traffic, no longer appears."

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

U 313 in attack area AC 88 as group "Fuchs".

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 307, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsö,
U 278, 310, 312, 363, 387, 425, 668, 737, 739, 956, 957, 965, 968, 995, 997 Narvik,
U 295 Bergen,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0100 U 307 put in to Hammerfest from AG 80.
1200 U 992 put in to Harstad from AB 90, at 1830 put out again, at 2330 put in to Narvik.
0645 U 771 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
1730 U 711 put in to Narvik from Hammerfest.
0330 U 1163 put out from Trondheim on open water passage to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 boat in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".
U 313 (Schweiger) in Kola Bay as group "Fuchs".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 312 (Nikolay), fourth operation, see Appendix II/4.
Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), sixth operation, see Appendix II/3.
Short report from U 956 (Mohs), seventh operation, see Appendix II/2.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff, Most Secret 1245 F I, S.O.s only:

"Answers to following questions are requested for the operations in Vaenga Bay:

1. Where can 4 "Marder" (midget submarines) be installed on a U-boat?

2. Where can the "Marder" be regulated for the last time before the operation?

3. What is the mine situation for the crossing to and in Kola Bay?

4. What local conditions prevail in Kola Bay (patrol positions, net barrages, etc.)?

5. Is it possible for the U-boat to remain off Kola Bay to pick up the returning "Marder"?

The operation will be know as "Cäsar". Reply requested on the basis of "Zoller"'s experiences."

In reply, teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 174/44 F Ops was sent:

"To Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff, for information Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Re 1. Narvik or Trondheim.

Re 2. Torpedo Command Ramsund or repair ship in Narvik.

Re 3. "Zoller" used convoy approach learned from P.O.W. statements and approached submerged at shallow depth. No mines intercepted as far as Salni island.

Re 4. Several times daily anti-submarine sweep in outer Kola Bay, unskilled; "Zoller" remained at 18 meters, was run over several times with Asdic but never picked up.
Patrol vessels, some with Asdic, at anchor on both sides of fjord. Apparently guarded anti-submarine net barrage on both sides of Salni island from about 6 meters, possibly to the sea-bed, buoys not visible, no mines confirmed as deep as A - 40.

Re 5. "Marder" can be picked up by Schnorchel boat."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

"It might be profitable to observe the QP convoy, which we have missed, as it puts in to port. Movements in Gorlo Strait indicate the assembling of PQ 33. Possibly the next PQ convoy may be expected earlier this time."

Re D:

"The operation by the small battle units planned against Kola Bay is welcomed."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0552 to 1228. Route 15% examined, Faeroes not examined because of weather, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AB 6192 - Tromsö from 0422 to 0906. Operation broken off at 0710 because of technical breakdown, exhaustive, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "E".
18th Group: very lively flying activity (44 aircraft) with no identifiable focal point.
All broadcasts reveal that the QP convoy and escort forces must have reached home waters.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88 in the attack area.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 307, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsö,
U 278, 310, 312, 363, 365, 387, 425, 668, 711, 737, 739, 956, 957, 965, 968, 992, 995, 997 Narvik,
U 295 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1800 U 307 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
0205 U 295 put in to Trondheim from Bergen.
U 1163 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 boat in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".
U 313 (Schweiger) in Kola Bay, group "Fuchs".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 278 (Franze), U 711 (Lange), U 739 (Mangold) and U 957 (Schaar):

"1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 6 October. Boats will have covered "MC" since noon on 5 October.

2. Proceed to Lödingen and from there in escort via inner leads to Trondheim. Time of sailing of escort from Lödingen will be previously transmitted to the U-boats on "MC". Boats will arrive punctually at Lödingen. U-boats have been reported to 63rd Patrol Vessel Flotilla in Lödingen and to Naval Harbor Master at port of next change of escort (Bodö or Mosjoen).

3. "MC" as far as Lödingen, from Lödingen radio frequency "Anton II", from Narvik Northern Waters very long wave. Report sailing from Lödingen to Captain U-boats on "MC".

4. Firing range of 63rd Patrol Vessel Flotilla off Tranöy (from Lödingen to 15° 30' E)."

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0515 to 1255. Faeroes not examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AH 9931 - AB 3437 - Tromsö from 0515 to 1607. Route exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Iokanka area: destroyer "Q", 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "G", "S", 1 minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 ice-breaker, 1 guardboat.
Russian radio traffic: slight.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88 in the attack area.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 636 Tromsö,
U 278, 310, 312, 363, 365, 387, 425, 668, 711, 737, 739, 956, 957, 965, 968, 992, 995, 997, 1163 Narvik,
U 295 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1500 U 636 put out from Tromsö for Hammerfest.
1354 U 307 put in to Tromsö from Hammerfest, at 1600 put out for Narvik.
1100 U 278, 711, 739, 957 put out from Narvik via inner leads to Trondheim.
0730 U 1163 put in to Narvik from Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 (Schweiger) in attack area AC 88 as group "Fuchs".

0735 Radio message 0400/10 from U 313 (Schweiger):

"Do not consider operation can be carried out just now. Am withdrawing to the east."

1116 Radio message 1003/755 to group "Fuchs":

"Continue unobserved patrol of outer Kola Bay, especially of the northern approaches. Only attack large convoys, carriers and other heavy units. Do not report unless observed. From 15 October try again to carry out operation "Fuchs". Otherwise it is planned that you should operate against the next approaching PQ convoy."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

1048 Radio message 1048/756 sent to U 703 (Brünner):

"If it is impossible at present to lay "Ernst", set off immediately to lay "August". Report position from AB 70."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer), sixth operation (third in Northern Waters): QP 30, see Appendix II/5.
Short report from U 737 (Brasack), eighth operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/7.
Short report from U 968 (Westphalen), fourth operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/6.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

0100 Admiral Commanding U-boats wired teleprinter message Most Secret 8262:

"With effect from 1 October, U 295 (Wiebold) is drafted from 11th U-boat Flotilla to 13th U-boat Flotilla for administrative purposes for Northern Waters operations."

1010 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5108 F II to Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Fourth Division:

"1. Request transfer and administrative and operational subordination of radio intercept group (Communications Lt. Heinichen) to Captain U-boats, Norway after completion of current duties with 1st Battle Group. Their experience in the northern area makes them particularly suitable for supporting convoy attacks in Northern Waters.

2. Questions of accommodation are arranged directly from here with local stations."

E. Survey of the situation:

Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff wired:

"Attack on dockyard installations in Bergen on 4 October presumably to be regarded as the beginning of systematic operations on U-boat bases on the Norwegian coast. Therefore further attacks may be expected in other places. Anti-aircraft defenses are weak or non-existent. No fighter defenses at present, as the use of our few heavy fighters is pointless against the enemy fighter cover. Thus, in almost peace-time conditions, the enemy can seriously interfere with our preparations for future U-boat warfare. Moreover, there is the problem of lack of shipping space. The shipping and supply situation is of critical operational importance with regard to the movements in the area of Army High Command XX. Attention is drawn to the considerable, continually increasing enemy pressure on the Norwegian coast as well as its lack of protection from those attacks. If it is not possible to allocate greater fighter forces, serious consequences may be expected."

Re VI:

"The commanders' reports further confirm the assumption that QP 30 escaped to the south via AB 95 and 97 after locating the U-boats lying ahead in the north and the west. The boats did

not consider this possibility as they searched. Offensive air reconnaissance or even only bearings taken on the convoy traffic by U-boats would have enabled many U-boats to attack.

(Signed) Suhren.

---

7 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Billefjord - Bear Island - Billefjord from 0513 to 1037, nothing to report, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 188 on meteorological reconnaissance in the area west of the Faeroes from 0546 to 1145. Faeroes not examined because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AA 9337 - Tromsö from 0538 to 1537. Route completely examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0815 in AE 9599 2 merchant ships, each 5,000 G.R.T., course 320°.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: destroyers "B", "E", 1 guardship.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Deyatelni".
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 minelayers, 2 minesweepers, 1 guardboat, 1 ice-breaker.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

U 313 in AC 80 as group "Fuchs".

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 310, 312, 363, 365, 387, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 997, 1163 Narvik,
U 295 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0045 U 636 put in to Hammerfest from Tromsö, at 0500 put out for AC 13.

0900 U 365 put out of Narvik, at 1656 passed Harstad, at 2207 made fast at German Air Force quay in Reisafjord.

0900 U 307 put in to Narvik from Tromsö.
U 278, 711, 739, 957 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in AC 80.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Transfer order for U 307 (Herrle):

"1. Put out from Narvik at 1000 on 8 October via Bogen to Trondheim.

2. Inner leads route to Bodö. Pick up escort from 63rd Patrol Vessel Flotilla at 1400 on 8 October in Lödingen. Change escort in Bodö. U-boat is expected by Naval Harbor Master, Bodö and 63rd Patrol Vessel Flotilla at 2400 on 8 October.

3. Report picking up escort in Lödingen on "MC".

4. From Lödingen radio frequency "Anton II", from Narvik Northern Waters very long wave."

Transfer order for U 997 (Lehmann):

"1. Put out from Narvik at noon on 8 October.

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen via Tromsö to Hammerfest. With pilot from Lödingen to Tromsö, then to Hammerfest escorted by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Current escorts can be used. Boat is expected by 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit.

3. Report to Lt. Harms, 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit in Tromsö to take on Commanding Officer of Hammerfest U-boat base, Lt. Commander Müller, if a request is made.

4. Report time of sailing from Narvik on "MC". Radio frequency "MC" as far as Harstad, "Anton I" from Harstad, Northern Waters very long wave from Narvik. Report on "Anton I" when you enter and sail from Tromsö and pass Harstad.

5. 12 hours' readiness in Hammerfest."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), sixth operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/8.
Short report from U 363 (Nees), third operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/12.
Short report from U 387 (Büchler), eighth operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/9.
Short report from U 636 (Schendel), tenth operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/10.
Short report from U 668 (von Eickstedt) third operation ("Grimm", "Schwefel", "Zorn"): QP 30, see Appendix II/11.
Short report from U 965 (Unverzagt), third operation ("Edelweiss II", QP 30), see Appendix II/13.
Short report from U 992 (Falke), third operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/14.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Organizational:

2350 Teleprinter message Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. informed us that the limits of the commands of Captain U-boats, West and Captain U-boats, Norway have been laid down north of the line as follows:

"from Grip lighthouse in the direction of Jan Mayen to 66° 30' N."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re IV (d):

The U-boats which are ready to operate are being sent from Narvik again as soon as possible to the northern bases, if they are not required here for the installation of intermediate wave D/F sets coming from the south.

(Signed) Suhren.

---

8 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0506 to 1318. Northern and southern parts of the Faeroes examined, no shipping identified. Thorshavn not examined.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AB 8535 - Tromsö from 0525 to 1020. Operation broken off at 0750 because of radio breakdown. Route exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "G", "Deyatelni".
Iokanka area: 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 guardship.
Russian radio traffic: slight.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88 in the attack area:

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 365 Reisafjord,
U 307, 310, 312, 363, 387, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 997, 1163 Narvik,
U 295 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0900 U 365 put out from Reisafjord, at 1430 put in to Tromsö.

1600 U 997 put out from Narvik, at 0025 passed Harstad on passage to Tromsö.

1030 U 307 put out from Narvik via inner leads to Trondheim.

1800 U 278, 711, 739, 957 put in to Trondheim after inner leads passage from Narvik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 boat in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler), see Appendix I/1.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 310 (Ley), second operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/15.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation: No comments.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - 74° 30' N, 30° E - Bear Island - Banak from 0815 to 1220, nothing to report, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AA 9337 - Tromsö from 0618 to 1640. Route exhaustively examined, no enemy encounters.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Murmansk area: flotilla leader "Baku", destroyers "Uritski", "E" and "S".
Iokanka area: 1 ice-breaker.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "Deyatelni" and probably another destroyer, 1 guardship, 1 minesweeper.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 80 in the attack area.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 365 Tromsö,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 636 proceeding from Hammerfest to AC 12.

0800 U 387 put out from Narvik, at 2145 put in to Tromsö, at 2300 put out again for AG 69.

0700 U 997 put in to Tromsö from Narvik, at 2300 put out again for Hammerfest.

U 307 proceeding via inner leads from Narvik to Trondheim.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in AC 80.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

After setting up meteorological shore transmitter "Erich", U 387 was to remove all the important parts from the old "Schatzgräber" camp. Details of minelaying at the camp have still to be requested from Naval Chief Command, Norway.

1506 Radio message 1333/646 sent to U 387 (Büchler):

"Mines on "Schatzgräber" are from 80 to 315 meters from the hut. Concentration point 100 to 200 meters. Areas due west in sectors of 20° each to the north and south are clear of mines. Electrical firing from switch-boxes in the hut. Further details following."

1816 Radio message 1721/781 sent to U 387 (Büchler):

"Firing unit is not in hut but bears 111° from it, distance 203 meters."

1418 Radio message 1323/780 sent to U 636 (Schendel):

"1. Speed up operation so that U-boat can reach the formation in AB 2150 on 12 October.

2. If this is not possible, report earliest time of arrival there on radio frequency "Anton".

3. Position short signal after passing west of 20° E."

After communicating with Naval Chief Command, Norway it was decided that AB 2150 would be the

rendezvous between "Exersteine" and the U-boat for return escort. Naval Chief Command, Norway obtained permission from Naval War Staff, Second Division for U 636 (Schendel) to provide escort. Naval War Staff, Second Division's approval was later received by teleprinter. See under D. U 636 (Schendel) then reported earliest date of arrival as 13 October.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 278 (Franze), fifth operation, ("Greif", "Grimm"), see Appendix II/18.
Short report from U 739 (Mangold), fifth operation, ("Greif"), see Appendix II/17.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1435 Teleprinter message Naval Chief Command, Norway Most Secret 01336 received:

"Request U-boat detailed to escort returning "Exersteine" and "Edelweiss II" to be in AB 2150 from 12 October. "Edelweiss II" is to be informed by you via Naval Communications Officer, Tromsö.

E. Survey of the situation:

Re II (d):

The destroyers again seem to have escorted empty ships from Archangel to Murmansk.

Re VI:

The operation by group "Greif" in Kara Sea, apart from the successes reported, gave the U-boats innumerable opportunities for attacking medium freighters and especially escort vessels, but unusually frequent torpedo failures prevented further sinkings deserved. They may have been due to vibrations in the U-boats caused by the ice, or to low water temperatures, or possibly in curve shots, to echo effect produced by heavy water layering in shallow sea areas and in the ice and finally, in the vicinity of Russkaya island to magnetic disturbances there.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - Kaamanen from 1006 to 1420, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

18th Group: very lively flying activity (56 aircraft), reconnaissance of the central and southern areas of the North Sea as well as the Norwegian coast.
Pummanki area: 9 probable M.T.B.s.
Iokanka area: destroyers "Uritski", "B", 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel: 1 guardship, 1 minelayer and 3 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minesweeper, 1 icebreaker.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.
U 636 AC 13 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771 Hammerfest,
U 365 Tromsö,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Narvik to "AF 69
1145 U 997 put in to Hammerfest from Narvik.
2200 U 307 put in to Trondheim from Narvik after inner leads passage.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Helhus" to Hope Island.

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

1145 Radio message 1109/793 sent to "Büchler" who is proceeding to Alexandra Land with meteorological shore transmitter "Erich":

"To "Büchler" from Captain U-boats:
Mines at "Schatzgräber" camp to be exploded only electrically with firing unit."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), ninth operation ("Haudegen"), see Appendix II/19.
Short report from U 711 (Lange), ninth operation, ("Greif"), see Appendix II/20.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

1820 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5199 F I sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"Reference 1. Captain U-boats, Norway 4775 A Ops. of 18 September (not to Luftflotte 5).

2. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 7122 C of 20 September.

1) On meteorological assignments at present at sea: U 703 (Brünner) with meteorological buoys

in AE 30; U 636 (Schendel) with meteorological unit off Hope Island as in reference 1. and radio message 0142 of 7 October, then proceeding to AB 2150 to act as return escort for "Edelweiss II" on 13 October; U 387 (Büchler) sailing on 10 October to Alexandra Land with meteorological shore transmitter "Erich".

2) U 365 (Wedemeyer) is lying ready in Tromsö to evacuate the German Air Force Station from South Spitsbergen. Release requested contrary to Para. 4 of Ref. 2., as we already fear that South Spitsbergen will ice up and the operation should be completed before the next PQ convoy. The relevant authorities have been informed."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

Apart from the 2 German Air Force meteorological units to be transported by U 636 and U 365, the only other operation for November is the landing of a unit on Bear Island. This will take longest because of the ice conditions and will conclude the numerous meteorological operations for this year, apart from the return escort to be provided for weather ship "Exersteine".

(Signed) Suhren.

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11 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Kaamanen - Bear Island - Banak from 0803 to 1132. Operation carried out on route as ordered, not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 1230 to 1758, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AB 7437 - AF 2834 - Trondheim from 0605 to 1554. Route 50% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Pummanki area: 20 M.T.B.s.
Murmansk area: destroyers "Gromyashchi", "B" and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "G", "S", 1 submarine, 2 minelayers, 1 guardship.
Belushya/Kara Sea: 1 ice-breaker.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.
U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.
U 636 AC 13 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771, 997 Hammerfest,
U 365 Tromsö,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 293, 307, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AF 69.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Helhus" to Hope Island.

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

U 387 (Büchler) proceeding to Alexandra Land with meteorological shore transmitter "Erich".

(d) Miscellaneous:

1545 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5227 F III sent to Naval Air base, Tromsö for "Wedemeyer":

"Sailing order for U 365 (Wedemeyer).

1. Put out from Tromsö after taking on "Landvik".

2. Report time of sailing on "Anton I".

3. U-boat Northern Waters radio frequency from Tromsö.

4. Announce escort promptly to 2nd Inshore Defenses Unit. Proceed via point "H".

5. After disembarkation, remain at landing place until station is ready to send and receive, then return. Report completion on "Anton I" when passing 75° N."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), sixth operation: ("Greif"), see Appendix II/21.
Short report from U 293 (Klingspor) first operation: QP 30, see Appendix II/16.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

0028 Teleprinter message Most Secret 01047/TP received from Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Second Division:

"1. At present 3 U-boats are employed on meteorological operations.

2. In Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. Most Secret 7122 C of 20 September, it was definitely laid down that not more than 1 U-boat was to be thus employed at the same time. Moreover, operations in accordance with 3 (a) and 3 (b) of the above reference were to be carried out by only 1 U-boat at a time.

3. Report immediately why action was taken contrary to this order."

0245 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5206 F I sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.:

"In reply to your teleprinter message Most Secret 01047 F II, reference Most Secret 7122 C of 20 September:

1. Meteorological operation by U 636 completed on 12 October according to plan, operation additional to "Edelweiss II" in accordance with reference.

2. Sailing of U 387 speeded up by 2 days as the uncertain ice situation may prejudice the Alexandra Land operation; U-boat will be ready for next convoy operation.

3. U 703 not affected by reference. Restriction to 1 U-boat referred expressly to new operations, not those already in progress. Boat has not reported since sailing on 16 September, has had orders since 6 October to return and report position.

4. The restriction on meteorological operations is understood here to mean that the greatest possible number of U-boats must be available for convoy actions. The speeding-up of meteorological operations has been effected because of the ice situation and will enable all U-boats to be ready for the next PQ convoy."

(Signed) Suhren.

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12 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on shipping reconnaissance, route Kaamanen - AC 7373 - 72° N, 27° E - 70° N, 35° E - Kola inlet - Kaamanen from 0551 to 1050.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - 74° 30' N, 18° E - 75° 30' N, 30° E - Banak from 0700 to 1134, exhaustive, no enemy ships sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route

Trondheim - AF 2977 - AA 9361 - AF 2972 - Trondheim, from 0554 to 1648. Route exhaustively examined, enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Vaernes - AE 8344 - AE 9895 - Vaernes from 0602 to 1420. Route 50% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0943 7 M.T.B.s in 3 lines ahead in AC 8827, course northwest, high speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Pummanki/Varangerfjord area: 22 patrolling M.T.B.s.
Iokanka area: destroyers "E", "J".
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "P", 2 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea: 1 ice-breaker.
Moderate radio traffic.
0800 Britain: Cleethorpes transmitted 9 radio messages for North Sea/Northern Waters area. There is a suspicion that these radio messages were intended for "Group" (N) at sea. Brief, faint radio transmission on escort wave at 0114 only.
18th Group: lively flying activity by day (23 aircraft), none at night.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.
U 636 AC 13 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 315, 771, 997 Hammerfest,
U 365 Tromsö,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 737, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 307, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2300 U 365 put out from Tromsö for AB 31.
U 387 proceeding from Narvik to AC 69.
2200 U 315 put out from Hammerfest for Vardö via AC 49.
2000 U 737 put out from Narvik for Harstad.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

1455 Radio message 1416/738 sent:

" "Schweiger" from Captain U-boats.
Report position immediately from AC 50 as ordered in radio message 1017 of 9 October."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

U 387 (Büchler) transporting meteorological shore transmitter "Erich" to Alexandra Land.

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Kolhus" to Hope Island.

0510 Teleprinter message received from Naval Radio Station, Tromsö, radio message 2020/126 from "Edelweiss II" to Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"Caught in shoal ice in 76° 31' N, 17° 15' W. Am drifting south. Expect change in weather, assignment carried out."

As "Exersteine" reported that she was caught in the ice, radio message 1037/736 was sent:

1129 " "Schendel" from Captain U-boats:
Do not approach AB 2150. Report completion of mission from AC 19. Then occupy attack area AB 37."

1330 Teleprinter message Most Secret 01476 F I Ops. received from Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"New disposition for U-boat "Schendel":
AB 1450 to pick up meteorological ship "Exorsteine" as soon as she is free from ice."

1520 Then teleprinter message Most Secret 5237 F I was sent to Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"In reply to your Most Secret 01465 F I Ops. of 12 October:
U 636 (Schendel) is first occupying AB 37 to reconnoiter for possible traffic, as the time of freeing of meteorological ship "Exersteine" cannot be foreseen and in accordance with Naval War Staff, Second Division's orders, not more than 1 U-boat is permitted to carry out meteorological operations at the same time. The boat will be at the rendezvous after the appropriate message. Request "Edelweiss II" be informed."

As no signal had been received from "Brünner" in answer to the request of 6 October,

1112 radio message 1034/735 was sent:

" "Brünner" report position immediately on "Anton I"."

(d) Miscellaneous:

1434 Radio message 1405/55 sent:

" "Brasack" move at once to Tromsö. There await further orders. "MC" as far as Harstad, then "Anton I"; switch to very long wave immediately. 5 hours' readiness in Tromsö. Report promptly on "MC" time of arrival in Lödingen to take on pilot."

Reference the intended U-boat operation to remove the Northern Waters repeating transmitter at Vardö from the dangerous coastal area,

1444 radio message 1337/1 was sent:

"Naval Radio Station, Vardö.
Report immediately whether a U-boat with 5 meters draft can put alongside the Vardö pier. Plan: removal of 3 heavy and 1 200-Watt transmitter at night. Otherwise test possibility of loading sets aboard the U-boat via a cutter."

1540 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5238 F III sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller):

1. Put out from Hammerfest via "SR 1" on the evening of 12 October.

2. Proceed to Vardö at a distance of 50 miles

from the coast via point "VAR" to take on important sets from Northern Waters Radio Repeater Station.
On the evening of 13 October pass "VAR" in darkness and put in to port. If this is not possible, make your presence known to the port by short flashes, expect cutter.

3. Return to Tromsö via point "H".

4. Observe Standing Orders Nos. 421 and 427.

5. Report time of sailing from Hammerfest promptly on "Anton I"."

2325 Radio message 1913/2 received from Island Commandant, Vardö:

"In reply to radio message 1337/1: pier 156 meters, depth of water 6 meters at low tide."

The radio message was transmitted to U 315 (Zoller) which was already bound for Vardö.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

1st Battle Group announced in teleprinter message Most Secret 2668 that the "Tirpitz" would be transferred at 0600 on 15 October.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 179 F I sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops, for information Naval Chief Command, Norway, Operations Staff:

"1. Captain U-boats, Norway has promised 6 U-boats as remote escort for the transfer of the "Tirpitz" on 15 October.

2. It is intended to dispatch U 315 (Zoller) immediately to evacuate the important transmitter from Northern Waters Radio Repeater Station, Vardö.

Request approval of 1. and 2."

E. Survey of the situation:

Re D:

The U-boats provided as escorts for 1st Battle Group can then remain at sea to form a new group for the next PQ convoy which is expected on about the 20th of this month.

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - 74° 30' N, 30° E - 74° 40' N, 18° E - Banak from 0700 to 1126, nothing to report, almost exhaustive, enemy not sighted.
1 BV 138 on shipping reconnaissance, route Billefjord - 74° N, 22° E - 74° N, 31° E - Kirkenes from 0911 to 1125. Operation abandoned in AC 4897 because of lack of cloud cover, nothing to report.
1 Ju 88 on diverging search patrol in the sea area 70° N, 33° E - 69° N, 42° E - 70° 30' N, 42° E - 70° 30' N, 42° E - 71° N, 34° E from 1000 to 1550. Total area examined with radar, no location.
1 Ju 88 on diverging search patrol, route Kaamanen - Vardö - AC 8541 - 6716 - 2647 - 8171 - Berlevaag - Kaamanen from 1200 to 1515, exhaustively examined by visual reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer 4:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological reconnaissance west of the Faeroes from 0616 to 1247. Faeroes examined, enemy not sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on meteorological reconnaissance, route Tromsö - AA 9364 - Trondheim from 0527 to 1721. Route 95% examined, enemy not sighted.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Pummanki/Varangerfjord area: 8 M.T.B.s and probably 2 others.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: 2 minesweepers.
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 2 minesweepers.
Russian radio traffic: slight.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.

U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.
U 636 AC 13 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 771, 997 Hammerfest,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 956, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 307, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 69.

2100 U 315 put in to Vardö from Hammerfest, at 2300 put out for Hammerfest.

0320 U 365 passed point "H" on passage from Tromsö to AB 31.

0005 U 737 passed Lödingen, at 0530 passed Harstad, at 1200 put in to Narvik again.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

0325 Radio message 2100/82 received from group "Fuchs":

"To Captain U-boats.

1. Grid squares 8821, 22, 24, 25, 27 (?), 28 (?), 50, 60, 8940 free of mines.

2. Anti-submarine forces (M.T.B.s) with torpedoboat, armed steam trawler, large cutter lying stopped in the outer bay up to 15 miles off the coast. Aircraft by day.

3. No surface locations.

4. Suspect surface listening station on the coast.

5. On the night of 30 September traffic off Teriberski, course southeast, all lights on.

6. Lights out since 5 October.

7. Inexact navigation because of lack of landmarks, bad visibility conditions landwards.

8. Schnorchel possibilities slight to date."

1916 Radio message 1807/762 sent:

"To group "Fuchs" from Captain U-boats.

1. Report received.

2. Continue to patrol Kola Bay and approaches unobserved.

3. No further attempt is to be made against the battleship until the results of new air reconnaissance are transmitted; then surface immediately using the new moon to get round Salny boom."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 387 (Büchler) transporting meteorological shore transmitter "Erich" to Alexandra Land.

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Helhus" to Hope Island.

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoy "Ernst" on the East Shelf off Iceland.

U 315 (Zoller) on transport passage to evacuate radio gear from Vardö.

2126 Radio message 2037/767 sent:

"To "Zoller" from Captain U-boats.
Put in to Hammerfest, not Tromsö. Unload sets on to "Black Watch". Then at immediate readiness in Hammerfest."

It was intended that the U-boat would thus be ready again more quickly for operations against convoys.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since there was no information regarding "Brünner" and he had not yet responded to the request to report his position immediately, radio message 2019/766 was sent:

2117 " "Brünner": put in to Andfjord - Narvik at 1500 on 16 October if transmitter is unserviceable."

The following orders were sent in Most Secret 5271 F I:

Sailing order for U 310 (Ley),
Sailing order for U 968 (Westphalen),
Sailing order U 995 (Hess),
Sailing order U 737 (Brasack),
see Appendix I/2.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

Nothing to report.

D. Plans:

Teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 1288 received from Naval Chief Command, Norway:

"Operation of 12 "Bibers" (midget submarines) intended against battleship of "R" class which has been repeatedly confirmed in Vaenga Bay. (Covername: operation "Cäsar"). For the operation, Small Battle Units Command requires the transfer of 3 U-boats to the most northerly repair ship (Hammerfest). It is requested that 3 U-boats be ready to operate, each in conjunction with 4 "Bibers". Operation planned for approximately the end of October. Request decision at once."

E. Survey of the situation:

1138 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5670 received from Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, Third Division (Koralle):

"Enemy situation telegram. Naval distribution. Subject: convoy traffic between Britain and Russia (PQ and QP traffic).
In the supply traffic between Britain and Russia which has begun to run again after a 4 months' break since mid-August 1944, two pairs of convoys have run with an interval of 4 weeks. PQ convoys put out from Britain about the middle of the month, QP convoys leave Murmansk towards the end of the month, 2 days after the arrival of the PQ convoy. If the departure of traffic continues in this sequence, we may expect a PQ convoy (34) to sail from Britain in mid-October and QP 31 from Murmansk at the end of October."

(Signed) Suhren.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - Bear Island - 74° 30' N, 30° E - Banak from 0700 to 1130, nothing to report, not exhaustive because of weather.
1 BV 138 on shipping reconnaissance with radar, route Billefjord - AC 4156 - AC 5154 - Kirkenes from 0908 to 1210. Cut short because minimum weather requirements were not fulfilled. (Billefjord - AC 4855 - AC 5488 - Kirkenes). Area 30 - 50 km. on both sides of the route was exhaustively examined with radar, no locations.
1 Ju 88 on diverging search patrol in the sea area AC 8584 - AW 2333 - AC 9519 - AC 8286 from 0610 to 1115. Area exhaustively examined with radar, no locations.
1 Ju 88 on diverging search patrol in the sea area AC 8463 - AC 6716 - AC 5299 - AC 7396 from 1053 to 1500. Area exhaustively examined with radar, no locations.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. North Sea/Northern Waters area: radio messages, some of operational and very urgent priority.
Radio traffic seemed to indicate forces at sea. 42 aircraft picked up.
18th Group: lively flying activity (45 aircraft) including 11 from Iceland.

In reply to a query sent to Radio Intercept Officer with 1st Battle Group as to whether there was any information that a PQ convoy was at sea,

Most Secret 2680 was received from 1st Battle Group:

"Not definite whether PQ convoy is at sea; according to our observations it seems unlikely up to now. From recent observations, it is probable that various isolated warship groups are at sea.
To amplify yesterday's Naval High Command evaluation, Radio Intelligence Section is

requested to issue immediately special features of radio traffic from British home area to Archangel and Murmansk and vice versa. To date, no special observations on escort and carrier wavelengths. Observations are transmitted immediately. According to earlier experiences, convoys maintain radio silence until first contact with the enemy."

2. Pummanki/Varangerfjord area: 10 M.T.B.s.
Iokanka area: destroyer "P", 1 guardship and 3 minesweepers.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyer "K".
Belushya/Kara Sea area: 1 minelayer and 3 minesweepers.
Russian radio traffic: moderate.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.

U 636 AC 13 on special operation.
U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 293, 711, 997 Hammerfest,
U 310, 312, 363, 425, 668, 956, 965, 968, 992, 995, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 307, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 387 proceeding from Hammerfest to AF 69.
U 365 proceeding from Tromsö to AB 31.

0900 Put out from Hammerfest: U 293 for AC 7186.
U 771 for AC 7195.
U 997 for AC 7181.

0800 U 737 put out from Narvik, at 1346 passed Harstad on passage to AC 7175.

1500 Put out from Narvik: U 310 for AB 9662.
U 968 for AB 9636.
U 995 for AC 7177.

U 315 proceeding from Vardö to Hammerfest.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.

1640 Radio message 1516/777 sent:

"On 14 October the following will put out from Hammerfest: U 771 (Block), U 293 (Klingspor), U 997 (Lehmann). From Narvik: U 737 (Brasack), U 995 (Hess), U 968 (Westphalen), U 310 (Ley). They will form group "Regenschirm" from AC 7195 to AB 9638."

The group was to form a defensive screen for operation "Comet" off Loppa.

2221 Radio message 2058/783 sent:

"Group "Regenschirm" from Captain U-boats.

1. During hours of daylight on 15 October, expect BV 138 on reconnaissance.

2. Task: to report and attack any enemy naval forces or aircraft approaching the coast. Expect aircraft carriers at all times. Report before attacking.

3. With immediate effect, cover radio frequency "Anton I", Northern Waters very long wave, transmitting under the 600 Series Nos."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 387 (Büchler) transporting meteorological shore transmitter "Erich" to Alexandra Land.

U 703 (Brünner) laying meteorological buoy "Ernst" on East Shelf off Iceland.

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Helhus" to Hope Island.

2040 Short signal 2026/782 received from U 636 (Schendel):

"My position is AC 1911."

This meant that the meteorological station "Helhus" had been set up according to plan.

U 315 (Zoller) on transport passage to evacuate radio gear from Vardö.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0001 Teleprinter message Most Secret 5259 F III sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Sailing order for U 293 (Klingspor), U 771 (Block), U 997 (Lehmann):

1. Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 14 October, "Lehmann" to AC 7181 right lower corner, "Klingspor" to AC 7186 upper center edge, "Block" to AC 7195 lower center edge.

2. Boats will join group "Regenschirm".

3. Positions must be occupied by 0600 on 15 October at the latest.

4. U-boat Northern Waters radio frequency, report time of sailing on "Anton I".

5. Operational Order No. 15 in force. Boats will remain submerged in their positions, surfacing only to charge batteries and take fixes."

2240 Teleprinter message Most Secret 4291 F III sent to U-boat base Hammerfest:

"Sailing order for U 315 (Zoller):

1. After unloading and refuelling, put out again for AB 56.

2. Operational Order No. 15 for Northern Waters U-boats and Northern Waters Order No. 8 in force.

3. U-boat Northern Waters radio frequency.

4. U 636 (Schendel) in AB 37, U 365 (Wedemeyer) and U 387 (Büchler) in the north, group "Regenschirm" from 14 October as in radio message 2058/783.

5. On 15 October, expect BV 138 on air reconnaissance in Bear Island passage.

6. Report time of sailing promptly on "Anton I"."

V. Reports of successes:

U 636 (Schendel) reported setting up meteorological station "Holhus" on Hope Island.

C. Surface forces: Nothing to report.

D. Survey of the situation:

0100 Teleprinter message Most Secret F I sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 13 October:

1. 3 boats on meteorological operations; of those 1 boat is at immediate readiness for convoy attacks, two will be ready by approximately 18 October.

2. 2 boats on special operations, U 313 and U 315 at immediate readiness for convoy attacks.

3. 4 boats put out from Narvik on 14 October; 3 boats sailed from Hammerfest to join group "Regenschirm" in accordance with Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops. S.O.s only. The group will form a patrol line against the PQ convoy.

4. 4 further boats will put out from Narvik on 15 October after being fitted with additional D/F equipment. Thus a total of 16 U-boats will be ready for the next PQ convoy.

5. In the light of experience, the convoy should be expected about 20 October, no clues yet."

(Signed) Suhren.

---

15 October, 1944.

A. Enemy situation:

I. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer 3:

1 BV 138 on reconnaissance from Billefjord to AC 4859 from 1028 to 1245. Operation abandoned because of lack of cloud cover. Area exhaustively examined with radar, no locations.
1 Ju 88 on meteorological and shipping reconnaissance, route Banak - 75° N, 17° E - 74° 30' N, 33° E - Banak, not exhaustive, enemy not sighted.
1 Ju 88 on diverging search patrol, route Kaamanen - AC 8192 - 5698 - 5651 - Berlevaag - Vardø - Kaamanen from 0533 to 1040. Exhaustively examined by radar, no locations.

Flieger Fuehrer 5:

1 BV 138 on reconnaissance, route Trondheim lake - AF 5629 - Trondheim from 0549 to 0915.
4 BV 138 on reconnaissance for operation "Comet" from 0540 to 1404. Reconnaissance area exhaustively examined, nothing to report.

II. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Aircraft report from U 995 (Hess),
aircraft report from U 315 (Zoller).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0650 In AF 5378 a carrier group consisting of 4 large ships in line ahead intercepted by visual reconnaissance, course north (inexact). Second ship identified as aircraft carrier. Screen of escort vessels round this formation. Range when sighted 30 - 35 km.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

1. 18th Group: moderate flying activity (26 aircraft) with greatest concentration in afternoon and evening, focal point northern North Sea. Cleethorpes transmitted 10 radio messages for North Sea/ Northern Waters area. Low priority until then. Our assumption that some naval forces were at sea was thus strengthened.

2. Pummanki area: 1 guardship and 8 M.T.B.s.
Murmansk area: destroyer "Deyatelni" and 1 minesweeper.
Gorlo Strait/Archangel area: destroyers "G", "P", "S", 1 guardship and 1 minesweeper.
Slight radio traffic.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

B. U-boats:

III. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

Group "Regenschirm":

U 310 AB 9662)
U 968 AB 9636)
U 995 AC 7177)
U 737 AC 7175) in patrol line.
U 997 AC 7181)
U 293 AC 7186)
U 771 AC 7195)

Group "Fuchs":

U 313 AC 88.

U 365 AB 31 on special operation.
U 387 AF 69 on special operation.
U 636 AC 1751 on passage for special operation.
U 703 southwest of AE 23 on special operation.

In port:

U 315 Hammerfest,
U 312, 363, 425, 668, 956, 992, 1163 Narvik,
U 278, 295, 307, 711, 739, 957 Trondheim,
U 716 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1930 U 668 put out from Narvik, at 2300 passed Lodingen on passage for Harstad.

2100 U 1163 put out from Narvik - Bogen, at 2330 passed Lödingen for Harstad.

2300 U 363, 425, 956, 965 put out from Narvik for Harstad.

0700 U 315 put into Hammerfest from Vardö, at 1200 put out again for AB 56.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 313 in attack area AC 88.
7 boats to provide escort for the transfer of the "Tirpitz" in patrol line AB 9662 to AC 7195.

0310 Radio message 0145/787 received from U 995 (Hess):

"Test diving in AB 9868: 2 electric motors clearly heard. "Ley" and "Westphalen" not possible. Continuing outward passage."

Coastal defenses were informed of the possible enemy submarines.

0835 Short signal 0831/788 received from U 995 (Hess):

"Am being attacked by aircraft. My position is AB 9626."

0926 Short signal 0925/790 received from U 995 (Hess):

"My short signal of today is canceled."

It appeared then that it was one of our own reconnaissance aircraft.

0900 Radio message 0841/789 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:
According to our air reconnaissance, the carrier formation was in AF 5378 at 0650, possibly on northerly course."

1300 Short signal 1248/796 received from U 315 (Zoller), outward bound from Hammerfest:

"Am being attacked by aircraft."

1325 Short signal 1305/797 received:

"Am being attacked by aircraft."

1328 Radio message 1248/798:

"Attacked in AC 7512 by "Catalina" with bombs and guns. No casualties. 3·7cm. gun clear with restrictions. Second aircraft at 1305 was BV 138."

1529 Radio message 1507/678 sent:

"Group "Regenschirm" from Captain U-boats: The strong carrier formation reported at 0650 in AF 5370 may be approaching. Boats within torpedo range should attack immediately without reporting; boats outside range should report at once."

As the result of a conference between Captain U-boats, Norway and Flieger Fuehrer 5, a divergent reconnaissance was planned for 16 October against the reported carrier formation.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The following are on transport assignments:

U 365 (Wedemeyer) transporting meteorological unit "Landvik" to South Spitsbergen.

U 387 (Büchler) transporting meteorological shore transmitter "Erich" to Alexandra Land.

U 636 (Schendel) transporting meteorological unit "Helhus" to Hope Island.

U 703 (Brünner) transporting meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August".

(d) Miscellaneous:

Teleprinter messages 5302 to 5307 F I sent:

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs),
Sailing order for U 1163 (Balduhn),
Sailing order for U 668 (von Eickstedt),
Sailing order for U 363 (Nees),
Sailing order for U 425 (Bentzien),
Sailing order for U 965 (Unverzagt),
see Appendix I/3.

V. Reports of successes: None.

C. Surface forces:

1420 Radio message 1245/45 received from 1st Battle Group through Naval Radio Station, Narvik:

"At 1200 the "Tirpitz" sailed with Captain, Cruisers on board."

D. Survey of the situation:

0025 Teleprinter message 5309 F I sent to Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops:

"U-boat situation in Northern Waters on 15 October:

1. German Air Force reported strong carrier formation at 0650 in AF 5370, northerly course, 4 ships, escort. Attacks off Trondheim on the Naval Signal Station.

2. As a PQ convoy is possible at the same time, available U-boats sailed for AB 50, six from Narvik, one from Hammerfest. The latter was attacked by a "Catalina" in the inner leads.

3. Group "Regenschirm" (7 boats) should probably conclude operations for operation "Comet" on 16 October.

4. U 365 (Wedemeyer) and U 387 (Büchler) on meteorological operations. U 636 (Schendel) detailed to evacuate "Edelweiss II" after landing meteorological unit "Helhus" in attack area AB 37.

5. Plan: Interception of PQ convoy by U-boats with intermediate wave D/F set and possibly by air reconnaissance provided for "Comet". Thereafter 15 to 18 boats will operate against the convoy."

(Signed) Suhren.

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APPENDIX I

Most Secret.

Sailing Orders.

1. Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler).

2. Sailing order for U 310 (Ley), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Hess), U 737 (Brasack).

3. Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs), U 1163 (Balduhn), U 668 (v. Eickstedt), U 363 (Nees), U 425 (Bentzien), U 965 (Unverzagt).

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APPENDIX I/1

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
- 5160 - F I.

On board, 8 October, 1944.

Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler).

1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 9 October with meteorological shore transmitter "Erich" via Tjeldsund - Finnsnesrennen on route "Rot" to Tromsö. Pilot from Lödingen. When passing Narvik boom, report on "MC" probable time of arrival at Tromsö.

2. Mine situation at "Schatzgräber" will be transmitted by radio to the boat (Chief Petty Officer Wieth on board for clearing of mines if required).

3. Put out as soon as possible via "SR 1", report on "Anton I" when Tromsö is passed. Proceed to Franz Josef Land (Alexandra Land) as instructed by Dr. Stöbe who will accompany you. Examine coast carefully beforehand.
If ice position does not allow you to reach Alexandra Land, transport set to the northwest coast of Novaya Zemlya. Coast to be examined particularly carefully as it is inhabited in parts (see Appendix).
Liston for set's transmissions and then commence return passage. When passing 76° N, report completion of assignment by short signal on "Anton I".

4. Operational Order No. 15 for Northern Waters U-boats in force.
Disposition against convoys possible at all times, attack in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8.

5. Radio frequency "MC" as far as Harstad, from Harstad "Anton I", from Narvik Northern Waters very long wave. U-boat Northern Waters frequency after passing "SR 1".

6. Enemy situation:

Last PQ convoy (33), not intercepted, passed north of Bear Island on approximately 22 September.
Last QP convoy (30) with 25 steamers and normal destroyer escort ran from 25 to 30 September. Convoy steered wide deception courses, at times close to the coast (50 miles). Simultaneously, a carrier formation ran on the northern convoy route to draw the U-boats to the north. Battleship "Rodney" and 1 auxiliary carrier were with the convoy.

Further convoys and carrier groups may be expected concurrently. Aircraft which have appeared with the latest convoys are:
"Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?). "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" were employed in attacks on the coast. Further, observe Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24, and 30.

7. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Special operations:

U 313 (Schweiger) in AC 88, U 636 (Schendel) proceeding to AC 13, U 703 (Brunner) laying meteorological buoys "Ernst" and "August" in the west. Officers only radio messages to group "Fuchs" have no importance for the others.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Banak to Jan Mayen and Bear Island (He 111s, Ju 88s, FW 200s, BV 138s).
Further reconnaissance will be announced.

p.p. Reche.

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Appendix I to Sailing order for U 387 (Büchler)

1. Franz Josef Land:

As far as is known, Alexandra Land is not inhabited. Russian airfields said to be on a few islands in the south or on the southeastern part of Franz Josef Land, therefore expect enemy aircraft (ice reconnaissance). Full anti-aircraft readiness must be ensured.

2. Novaya Zemlya:

Charts of the northern part of Novaya Zemlya are scarce and inadequate. Russian whalers must be expected although, according to past experience, all whaling ships have left northern Novaya Zemlya by the beginning of October.
According to the Soviet Naval publication on "Kara Sea", the following are inhabited points in the north island of Novaya Zemlya (north of Matochkin Strait):

Radio and polar stations:

Cape Jelaniya:	76° 58' N, 68° 35' E.
Russkaya Savaniya:	76° 11' N, 62° 36' E.
Matochkin Strait:	73° 15' N, 57° 23' E.
Lagernaya:	North bank of the western exit of Matochkin Strait.
Cape Stolbovi:	72° 38' N, 54° E.
Mali Karmakulski:	72° 24' N, 52° 38' E.

Places inhabited continuously or at times, apart from polar stations on the west coast:

Mityushikha Bay:	(about 73° 35' N) Hut, frequently visited by fishermen and trappers.
Melki Bay:	(about 74° N) Hut.
Krestovaya Bay:	(about 74° 12' N). Continually inhabited colony (land path over pass from here 150 meters to the east coast).
Severnaya Sulmoneva Bay:	(about 74° 30' N) Hut.
Mashigina Bay:	(about 74° 42' N) Small hut.
Sadovskogo Bay:	(about 74° 58' N) Smidovicha settlement on the southeast coast of Admiralty Peninsula.
Sosnovskogo Bay:	South coast of Admiralty Peninsula. Small hut.
Arkhangelskaya Bay:	(about 75° 54' N).
Gorbovic islands:	Huts frequently visited by fishermen and trappers.

Russkaya harbor:	Near the polar station a settlement consisting of a house, 2 barns, cookhouse and whale refinery. 1 motorboat and rowing boat available.

The bays north of Krestovaya bay and the area around Gorbovie islands and to the north of them are often visited by fishermen and trappers in the summer. Russian ice reconnaissance aircraft must be expected. Submarine reconnaissance is also possible. Since September, signal and radio stations have had orders to increase watchfulness against U-boats.
A guardship lies off Cape Jelaniya. The only enemy naval forces to be expected are very heavily armed ice-breakers.

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APPENDIX I/2

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
- 5271 - F I.

On board, 13th October, 1944.

Sailing order for U 310 (Ley), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Hess), U 737 (Brasack).

1. Put out from Narvik on 14 October. Report time of sailing on "MC".

2. Proceed through Andfjord at a distance of 50 miles from the coast to ----(see under 6(a)). Pilot from Lodingen to Tromsö.
In any encounters at night in the inner leads, set navigation lights, illuminate the bow, give warning note on steam whistle. Increased danger from submarines off Andfjord and in the formation.

3. Operational Order No. 15 for Northern Waters U-boats in force. Attack convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8. Remain unobserved in the formation; surface only to charge batteries and take fixes.

4. Radio frequency "MC" as far as Harstad, Northern Waters very long wave, from Harstad U-boat Northern Waters frequency. Radio silence except for enemy reports.

5. Enemy situation:

Last PQ convoy (33), not intercepted, passed north of Bear Island on approximately 22 September.
Last QP convoy (30) with 25 steamers and normal destroyer escort ran from 29 to 30 September. Convoy steered wide deception courses, at times close to the Norwegian coast (50 miles). Simultaneously, a carrier formation ran on the northern convoy route to draw the U-boats to the north. Battleship "Rodney" and 1 auxiliary carrier were with the convoy. Further convoys and carrier groups may be expected concurrently.
Aircraft which have appeared with the latest convoys are: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?). "Seafires", "Barracudas" and "Martlets" were employed in attacks on the coast. Further, observe Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

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6. Own forces:

(a) U-boats:

Special operations: U 703 (Brunner) in the west, U 365 (Wedemeyer), U 636 (Schendel), U 387 (Büchler) in the north, U 313 (Schweiger) in AC 88, U 315 (Zoller) returning from Vardö to Hammerfest.
The following are forming a patrol screen as group "Regenschirm": U 310 (Ley) in AB 9662 upper center edge, U 968 (Westphalen) in AB 9636 left upper edge, U 995 (Hess) AC 7177 left center edge, U 737 (Brasack) AC 7175 right center edge, U 997 (Lehmann) AC 7181 right lower corner, U 293 (Klingspor) AC 7186 upper center edge, U 771 (Block) AC 7195 lower center edge.
Group must occupy positions by 0600 on 15 October at the latest.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Tromsö and from Banak to Jan Mayen and Spitsbergen (He 111s, Ju 88s, BV 138s, FW 200s).
Observe Northern Waters Directions No. 29. Further German naval forces and aircraft will be announced.

7. This order is to be destroyed after putting in to port.

p.p. Reche.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I/3

COPY

Most Secret

Captain U-boats, Norway
Serial No. Most Secret
- 5302 and 5307 F I

On board, 15 October, 1944.

Sailing order for U 956 (Mohs), U 1163 (Balduhn), U 668 (von Eickstedt), U 363 (Nees), U 425 (Bentzien), U 965 (Unverzagt).

1. Put out from Narvik on the morning of 16 October. Report promptly on "MC".

2. Proceed through Tjeldsund - Andfjord to AB 59, U 956 to AB 9414, U 965 to AB 5724.
In any encounters at night in the inner leads, set navigation lights, illuminate the bow and give warning note on steam whistle.

3. Operational Order No. 15 for Northern Waters U-boats in force. Attack convoys in accordance with Northern Waters Order No. 8. Observe Northern Waters Directions No. 33. Remain unobserved in the formation; surface only to recharge batteries and take fixes.

4. Radio frequency "MC" as far as Harstad, Northern Waters very long wave, U-boat Northern Waters radio frequency from Harstad. Radio silence except to report main targets, first appearance of carrier-borne aircraft or if observed.

5. Enemy situation:

Last PQ convoy (33), not intercepted, passed north of Bear Island on approximately 22 September.
Last QP convoy (30) with 25 steamers and normal destroyer escort ran from 29 to 30 September.
Convoy steered wide deception courses, at times close to the Norwegian coast (50 miles). Simultaneously, a carrier formation ran on the northern convoy route to draw the U-boats to the north. Battleship "Rodney" and 1 auxiliary carrier were with the convoy. Further convoys and carrier groups may be expected concurrently. Aircraft which have appeared with the latest convoys are: "Catalinas", "Swordfish", "Fulmars", "Corsairs" (?). "Barracudas", "Seafires" and "Martlets" were employed in attacks on the coast. Observe Northern Waters Directions Nos. 22, 24 and 30.

6. Own forces:

(a) U-boats: Group "Regenschirm" in patrol screen from

Lopphavet AB 9662 to AC 7195 with the following boats:

U 310 (Ley), U 968 (Westphalen), U 995 (Hess), U 737 (Brasack), U 997 (Lehmann), U 293 (Klingspor), U 771 (Block).

In attack areas: U 636 (Schendel) AB 37, U 315 (Zoller) proceeding to AB 56.

Special operations: U 703 (Brünner) in the west, U 365 (Wedemeyer), U 387 (Büchler) in the north.

(b) German Air Force:

Daily meteorological flights from Trondheim or Tromsö and from Banak to Jan Mayen and Spitsbergen (He 111s, Ju 88s, BV 138s, FW 200s). Observe Northern Waters Direction No. 29. Further German naval forces and aircraft will be announced.

7. This order is to be destroyed after putting in to port.

p.p. Reche.

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APPENDIX II.

Most Secret.

Short reports.

1. Short report from U 997 (Lehmann), third operation.
2. Short report from U 956 (Mohs), seventh operation.
3. Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), sixth operation.
4. Short report from U 312 (Nikolay), fourth operation.
5. Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer), third Northern Waters operation, sixth part-operation.
6. Short report from U 968 (Westphalen), fourth operation.
7. Short report from U 737 (Brasack), eighth operation.
8. Short report from U 315 (Zoller), sixth operation.
9. Short report from U 387 (Büchler), eighth operation,
10. Short report from U 636 (Schendel), tenth operation.
11. Short report from U 668 (von Eickstedt), third operation.
12. Short report from U 363 (Nees), third operation.
13. Short report from U 965 (Unverzagt), third operation.
14. Short report from U 992 (Falke), third operation.
15. Short report from U 310 (Ley), second operation.
16. Short report from U 293 (Klingspor), first operation.
17. Short report from U 739 (Mangold), fifth operation.
18. Short report from U 278 (Franze), fifth operation.
19. Short report from U 307 (Herrle), ninth operation.
20. Short report from U 711 (Lange), ninth operation.
21. Short report from U 957 (Schaar), sixth operation.

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APPENDIX II/1

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret:

Short report from U 997 (Lehmann), third operation.

14 September, 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
2 October	Put in to Narvik.
16 - 30 September	Attack areas with group "Grimm" in Bear Island passage and to the east.
25 September	At noon in AB 6924 proceeding to new attack area, submerged from large land-based aircraft, course east, range 15,000 meters, unobserved, no location.
From 30 September	At 0055 operated on QP convoy. As we were more than 250 miles astern of the convoy when "Ley" first reported it, operated on stragglers. At 0300 submerged from attacking flying boat ("Sunderland"). At 1700 operated on "Bentzien"'s convoy report. Shadowed battleship or carrier formation from 1900 to 2100. Last seen in AB 4789, course 290°, speed approximately 25 knots. During the night searched unsuccessfully for convoy to the southwest.
1 October	Broke off operations early, as the taking of hydrophone bearings and any unobserved underwater attacks were impossible, apparently because of very

loud rattling of radio receiver even at slowest submerged speed. Cannot be remedied with equipment on board.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed operation with no opportunity for attack.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5039 - F Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/2

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 956 (Mohs), seventh operation.

14 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded to AC 4773.
From 16 September	In group "Grimm" west and east of Bear Island passage.
29 September	At 0330 in AC 5734 faint hydrophone bearing, 150°. Half an hour later large silhouette in periscope, probably carrier, range 4,000 meters, northwesterly course, enemy bow left, angle 90°, high speed. Otherwise nothing to be seen in the dusk. Hydrophone bearing: 2 destroyers making a sawing noise, 1 piston noise. id not attack as torpedo was not ready quickly enough. At 0535 in AC 5734 alarm because of "Swordfish", range 7,000 meters. At 0652 in AC 5734 alarm because of aircraft. Range 10,000 meters, type not identified. At 2036 in AC 5733 operated on "Ley"'s report of convoy in AC 4526.
30 September	At 1641 in AB 9368, U 425 (Bentzien) reported convoy in AC 7710. Hauled ahead for night attack, no contact.

1 October	In patrol line from AB 5816 to 8669. At 0215 alarm because of aircraft (engine noise of BV 138). At 1241 in AB 8965 alarm because of aircraft, range 7,000 meters, (probably flying boat). At 1804 in AB 8666 2 vessels bearing 100°, range 5,000 meters enemy bow left, angle 30° (motor minesweeper type, probably minelayers) approaching. Alarm. Hydrophone pursuit with location by explosive soundings. At 2341 broke off convoy operations in AB 8666.
2 October	Put in to Harstad.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Having little experience of convoys, the commander missed a good chance of success on 29 September by not being ready to fire; on 30 September he gave up an excellent attacking position by postponing attack and did not maintain contact, so that convoy was lost by the only shadower and escaped unattacked.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5063 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/3

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Teleprinter message:

Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 425 (Bentzien), sixth operation.

14 September 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded to AC 4146.
From 16 September	West and east of Bear Island passage with group "Grimm".
26 September	Attack area AC 5640, depth of sweep 50 miles. Nothing sighted, unobserved.
29 September	At 2240 hauled ahead at maximum speed, course 250°, to act on "Ley"'s convoy report. 200 miles astern.
30 September	At 1641 convoy sighted in AC 4775: 2 heavy units, probably "Rodney" and heavy cruiser with 4 destroyers 5 miles ahead of the convoy. 26 units were counted. Shadowed until 2140. Then lost contact at nightfall in AB 9386 when formation made a sharp deviation to the north. Mean convoy course was 230°, speed 10 knots.
1 October	Until 0225 searched on various courses at maximum speed. No hydrophone bearings, nothing sighted. Hauled ahead to the west. At 1340 joined patrol line AB 8623.
1 October	Operation broken off. Returned.

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Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

In spite of lying far astern, maintained contact with the enemy by operating energetically, reported well. Well-executed operation by reliable commander, even although he had no opportunities to attack.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5064 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/4

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff; First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret:

Short report from U 312 (Nikolay), fourth operation.

7 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
2 October	Put in to Narvik.
8 September	In AB 9520 submerged unobserved from "Liberator".
9 - 30 September	In reconnaissance areas with group "Grimm".
30 September and 1 October	Operated on QP convoy. At the outset we were too far astern and had to break off operations at noon on 1 October because of fuel shortage. No contact was made. Nothing sighted, no locations.

Experience with 3·7 cm. gun: Spring to the cocking handle repeatedly jumped over the thrust block which is too short. Fault corrected by welding knob to the thrust block.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Operation carried out correctly, but with no chances to attack, as the boat did not reach the convoy.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5065 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/5

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 365 (Wedemeyer), sixth part-operation (third in Northern Waters): QP 30.

28 September 1944 Put out from Narvik.

3 October Put in to Narvik.
Made for AC 43.

29 September From 1100 high cruising speed. At 2200 "Ley" reported convoy in AC 4526 at 1520. My position was AC 4754. Until 0100 on 30 September operated unsuccessfully against convoy, then hauled ahead to position line AB 8275. In AB 8333 received report from "Bentzien" of convoy in AC 4775 at 1700. Operated on it unsuccessfully until 1116 on 1 October, assuming enemy course to be 260° to 230°. Finally made for patrol line AB 5898.

2 October At 0000 commenced return passage to Narvik. Suspect that enemy locating aircraft were operating at night also in order to guide the convoy past U-boats without themselves attacking. Focal point of location was on 29 September from 1800 to 2000 in AB 9332 to 6993 and on 30 September from 1900 to 2330 in AB 9117 to 9168.
No hydrophone bearings, own radar set broke down, beyond repair.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed operation, but no contact was made owing to lack of information.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 5100 F Ops.

APPENDIX II/6

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 968 (Westphalen), fourth operation: QP 30.

24 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via AB 68 to AC 4366, group "Zorn".
29 September	From 2015 operated on QP convoy in AC 4460, hauled ahead to north, no contact.
30 September	New convoy position AC 7110. Ordered to operate. At 1838 in AC 6712 alarm because of "Swordfish" at A - 20, 1 depth charge nearby. Smoke float at place of submerging. Aircraft circled for 20 minutes. 10 minutes after surfacing sighted aircraft on course to buoy, unobserved. Alarm. No location although it was almost dark.
1 October	At 0300 all-round listening in AC 9290, no results, operated on enemy course of 250° and hauled ahead. Saw two of our own U-boats. From 0800 made long legs to search for any stragglers. At 1100 changed position with "Ley". At 1230 set off to position line as ordered. At 2200 reached AC 8310.
2 October	At 0000 ordered to break off operations. Returned to Andfjord.

Experiences:

While at maximum speed, "Tunis" can be used only in sea up to force 2. This is because of its weight and size, otherwise the installation stood the test. "Hohentwiel" badly missed. Rod aerial necessary for first sighting report from underwater position line.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Convoy operation with no contact. U-boat operated to the north from position astern, as the commander considered "Bentzien"'s report of convoy far south as improbable.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5101 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/7

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 737 (Brasack), eighth operation: QP 30.

16 September	Put out from Trondheim.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
17 - 19 September	In patrol line with group "Feuer" from AF 5684 to 5895. 2 "Fliege" locations on the night of 18/19 September.
19 September	Proceeded to Narvik.
21 September	Put in to Narvik.
22 September	Put out again for Tromsö.
24 September	Put out from Tromsö for attack area AC 5722, group "Grimm". No contact with the enemy.
26 September	AC 5821.
28 September	At 1049 sighted flying boat. Submerged unobserved.
29 September	At 0218 location on "Fliege".
29 September - 2 October	Operated against westbound convoy.
30 September	At 1500 fog bank (artificial?) ahead. When "Bentzien" reported the convoy in AC 4775 at 1658 on 30 September, we lay due north of it. Hauled ahead for night attack. No contact with the enemy.

2 October — Ordered to break off operations, returned to Narvik.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Incorrect tactics in this case. When the convoy was reported in his vicinity, the commander did not immediately push ahead to make contact, but believing the naval and air escorts near the convoy to be too strong, tried to reach a forward position by circling the escort. The correct reaction should have been that if other boats could manage it, so could U 737. The convoy was thus able to escape from the only shadower by deviating in the evening.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5103 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/8

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 315 (Zoller), sixth operation: QP 30.

28 September 1944 Put out from Narvik.

3 October Put in to Hammerfest.

Proceeded to AC 82 and 86.

29 September Proceeded at high cruising speed to AC 8860. At 2251 operated at maximum speed on convoy reported by "Ley" in AC 4526.

30 September At 0410 in AB 9324 "Fliege" location becoming louder at times. Submerged first to A, then to various depths, to listen for convoy which must be in the vicinity. Short repair to Diesel. No hydrophone bearing.
At 0605 in AB 9325 at periscope depth. Land-based aircraft bearing 070° to 120°, flying up and down, range 400 - 800 meters, medium altitude. In AB 9321 circling carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 110 to 125°. Assume that it is the forward escort of a convoy or a carrier formation as depth charges were coming from the same direction.
At 1015 aircraft lost to sight.
At 1030 hydrophone bearing, we then stopped.
At 1105 one of our U-boats, course 250°, slight speed, surfaced showing broad silhouette. Proceeded westward at maximum speed.

At 1158 ordered by radio to proceed to position line from AB 8169 to 8524 on 1 October. Made for AB 8271.
At 1353 2 aircraft in AB 6898 (type not identified), bearing 190°, range 18,000 meters, medium altitude, flying past. Remained on the surface.
At 1550 carrier-borne aircraft, bearing 340°, range 15,000 meters, flying past. Remained on the surface.
At 1755 operated on report from "Bentzien" that convoy was in AC 7110. Hauled ahead of convoy's reported course.
At 2234 "Bentzien" lost contact. Hauled ahead at maximum speed.

1 October

At 0300 submerged to listen on hydrophones. No hydrophone bearings. According to hydrophone bearing from "Ley", we must have passed close to the convoy in AB 9258. Pressed on to the northwest.
At 0635 "Ley" reported destroyer in AB 8545. Went on to 210°, then altered course to 240°. 1 Diesel broke down for 3 hours.
At 1330 made for patrol [illegible] position in AB 5894 as ordered.
At 2400 commenced return passage to Hammerfest as ordered.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway.

Well-executed convoy operation, but no contact or success owing to lack of sufficient information on the convoy's course.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5118 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/9

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 387 (Büchler), eighth operation.

28 September 1944	Put out from Trondheim.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Moved from Trondheim to Narvik.
30 September - 2 October	Operated on QP 30. After "Bentzien" had lost contact in AB 9386, searched until 1300 on 1 October in AB 9495. Enemy not sighted. Good results with "Tunis", several locations recorded. No new information.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

No contact owing to lack of information on the convoy's courses.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5117 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/10

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 636 (Schendel), tenth operation: QP 30.

25 September 1944	Put out from Tromsö.
2 October	Put in to Harstad.
	Proceeded via AC 43 to AC 4319, group "Zorn".
25 - 29 September	Nothing sighted.
29 - 30 September	Operated on "Ley"'s report of convoy in AC 4526. Hauled ahead to the north. Nothing sighted.
30 September - 1 October	Operated on "Bentzien"'s report of convoy in AC 4775.
30 September	At 1925 drove off "Swordfish" in AB 6491. No damage, otherwise nothing sighted.
1 - 2 October	Group "Grimm" in AB 8387. Nothing sighted.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

No contact, no success owing to lack of information on the convoy's courses.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5119 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/11.

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 668 (v. Eickstedt), third operation. ("Grimm", "Schwefel", "Zorn").

14 September 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
3 October	Put in to Narvik - Bogen.
	Proceeded to AC 4773 ("Grimm").
15 September	Attack area AC 4495.
16 September	AB 6995.
17 September	Proceeded via Lopphavet to Alta ("Schwefel").
18 September	Put in to Kaafjord.
18 - 25 September	In Altafjord to escort Battle Group. At 1430 put out for AC 45.
27 September	At 2200 reached patrol line in AC 4361 ("Zorn").
28 September	At 2030 returned to Hammerfest to disembark sick Watch Officer.
29 September	At 1850 in attack area AC 4930, acting on "Mohs"'s aircraft carrier report.
30 September	At 1300 Watch Officer transferred to escort at approach point. Continued to operate on QP convoy. At 1800 enemy submarine in AC 7173.

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1 October	At 1800 reached AB 8345 in patrol line ("Grimm").
1 - 2 October	Nothing sighted or heard on hydrophones apart from our own U-boats. At 0600 returned to Narvik.

Mines (Mark XX.): On 16 September AB 6995, 18 September 7435, 29 September AC 4838 (Russian aircraft or submarine mine), 2 October AB 8682.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Convoy operation with no contact owing to lack of information.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5120 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/12

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret:

Short report from U 363 (Nees), third operation: QP 30.

28 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded to operational area AC 43.
29 September	Proceeded at high speed to AC 4980. At 1600 "Fliege" location in AC 4878, submerged, 30 minutes later 35 distant deterrent depth charges at intervals of 3 to 5 minutes. At 2000 operated on report from "Ley" of convoy in AC 4526.
30 September	"Fliege" location in AB 6995, submerged. At 1309 set course for new position line AB 8169 to 8524. At 1820 operated on "Bentzien"'s report of convoy in AC 4775.
1 October	Hauled ahead on probable convoy course as far north as 70° N. At 1612 set course for patrol line in AB 8232.
2 October	Arrived at 0015. Commenced return passage to Narvik. No attack followed location, submerged to remain unobserved. No aircraft seen during the operation.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Convoy operation with no contact owing to lack of information.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5121 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/13

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Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval Chief Command, Norway, Ops. Staff.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 965 (Unverzagt), third operation, ("Edelweiss II", QP 30).

19 August 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Moved to Tromsø to take on mines, then on to Hammerfest.
22 August	Attacked off Hammerfest by fighter ("Martlet"). 3 dead, 8 wounded. Minelaying operation broken off.
1 September	Returned to Narvik via Tromsø to unload mines.
8 September	Put out from Narvik. Operation "Goldschmied". Moved to Tromsø.
16 September	Group "Schwefel" at disposal of Battle Group and Commandant, Altafjord.
22 September	Moved to Tromsø. At readiness for "Edelweiss II".
26 September	Put out from Tromsø to AB 28 to AH 89 with meteorological survey ship "Exerstein". Nothing sighted, no locations. (Ice limit - East Greenland).

29 September	At 0230 left meteorological ship in AH 8997 in strong drift ice, steered further on mean course of 300°.
30 September	As QP convoy was reported, made for AB 45 without stopping.
1 October	Joined group "Grimm", operated on QP convoy. No enemy contact. No enemy locations.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Simple escort duty.

2. Did not reach QP convoy because of the distance involved.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5144 - F 1.

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APPENDIX II/14

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Northern Waters.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 992 (Falke), third operation: QP 30.

13 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Hammerfest.
4 October	Put in to Narvik.
13 - 26 September	Set up meteorological shore transmitter "Walter" on Jan Mayen. No contact with the enemy.
27 - 29 September	Security boat for reconnaissance flight in AB 5483.
30 September - 3 October	Operated on QP convoy and in patrol line in group "Zorn".
30 September	At 1248 "Swordfish" in AB 6759. Unobserved. Alarm. Aircraft twice crossed our course while we were at periscope depth. At 1257 hydrophone bearing, 040°. After deviation, steered collision course. Deterrent depth charges in series continuously. At 1450 2 destroyers of "Jervis" and "K" or "N" classes in AB 6764, course 260°, speed 3 - 4 knots. One with noise box, often switched off for short time. At 1540 lay between 2 destroyers at periscope depth. Fan-of-three not clear. Curve shot promises no success. Still a broad noise band, bearing 000° - 070°. Suspect convoy. Therefore

pressed through the escort unobserved without attacking. At 1645 in AB 6729, 3 destroyers made off to the northwest, then no more hydrophone bearings. At 1955 in AB 8729 operated on convoy report from "Bentzien", convoy course 230° - 250°. Enemy not sighted. "Tunis" functioned throughout operation, no location picked up.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Well executed landing operation.

2. Operation on QP convoy brought no contact or success owing to the slight information on the convoy courses. In accordance with the order no attack was made on the 2 destroyers because the commander assumed with justification that the convoy was still astern.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5148 - F Ops.

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APPENDIX II/15

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 310 (Ley), second operation.

25 September 1944	Put out from Narvik.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via AC 45 to AC 4328 to join group "Zorn".
29 September	En route, hydrophone bearing of 085° at 1400 in AC 4526. At 1531 2 destroyers, bearing 090°, angle on the bow 0°. Turned towards them. At 1600 convoy some 10,000 meters off, "Rodney" ahead, aircraft carrier astern with the convoy, leading ships already bearing 060°. Observed too late as attack was first planned on destroyers which were far away, providing the convoy's escort on the starboard bow. At 1627 3 associated single shots on 3 overlapping steamers, angle on the bow 80°, range 5,000 meters. 2 explosions after 3 minutes 2 seconds and 3 minutes 7 seconds. Destroyer of escort on starboard quarter turned towards us. Quickly dived to 2A then fired blind curve shot from tube V, missed. From 1640 to 1816 single depth charges. Asdic, broad sawing noise. At 1956 surfaced. Steamer burning in the northwest, fire then put out, destroyers nearby. Pursued them on course 270°. At 2020 sent convoy report.

At 2155 "Wanze" location, started 2 "Aphrodites".

30 September — At 0733 "Swordfish" flew towards us from misty horizon, drove it off.
At 0746 alarm, 2 bombs at A + 10, no casualties.
At 0819 hydrophone bearing, 000°. 2 destroyers in line ahead, angle on the bow 0°. Curve shot, angle on the bow 60°, range 2,000 meters, missed. From 0850 to 1041 single depth charges.
At 1200 surfaced in AB 6685. Continued on course 270°. Assume convoy to be in the north.
At 1358 4 carrier-borne aircraft, submerged.
At 1646 operated on "Bentzien"'s report of convoy in AC 7110.

1 October — Heard destroyer and 2 piston engines in hydrophones, bearing 090° and 190°, at 0126 and 0144.
Operated on convoy course of 230°.
At 0805 heard nothing more, with "Westphalen" found nothing to the west and east.
At 1226 ordered to form new patrol line from AB 5816 to 8689 with 16 other boats.
At 2247 ordered to break off convoy operations and put in to Narvik.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

U-boat's first convoy operation carried out with good fortune and skill. Successes: 1 steamer sunk, 1 steamer probably hit. Discovery of motor rescue vessel by "Herrle" confirms that at least 1 steamer (Liberty) was sunk.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5155 - F Ops.

APPENDIX II/16

COPY

Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 293 (Klingspor), first operation: BP 30.

26 September 1944	Put out from Harstad.
4 October	Put in to Hammerfest.
26 September	Proceeded to patrol line AC 4366 - 4232, group "Zorn".
30 September	Operated from AC 4776 on "Ley"'s report of convoy in AC 4526. At 1808 operated on southerly course from AB 6985 on convoy reported by "Bentzien" in AC 4775. After contact was lost searched on northwesterly courses.
1 October	At 1534 in AB 9248. Made for AB 8388 at maximum speed to form patrol line with group "Grimm".
2 October	Broke off operations as ordered in AB 9174. Nothing sighted, no hydrophone bearings or locations. Returned to Hammerfest.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

No contact made with the enemy owing to lack of sufficient information on convoy courses and late reception of radio messages.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5159 - F 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/17

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 739 (Mangold), fifth operation ("Greif")

2 August 1944	Put out from Narvik.
1 November	Put in to Hammerfest.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded through AF 88 to attack area AT 67 and 64.
12 August	At the eastern entrance to Matochkin Strait, no traffic, ice.
16 August	At 0955 in AT 6847 and at 1640 in AT 6761, submerged from "Catalina". At 2223 in AT 6725 sighted escort vessel, lost her in fog.
23 August	At 0941 in AT 6727 "Catalina". At 1956 in AT 6432 escort vessel, tacking sharply, was not able to fire.
25 August	At 0739 in AT 6473 submerged from "Catalina".
1 September	Proceeded to AS 4331.
3 September	At 1150 in AS 1998 met "Franz". At 1256 submerged from "Catalina". At 1435 in AS 4332 avoided fan-of-four. At 1450 submerged from flying boat.
4 September	Torpedo in tube V not clear, discharged it, continued eastward.

5 September	At 1635 in XA 7463 hydrophone bearing. At 1744 in XA 7541 curve shot missed destroyer of "Grosny" class on northeasterly course.
6 September	6 hours of explosions off Kravkova (depth charges aimed at U 362 (Franz)?)
7 - 11 September	Proceeded to AF 80 to send situation report.
12 September	Met "Franze" off Belukha islet.
16 September	Met "Lange", "Schaar", "Franze". Proceeded eastward.
18 September	At 1555 4 escort vessels in XA 5945. While hauling ahead, unfortunately went into an ice field. Tubes III and IV not clear.
20 September	Met "Lange" and "Schaar" off Belukha.
21 September	At 1148 in XA 7382 submerged from "Catalina". At 1710 operated on convoy report from "Lange".
22 September	At 1027 in XA 4987 westbound convoy. At 2149 in XA 7169 curve shot missed freighter. Depth charges in the distance.
24 September	At 0901 sank an escort boat in AS 2723. Boat hit by 1 curve shot, 1 T III torpedo: 1 curve shot, 1 T III torpedo miss. "Catalina" over escort boat.
27 September	At 0805 met "Lange" and "Schaar" in AS 2417. Commenced return passage.
5 August	Drifting mines in AC 4932.
7 August	Drifting mines in AC 6123.
	"Hohentwiel" cable reeved again after 14 days in spite of being renewed before sailing.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Reliable commander carried out an efficient shallow water operation despite difficult navigational and ice conditions.
2. Torpedo failure probably caused by vibrations in the ice and lower water temperatures or even by layering and echo effect.
   Successes: 1 escort boat sunk.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5163 - F 1.

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APPENDIX II/18

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Most Secret.

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 278 (Franze), fifth operation, ("Greif", "Grimm").

2 August 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
2 October	Put in.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
2 - 12 August	Proceeded via AF 88 to Kara Sea.
12 August	In AT 8371 single-engined Russian flying boat approached from low cloud, no location. 3·7 cm. gun temporarily out of action. Drove it off with twin guns.
13 - 31 August	In attack area off Yugorski Strait (AT 85). Scarcely any traffic. 2 steamers and a few small vessels sighted. Suspected minefield off Beli point to the east found to be confirmed.
24 August	In AT 6568 came upon a destroyer of "Uritski" class and 2 escort vessels in the darkness. Underwater night attack on destroyer, at 2351 curve shot missed. Presumably the vessel made a turn of 90° after hearing the shot on hydrophones. 12 medium depth charges at 2A + 20. No casualties.
1-5 September	Proceeded to sea area around Nona Islands via position lines I (AS 1982) and II (XA 7185).

6 September	Dropped anchor in a bay of the Kravkovo Islands. Look-out periscope camouflaged as light buoy . After a short time minesweeper approached. Left island. From 0916 to 1306, 31 explosions were heard in the southwest. (U 362 (Franz)?)
8 September	Tried to reach Kravkovo again in the morning, driven away by a cruising MO-boat. Stayed in the area until 11 September, daily patrols by MO-boats, once "Catalina".
9 September	Landing operation on Rignes Island to destroy suspected radio station, which we found abandoned (camp site, wooden mast, dry batteries lying around). Withdrew quickly as 2 patrol vessels were on the other side of the island, one of them close to the land.
12 September	Met "Mangold" as ordered off Belukha islets and, after a conference, occupied attack area XA 7310.
16 September	Met "Lange", "Schaar", "Mangold" off Belukha islets and, after a conference, proceeded to Kara Sea shipping route.
23 September	Occupied attack areas AT 6420 and 6430.
24 September	Returned to carry out ice reconnaissance as ordered.
25 September	Confirmed ice limit in AF 8388. Made for AC 45.
26 September	Joined group "Grimm", reached attack area AC 6744 on 28 September.
29 September	At 1930 ceased to operate against QP 30 because of lack of fuel.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Well-executed, efficient operation in shallow water by reliable commander, no successes.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5164 - F 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/19

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 307 (Herrle), ninth operation, ("Haudegen").

10 September 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
4 October	Put in to Hammerfest.
7 October	Put in to Narvik.
10 September	Proceeded from Hammerfest with meteorological survey ship "Busch" east of Spitsbergen and around Nordaustland to Rijpfjord.
14 September	Reconnaissance and setting-up of meteorological station "Haudegen" in Rijpfjord.
17 September	Reconnaissance of northeastern bays and setting-up of alternative camps: Walenbergfjord, Albrecht Bay, Duvefjord.
23 - 27 September	In Rijpfjord supporting the setting-up of the camp. Set off with meteorological ship "Busch".
28 September	Proceeded to Liefdefjord. Returned via Raudfjord, Sorgfjord, Hinlopen Strait, Hope Island.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

Meteorological operation carried out according to plan by reliable U-boat, no enemy encounters.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5181 - F 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/20

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Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 711 (Lange), ninth operation ("Greif").

7 September 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
3 October	Put in to Hammerfest.
4 October	Put in to Narvik.
7 September	Proceeded to Kara Sea via AF 88 to group "Greif". At 2125 submerged in AC 4892 as a "Fliege" location became stronger.
11 September	At 1600 from AT 3212, proceeded submerged to Jelaniya Radio Station, no vessels intercepted there.
13 September	In XA 7450 searched the northerly sea route between Rignes and Belukha islet for enemy traffic.
15 September	In XA 7536 sighted Soviet guardship No. 25, escort boat type. Range 14 miles, southwesterly course, speed approximately 14 knots. Hauled ahead as far as Kaminskogo Island, vessel lost to sight in bad visibility.
15 September	In XA 7561 on return passage along the patrol route close to the coast, sighted radio station and building in 75° 38·7' N, 91° 30' E. A nearby bay was an auxiliary anchorage for patrol vessels.

16 September — In XA 7532 met group "Greif" off Belukha. Refuelled U 739. Decided that 3 U-boats would make a thrust to Wilkitzki Strait and further east, group radio frequency with radio procedure like that of the Russians.

17 - 18 September — North winds had brought a lot of ice off Russki Island and in Wilkitzki Strait. New ice. Damaged by ice: forward periscope, all-round dipole and 3·7 cm. anti-aircraft gun. Returned with group "Greif" to Belukha.

20 September — At 0754 in XA 7532 "Catalina" in the northwest. Range 20,000 meters, westerly course, unobserved.
At 0830 met "Schaar" and "Mangold". Refuelled from "Schaar" whose boat had suffered greater ice damage.
At 1600 made for radio station on Cape Sredni, no vessels in Eklips bay.

21 September — North of Russki. Drift ice and new ice forming.
At 0632 in XA 5757 stern curve shot fired at patrol vessel of 800 tons, speed 9 knots, enemy bow left, angle 60°, range 1,800 meters, torpedo went in the direction of the hydrophone bearing, blowing-head failure after 4 minutes. Missed. Went in pursuit.
At 1000 in XA 5781, submerged off Russki radio station, as it was known to be an approach point. 6 escort vessels from the northwest, angle on the bow 0°. Steam trawler in the southeast, no convoy. Attacked the probable search group.
At 1048 stern curve shot fired at twin-funnelled destroyer or torpedoboat, angle on the bow 0°, speed 9 knots, range 1,800 meters, depth-setting 4 meters. Torpedo ran in direction of hydrophone bearing, no explosion, missed.
At 1050 bow curve shot fired at vessel of steam trawler type, enemy bow right, angle 20°, speed 9 knots, depth-setting 3 meters, range 1,200 meters. Ran on hydrophone bearing, after 12 minutes no explosion, missed.
At 1122 bow T3 A torpedo fired with long left loop at 3 escort vessels, enemy bow left, angle 45° - 55°, range 2,500 meters, setting for preliminary run 2,000 meters, depth-setting 4 meters. Aimed at middle vessel. No explosion, missed.

At 1125 bow T3 A torpedo, circling shot, fired at 2 vessels of Russian escort type in narrow formation, enemy bow right, angle 0° to 3°, range 2,300 meters, speed 8 - 9 knots, depth-setting 4 meters, setting for preliminary run 1,000 meters, allowing for enemy speed of 5 knots. Aimed at vessel on the right. No explosion, missed. Boat was passed over 4 times while at A - 55, then according to hydrophone bearings, search group made for Russki and altered course to west above us. Pursued them. Suspect from hydrophone bearings that a convoy from the east was picked up off Russki.
At 1827 in XA 5771 silhouettes in the south, westerly course, speed 9 knots, only escort vessels, radio traffic.
At 1836 altered course to east, turned towards them.
At 1849 escort vessel asked us for recognition signal by radio. Submerged.
At 1855 in XA 5771 bow curve shot fired on hydrophone bearing at 2 escort vessels, course 000°, speed 8 knots, according to dead reckoning range 800 meters, depth-setting 4 because of ice, no explosion, missed. Escort again proceeded eastward. Surfaced in ice.

22 September

At 0400 in XA 4994 2 escort vessels from the east, range 7,000 meters, speed 8 knots, disappeared again in the mist on easterly course. Presume only search groups at present.
At 0845 in XA 4986 2 escort vessels in the north again, lost to sight on northerly course, range 8 miles. Expect convoy to pass near us. From 1345 operated on convoy reported by U 957 in XA 7292. Could only make 14 knots.

23 September

Shadowed convoy from 0020.
At 0435 we lay in XA 7441. While in the convoy, a T III A torpedo proved to be a tube-runner after the bow-cap opened and was discharged at Diesel escort vessel 900 meters distant, enemy bow right, angle 65°. Circle-runner, dived quickly; at A - 44 struck the sea-bed, at the same time the torpedo exploded above us after 3 minutes 25 seconds running time, no serious damage. Boat was in the midst of the starboard escort, nothing seen because of smoke from steamers.
At 1025 in AS 2486 sighted mast top and smoke cloud in AS 2726 and reported.

At 1037 in AS 2486 probable enemy periscope, range 1,000 meters.
At 1100 mast top and smoke cloud in AS 2722.
At 1710 convoy in AS 2775, course 170°, speed 8 knots; 2 steamers, 6 escort vessels in broad formation.
At 1725 fired T III A torpedo at leading steamer of 3,500 G.R.T., range 2,500 - 3,000 meters, enemy bow right, angle 45°, speed 8 knots, long loop to the right, preliminary run 2,000 meters, depth-setting 5 meters. No explosion. Missed.
At 1728 fired T III A torpedo at second steamer of 3,000 G.R.T., enemy bow right, angle 35°, range 3,000 - 3,500 meters, speed 8 knots, preliminary run 2,500 meters, depth setting 5 meters. No explosion. Missed.
At 1735 fired bow curve shot at outer starboard escort, range 1,400 meters, angle on the bow 0°, depth-setting 5 meters, speed 9 knots, then submerged. Torpedo ran on hydrophone bearing, no explosion, missed.
Lost contact.

24 September — At 0345 in AS 2496 submerged because of approaching "Catalina", range 10,000 meters, unobserved.
At 1540 met U 957 off Scott-Hansen island. Transferred landing party for destruction of Sterlegova radio station to "Schaar".
At 2300 from XA 7571 passed Stalinza Islet and put in to the "Bay of false fire" where we safeguarded the operation from the seaward side.

25 September — In XA 7493, after successfully surprising the radio station, we rested on the sea-bed off Sterlegova. Because of the weather, it was not possible to embark before 26 September. Radio traffic maintained by Russians under the supervision of 2 members of the radio intercept group.

26 September — At 1830 the landing party from "Schaar" set Sterlegova on fire. Petrol tanks and remaining buildings were destroyed.

27 September — At 0800 in AS 2417 met "Schaar" and "Mangold" east of Isvesti Zik Island. Transferred fuel oil to "Schaar". Finally returned via AF 88 and AC 54.

3 October — At 0845, shortly after picking up the escort, a "Boston" flew towards us from the east at medium altitude, opened fire at 5,000 meters, turned away to the west.

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Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

1. Another excellent operation carried out by outstanding commander, several successes escaped him because of torpedo failures as yet unexplained.

2. More details in torpedo short report.

3. Successes: Important reconnaissance information was gained. The boat also shared in the destruction of a radio station, taking valuable prizes and prisoners.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5194 - F Ops.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II/21

COPY

Most Secret

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Emergency. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, First Division.

Emergency. For information 13th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 957 (Schaar), sixth operation ("Greif").

7 September 1944	Put out from Hammerfest.
2 October	Put in to Hammerfest.
3 October	Put in to Narvik.
	Proceeded via "AF 88 to Kara Sea.
13 - 14 September	Operated submerged off the entrance to Dikson. Sighted patrol vessels and "Catalinas". Shipping consisted of several vessels and 2 steamers.
15 September	Proceeded by the outer route to rendezvous at Belukha as ordered, group radio frequency.
16 September	Conference with "Lange", "Mangold" and "Franze". Refuelled.
17 September	Proceeded via Russki on ice-reconnaissance of Wilkitzki. Operated on eastbound convoy in XA 4998. 3 steamers, 4 escort vessels. Radio messages not heard.
18 September	Hauled ahead through icefields as far as Chelyuskin. Strong drifting ice prevents our improving attack position. Tried to approach. Curve shot exploded prematurely. Hydrophone pursuit by 4

escort vessels. Periscope unserviceable. Escaped after 7 hours, meanwhile approaching Wilkitzki. Strong drift made us stick in new ice formation.

19 September — Managed to get clear with damaged bow-caps.

20 September — Belukha: refuelled "Mangold". Decided to continue as shadower and ice reconnaissance boat. Only 2 torpedoes clear for operating as repairs to bow-caps were unsuccessful.

21 September — Escort group sailed over us. Pursued it, turned off east. Exchanged recognition signals with Russki signal station, deception successful.

22 September — Convoy sighted in XA 4978 to west. Shadowed convoy. In XA 7219 curve shot missed freighter. Unexplained miss.

23 September — In XA 7183 fired curve shot at "Grosny" class destroyer and sank it. No more tubes able to fire. Continued to shadow. Escorts observed several times in fog. As a result of continuous loading water content in oil 12%. Broke off operations.

24 September — Carried out operation at radio station at Sterlegova. Took prisoners. Captured code and cipher material. Recalled.

27 September — Returned via Jelaniya.

Comments by Captain U-boats, Norway:

The execution of reconnaissance and landing operations and the convoy attacks in shallow waters with difficult ice conditions resulted in the award of the "Knight's Cross" to the commander.

Successes:

1 destroyer sunk. Sterlegova radio station destroyed. Valuable coding information acquired and prisoners captured.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret - 5205 - F 1.